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Cover
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905:
Russian sailors abandoning a beached
warship are rescued by Japanese fishermen and naval personnel in a painting
by Henry Reuterdahl that appeared on
the cover of the 17 June 1905 issue of
Collier’s magazine. The incident is apparently imaginary (as was characteristic
of the work of Reuterdahl, who was to become famous as a World War I poster
artist); however, a tradition survives in
Japan that Russian crews were in fact
rescued in such ways. This number of
Collier’s, which appeared immediately
after the epochal battle of Tsushima (27–
29 May), printed an analysis of that engagement by Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan: “The Battle of the Sea of Japan:
A Critical Estimate of the Elements of
Togo’s Era-Making Victory” (pp. 12–13).
The Japanese commander at Tsushima,
Admiral Heihachiro Togo, observed
Mahan, had shown himself “a naval officer who, beyond all others at the moment,
can appreciate . . . the real possibilities
open to each branch of naval warfare.”
How Admiral Togo achieved such professional mastery—more broadly, how the
highest Japanese politico-military leadership performed in its first major challenge
in the global arena—are the subjects of our
lead article, by Vice Admiral Yoji Koda,
Director General of the Joint Staff Office,
Japanese Defense Agency, the equivalent
of the U.S. Deputy Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Image courtesy of the Naval War College
Museum.
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deploying ten months later to Fifth and Sixth Fleet operating areas as Air Warfare Commander (AWC) for the
USS Enterprise Strike Group. The ship was awarded the
Battle Efficiency “E” for Cruiser Destroyer Group 12.
Returning to the Pentagon and the Navy Staff, he directed the Surface Combatant Force Level Study. Following this task, he was assigned to the Plans and Policy
Division as chief of staff of the Navy’s Roles and Missions Organization. He finished his most recent Pentagon tour as a division chief in J8—the Force Structure,
Resources and Assessments Directorate of the Joint
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

Bringing the fight to our enemies is our mission. Transforming
ourselves and our great institution for the dangerous decades
ahead is our imperative. Our task: Prevail today while bridging to
a successful future.
ADMIRAL VERN CLARK, USN

THERE IS AN OLD ADAGE THAT SAYS, “If you don’t know where you are

headed, any road will take you there.” This statement highlights the
need for leaders to define a clear vision of where they want their organizations to
head, in order to direct and motivate their teams to achieve the desired
end-state. One method the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) uses to provide
the Navy with vision and direction is an annual guidance statement. The theme
of the CNO Guidance for 2005 is “Winning the fight . . . and bridging to the future.” This guidance, contained in a concise document of less than thirty pages,
provides a clear and persuasive road map for the year, and it tasks the Naval War
College to play a leading role in helping to shape the Navy’s future. In my last
President’s Forum, I outlined our three top goals. The first and foremost was to
ensure that our academic programs remain current, rigorous, and relevant. Let
me follow up—in the context of the CNO Guidance—with some of the ways in
which the College is transforming itself and its programs to ensure that all we do
continues to be relevant to our warfighters.
Not Just Change at the Margins. Admiral Clark’s 2005 Guidance calls the Navy’s
ongoing efforts to “transform ourselves and our great institution for the dangerous decades ahead” an imperative. To do this requires more than change at the
margins. On the one hand, the College—through its mission—must ultimately
serve as an instrument of change, helping the Navy at large to transform itself
into the flexible and responsive maritime force envisioned in Seapower 21. On
the other hand, to do this effectively the College itself must be transformed to respond to the evolving vision and needs of the twenty-first-century warrior. Our
existing programs and educational approach have served us well for many years,
and incremental changes have routinely been made to keep the academic
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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material current, relevant, and rigorous. It is becoming evident to many of us,
however, that more substantial changes are required to restructure our existing
courses and offer new ones to better respond to new demands and equip our future leaders to face the uncertain future. We are actively engaging the impressive
intellectual capital of the entire college community to address the several specific task areas assigned to us in the 2005 Guidance:

• Restructure the Navy’s intermediate and senior service college programs to
align them with the Professional Military Education (PME) continuum. I
have asked our department chairs to take a detailed look at the ways in
which we can refocus our academic programs to provide the Navy’s officer
and enlisted leadership with a continuum of educational opportunities
over an entire career. For our officer corps, the expectation is that specific
Professional Military Education milestones will be met at the primary level
(during their first five to seven years of service); at the intermediate level
(at eight to fourteen years of service); and at the senior level (fifteen to
twenty years of service). This three-phase approach replaces the old
paradigm in which Navy officers were rarely exposed to more than one
professional military educational experience throughout their careers. This
long-established paradigm drove us to align our intermediate-level and
senior-level curricula to cover essentially the same material, albeit in
greater depth at the senior level. In contrast, the new PME continuum will
allow us to create a sequence of courses, each of which builds upon
previously mastered learning objectives. As such, we expect to see a
significant difference in the focus of our intermediate-level College of
Naval Command and Staff course and our senior-level College of Naval
Warfare program. It is too early to know exactly how this new approach to
officer development will be implemented in detail, but we anticipate that
the future will see officers arriving at the College of Naval Command and
Staff having learned the basics of Navy and joint military operations
through our Navy Primary PME program (under development for delivery
to the fleet via distance education in January 2006). They will be better
prepared to engage in a robust study of issues that midgrade officers will
face, including military operations at the tactical/operational level. We
would then expect that a significant portion of the most promising
(postcommand) officers will have the opportunity to complete a College of
Naval Warfare program focused on the range of competencies required for
senior, strategic leadership. We have begun a careful and deliberate process
to evaluate several alternative approaches to our curricula. The goal will be
to transition to a multistep continuum of educational experiences that are
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coherent, integrated, and sequential, and that will lead to the development
of the competencies our graduates need to succeed in senior leadership
positions. Moreover, these competencies must respond to the Navy’s
Human Capital Strategy. While CNO’s guidance focuses on our
intermediate and senior curricula, the College is working to extend this
approach to enlisted and flag ranks.

• Develop a plan to improve strategic and operational planning capability on
joint and Navy staffs, afloat and ashore. We are working closely with the
Chief of Naval Operations’ Plans, Policy and Operations Division (N3/5) to
define accurately the strategic and operational planning skills that are
needed for officers serving on joint and Navy staffs. We now envision
several revised or newly created courses that will help meet the currently
unfilled demand:
• Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s (JFMCC) course for flag

officers. One of the greatest strengths of America’s armed forces is the
degree to which forces from the various military services can be rapidly
brought together and integrated into a single joint force to respond to a
broad range of national tasking. One of the challenges is the effective
command and control of these diverse forces. The Naval War College is
taking the lead in developing a specialized Joint Force Maritime
Component Commander (JFMCC) course for Navy flag officers. The
course, which will be offered for the first time this fall, will focus on
operationalizing the ForceNet pillar of Seapower 21 and developing the
comprehensive understanding of networked forces naval commanders
will need to command and control forces in the joint, coalition, and
interagency environment. Three- and four-star operational commanders,
along with several retired three- and-four-star mentors, will help us
deliver an intense, week-long curriculum focused on decision making at
the operational level of war. The result of this vital initiative will be the
more effective integration of maritime forces in future joint operations.
• The Naval Operational Planner Course (NOPC). Navy operational staffs

increasingly require officers who are not only expert in their own
platforms but properly skilled in the planning and execution of joint
and naval operations. Such competence must be employed in a rapidly
evolving, complex environment where the speed and agility of the
planning process are key to victory. Since 1999, the College’s Naval
Operational Planner Course has prepared its students to perform
effectively in planning billets on operational staffs around the world. A
recent review of the qualifications of the Navy officer corps demonstrated
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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the need for significantly more officers with this skill set. Responding to
CNO’s tasking, we have added a second seminar to the Naval Operational
Planner Course from the March 2005 inputs to the College of Naval
Command and Staff (CNC&S), which doubles the annual throughput.
We are also reviewing the content of the basic CNC&S curriculum with
the intent to embed more of this course material into the core program,
thus providing all of our graduates with a greater degree of planning
expertise so critical to effective participation in the joint command and
control process.

• Develop and offer a set of clustered elective courses that produce skill sets that
are identified and tracked by our personnel management system. Today, most
students at the Naval War College spend about 20–25 percent of their time
completing a total of three elective courses, which they freely choose from
the list of nearly seventy-five electives that are offered each academic year.
We are now reviewing the costs and benefits of this free-form approach to
electives and are beginning to create a number of multicourse “elective
clusters,” or concentration areas, that could be completed sequentially
throughout the academic year. Completion of a given three-course sequence
would result in a certificate or Additional Qualification Designator (AQD)
recognizing the level of learning attained and providing a method for the
Navy to track and assign graduates to specific jobs requiring a greater level
of competence in a particular area. We have already implemented two such
concentration areas for warfare analysis and joint operational planning.
Others in development include regional studies (e.g., Asia-Pacific, Europe,
Greater Middle East, Africa, and Latin America), corporate strategic
planning and risk assessment, and information operations. The result will
be an increase in the level of knowledge conveyed to our students in these
areas, without any increase in education time.

• Identify Reserve Component individual skills training and professional
military education requirements for incorporation into Sea Warrior. Current
military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted to an
unprecedented degree the role that reserve and National Guard forces
play in our Total Force approach to military manning. The challenge
today, as it has been in the past, is to ensure that the members of the
Reserve Component (RC) obtain the education and training they need to
perform effectively alongside their Active Component colleagues. The
College will continue to have students from the RC in all of our resident
and nonresident programs, and we will continue to offer specialized
programs for members of the RC, scheduled to meet the unique learning

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:06 PM

12

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2005 Issue

PRESIDENT’S FORUM

9

needs of our citizen soldiers and sailors. We are actively engaged with Task
Force Warrior, the Chief of Naval Reserve, and the Naval Education and
Training Command to map the requirements and develop flexible
educational programs to meet these needs.
Each of these initiatives represents a significant vector for change. Taken together they signal a sea change in the education mission of this institution. The
result will be a College better aligned with our Navy’s strategic priorities and
better able to provide warfighters with the operational planning and strategic
leadership competencies demanded by twenty-first-century warfare.
As we look to the future, it is absolutely essential that we build on the institutional foundations of this college’s extraordinary success. The evaluation recently provided by the New England Association of Schools and Colleges during
its reaccreditation process is relevant:
We find the Naval War College to be led by capable and committed administrative
officers, staffed by an impressive faculty of dedicated scholars, teachers and researchers, supported by a capable administrative staff, and blessed with talented, motivated
students who encounter a high quality learning experience. We believe the students,
the Navy and the nation are well served by this fine academic institution.

We will keep the best of what we do, which is most of what we do, and will
evolve it to provide our nation strategic leaders ready to shape the future.

J. L. SHUFORD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
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Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, of the Japan Maritime SelfDefense Force (JMSDF), is Director General of the Joint
Staff Office, Japanese Defense Agency. He is a graduate
of the National Defense Academy, the JMSDF Officer
Candidate School and Naval Staff College, and, in 1992,
the U.S. Naval War College. Commissioned as an ensign
in March 1973, he served as division officer and department head in the destroyers JDS Mochizuki, Tachikaze,
and Shirayuki and the destroyer escort JDS Yudachi,
and commanded the destroyer JDS Sawayuki. He served
ashore in the JMSDF Programming Center, in the Plans
and Programs and System Programs divisions of the
Maritime Staff Office (MSO), and as a liaison officer at
the U.S. Naval Academy. After promotion to rear admiral in 1997, he was Chief of Staff, Commander Fleet Escort Force; Commander, Escort Flotilla 3; and Director,
Operations and Plans Department, MSO. He was promoted to vice admiral in January 2003, becoming Commander, Fleet Escort Force. Vice Admiral Koda assumed
his present duties in August 2004.
© 2004 by Yoji Koda
Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, Vol. 58, No. 2
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THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Primary Causes of Japanese Success
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force

T

he year 2005 is the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War.
It also marks the hundredth anniversary of the end of the Russo-Japanese
War. For Japan, and for Western powers as well, that war, fought in the Far East
in 1904 and 1905, has significance in many respects.
Japan joined the international community in the mid-nineteenth century.
That period of history is known as “the age of imperialism” and was characterized by the dominance of Western nations on the world scene. The Japanese,
however, because of their eagerness to learn, capacity to adapt, discipline, and
frugality, caught up with the West much more quickly than was expected.
As Japan expanded its contacts with foreign nations, however, many problems with those countries emerged. Japanese leaders, though they had little experience in handling diplomatic issues, dealt with these issues in ways that in
most cases proved advantageous to Japan. Through the successful settlement of
such issues, they raised the nation’s stature in the international community. In
the process, the Japanese government developed appropriate strategies for coping with diplomatic problems and showed excellent leadership, firmness, and
coordination skills in the execution of those strategies. They also showed a sense
of balance in estimating situations. Of all the episodes that vitally affected Japan
in that era, the Russo-Japanese War (like the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95)
most changed the future of the nation. This article will examine Japanese strategy and policy as well as leadership in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s success in
the Russo-Japanese War (in implicit contrast to its failure in World War II
thirty-five years later) shows that its leaders at the turn of the twentieth century
did a much better job than their successors with respect to management of
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public opinion, goals, alliances, risk assessment, intelligence, sabotage,
interservice cooperation, and negotiated war termination.
THE EAST ASIAN SITUATION IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY:
THE JAPANESE PERCEPTION
In 1639, Japan closed itself to all Western powers except the Netherlands. In
1854, following the visit of U.S. warships under Commodore Matthew Calbraith
Perry in 1853, Japan reopened its doors to the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia. The following year, France was included by the Treaty of Amity. Of these Western powers, Britain and Russia had the strongest impact on the
national security policy of the Japanese government, which had just assumed
power after the 250-year Tokugawa shogunate. Japanese leaders judged that the
British intended to include Japan within their sphere of influence (see map 1).
Similarly, the Japanese leaders were in general unfavorable to Russian policy
in the Far East. Russia, defeated in the Crimean War in 1856 by the United Kingdom and France, had lost an opportunity to expand into the Balkan states. In addition, and in spite of the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish war, the
chancellor of unified Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, had wisely and effectively
stopped the southward momentum of Russia toward the Balkans, by the 1878
Treaty of Berlin. As a result, Russia turned its foreign policy from southward to
eastward, accelerating the speed of its expansion to the east. This switch inevitably generated friction with the British in Asia. The first incident was conflict between Great Britain and Russia in Afghanistan, which ended in political
compromise. The compromise practically stopped the momentum of Russia’s
southern expansion, forcing even greater Russian emphasis on expansion toward the Far East.
Here, a review of the chronology of Russian eastward expansion is necessary.
In 1847, Russia established a governor general for eastern Siberia, whose office at
Petropavlovsk acted as headquarters for eastern and southern movement in the
Far East. The Russians expanded their influence to the mouth of the Amur River,
where they established a principal base, Nikolayevsk, substantially increasing
their power in the region. But this expansion generated friction with China. The
territorial dispute was settled by the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860).
Reconciliation meant, however, the end of further expansion toward China.
At this point, Russia was forced to change its focus to the coastal areas of the
Sea of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The Russians reached the best natural
harbor in the area, Vladivostok, in 1860. At about this time Russia tried to force
the Japanese off Karafuto (Sakhalin Island). This was accomplished, but at the
expense of another territorial dispute. Russia finally acquired Sakhalin Island in
exchange for the cession of the Chi-Shima Retto (Kuril Islands) to Japan in 1875.
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Furthermore, to Japanese eyes Russia appeared to be trying to
annex Hokkaido (the
second-largest main island of Japan, only thirty
nautical miles south of
Sakhalin), by regularly
sending Russian ships
and people there. The
reason was that many
ports on Hokkaido did
not freeze in winter; that
would have made the island an acquisition of
immense importance.
Russia also noted the
strategic importance of
the Tsushima Islands,
which lie between Japan
and the Korean Peninsula. In 1861, only a year
a f te r t h e s e i z u re o f
Vladivostok, four Russian ships were sent to
Tsushima, and a landing
force occupied a small
Tsushima
port on the island. However, the then-helpless
Tokugawa shogunate
government asked for help from the British, who sent two warships from the
East India Fleet. This Russian expansion attempt was thus frustrated.
In 1884, Russia established at Khabarovsk a governor general for the Amur
region, to be responsible for the development of Far Eastern Russia. A new shipping route was opened between Odessa, on the Black Sea, and Vladivostok the
following year. More importantly, in 1891 construction of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad commenced and the East Asian Squadron was reinforced. These developments triggered serious “Northern concern,” as it was known, among Japanese leadership of both the Tokugawa shogunate and the succeeding Meiji
1
government. This pattern of Russian southward expansion in the Far East was
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perceived by a majority of ordinary Japanese as aggression. A cornerstone-laying
ceremony for the Trans-Siberian Railroad at Vladivostok in 1891 made a particularly strong impression.
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND TRIPLE INTERVENTION
The widespread and strong sense of a Russian threat produced in the minds of
the Japanese a conviction that it was necessary to establish buffer zones between
Japan and Russia. Japan saw the Korean Peninsula and southern Manchuria as
potential buffers and therefore made it a policy to prevent these areas from being
possessed by Russia. In the early 1890s, however, Japanese leaders estimated that it
would be difficult for Russia to seize and permanently occupy them until the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, probably more than ten years in the future.
The Japanese in the 1890s saw China, which under the Qing dynasty had long
2
been a teacher as well as historical rival, as, like Russia, a potential threat. In fact,
the Japanese saw Qing as capable of attempting to annex Korea, which made the
threat urgent. In light of domestic chaos that had existed in Korea since 1884, Japan decided to forestall Qing intervention. In 1894 and 1895 Japan fought the
Sino-Japanese War with the goal of thwarting the expansion of Qing into the
Korean Peninsula, by way of establishing a buffer zone there. This objective was
partially realized by an advantageous settlement at the end of the war. For Russia, however, the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War was an opportunity to
strengthen its “proceed east and south” policy, which had once been stopped by
its treaties of 1858 and 1860 with China. For the major world powers, the war
served to expose the incompetence of the Qing military.
The peace treaty concluded at the Japanese western port city of Shimonoseki
in March 1895 that ended the Sino-Japanese War contained the following major
points (see map 2):

• Qing recognized the right of self-determination of Korea.
• Qing ceded the Liaotung Peninsula, Taiwan (Formosa), and the Pescadores
Islands to Japan.

• Qing paid war reparations to Japan (200 million tael/liang).3
• Qing gave Japan most-favored-nation status.
• Qing opened several ports and gave Japan free navigation rights along the
Yangtze River.
Russia, for which Japan’s presence in China and Korea, especially in the
Liaotung Peninsula, had become an obstacle to expansion, concentrated its efforts
on expelling Japanese forces from China and Korea. Russia perceived Japan as a
potential, and maybe the most dangerous, challenger to its interests in China. To
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1
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this end, Russia—along
with France (a partner in
the Franco-Russian entente) and Germany (which
wanted to turn Russian
eyes away from Europe)—
cunningly reacted with
superficial anger to the reconciliation between Qing
and Japan. In April 1895,
immediately after the conclusion of the Shimonoseki
Treaty, all three nations declared that Japanese possession of the Liaotung
Peninsula represented an
obstacle to peace and stability in the Far East, and
“recommended” that Japan
relinquish its rights there.

A SOUND DECISION BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
The government of Japan, headed by Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito, considered
the following three options in response to the pressure being applied by Russia,
France, and Germany:
1. Declare war against these three nations
2. Request a conference of the major powers
3. Accept the “recommendation” and return control of the Liaotung Peninsula to Qing.

Option one proved impracticable. Japan was too weak to declare war against
these major world powers. Option three was considered too humiliating. The Ito
cabinet therefore attempted to implement option two, with some behindthe-scenes diplomacy, but it quickly realized the hopelessness of the attempt.
When Ito saw the real situation, he was quick enough to switch his strategy. The
Japanese government reluctantly decided to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula,
which had been obtained at the cost of a large number of Japanese soldiers’ lives,
and return it to Qing. The decision was conveyed to these three nations on 5 May
1895, and the Meiji emperor officially announced the decision directly to the
4
Japanese people. This willful intervention by Russia, France, and Germany
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fueled resentment, particularly against Russia, which had obviously been, in
Japanese eyes, the principal perpetrator of the Triple Intervention.
It was in this episode that the Japanese experienced for the first time since the
opening of their country the reality of the international power game. The Japanese people, whose nation had joined the Western-governed international club
only twenty-five years before, now saw the cold reality of international relations—that the weak were the victims of the strong. Both the Japanese people
and their government believed that the concessions gained through the treaty of
1895 were lawful in light of current international custom and, further, had been
bought with the blood of Japanese soldiers. But these gains were now negated
and finally lost due to what seemed an absurd intervention of three nations.
Moreover, the Japanese people were angered that their country was so weak that
it had no choice but to accept the actions of the great powers. This quickly encompassed the nation. It did not take long for a strong hatred of Russia and a desire for revenge to grow in most Japanese minds.
There was a positive side to this incident. The Japanese leaders learned the lesson that well-balanced national power was the most important condition of survival in the international community, where the law of the jungle largely
prevailed. In order to cope with the seemingly helpless situation in which Japan
now found itself, the government started a vigorous nationwide campaign,
known as Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan—“Submit to any hardships to achieve revenge,” or,
5
“Accept the humiliation now; revenge will come later.” The campaign united
the Japanese people.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government decided to build up national power, especially military, in the quickest possible manner. The Diet accepted an ambitious force buildup plan in its first session after the intervention. The size of the
Imperial Army was to be increased from seven divisions to thirteen. The Imperial Navy program (purchases from foreign countries, mainly Britain and the
United States) called for 104 new ships, including four battleships and eleven armored cruisers, to be completed between 1896 and 1905.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA
The Western powers fully took advantage of postwar chaos in China (see map 3).

• In 1896, Russia gained the right to build the “East Qing Railway” through
Manchuria, a shorter route than the Trans-Siberian Railway.

• In 1897, Germany sent warships and troops to occupy Tsingtao, in response
to the murder of three German missionaries on the Shantung Peninsula.

• In 1898, Germany forced Qing to grant a lease to Tsingtao.
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• Immediately after the signing of the German lease, Russia sent a fleet to
Port Arthur and Talien to intimidate the Qing government into a lease of
the former, at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula. This maneuver was
successful; Russia gained the port and extended to it a branch line of the
East Qing Railway. Thus the Liaotung Peninsula, which was one of the
major objectives of the Triple Intervention and had been a main concern as
well, fell into the hands of Russia, a ringleader of the intervention.

• In the same year, Britain concluded a lease on Weihaiwei, on the Shantung
Peninsula.

• In 1899, France signed a lease for Kwangchowwan.
The growing Chinese nationalism against outrageous activities by Western
great powers was transformed into a campaign to expel them. The campaign expanded rapidly within the country in 1899, and in 1900 the violence against foreigners escalated into a severe incident, the Boxer Rebellion.
In order to ensure the security of Beijing, eight nations, including Britain, the
United States, France, Russia, and Japan, sent troops to the city, which they
barely secured by the end of 1900. As a part of this military campaign, Russia
sent a large force to Manchuria; however, the force remained in the area even
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after the cessation of hostilities in Beijing. In spite of opposition by the Qing
government, which was backed up in this regard by Japan and Britain, Manchuria was for all intents and purposes occupied by Russia in that year. Russia also
proposed that Japan would agree to neutralize the Korean Peninsula, but the
Japanese government refused the proposal. It was felt that neutralization of the
peninsula would eventually lead to an unwilling ratification of Russian control
of Manchuria.
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY
If the Korean Peninsula fell into their hands, the Russians, who already maintained a large force in Manchuria, would gain substantial freedom of action in
the Far East. Additionally, the security of Japan would be weakened; the independence of Japan itself could be seriously jeopardized. The Japanese government’s options for favorably resolving this difficult situation were to expel
Russia from Manchuria by military means or forestall a Russian invasion into
the Korean Peninsula through a diplomatic treaty or an agreement with Russia.
The initial assessment by the government was that the first option was practically impossible, because the military power of Japan at that time was still too
small to counter the Russian force in Manchuria. Therefore, and somewhat surprisingly, given Japan’s hostility toward Russia, the Japanese leaders started thinking of ways to implement the second option. The idea was that Japan would accept
Russian seizure of Manchuria if Russia accepted Japanese control over Korea.
Heated debates arose within the government, and no conclusion was reached.
A Unique Decision-Making Body: The Genro
In order to clarify the decision-making process of the government of Japan in
the Meiji era, a unique Japanese mechanism or entity widely referred to as the
Genro must be mentioned.
Genro is an informal, collective term embracing several of the most influential and experienced politicians and military leaders of the Meiji era. There are
minor disagreements today as to which particular individuals it comprised. But
four people—ex–prime minister Hirobumi Ito, ex–financial minister Kaoru
Inoue, hero of the Meiji Restoration War and Army general Aritomo Yamagata,
and ex–prime minister Masayoshi Matsukata—are generally considered to have
been the most influential Genro members at the time. The Genro served as special advisers to the Meiji emperor. Many fundamental issues of the nation were
brought to them. They discussed issues, identified the underlying problems, and
developed strategies and policies for dealing with them. They also assisted in the
implementation of those strategies, by coordinating not only within the government but also between the government and the military. The group also acted as
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a go-between for the government and the economic community. The advantage
of the Genro was that its members had no official portfolios, as it was not an official organ. Thus, the Genro could act collectively as honest brokers, free from
“noisy and willful” external influences and so in a position to provide ideal
“classroom answers.” Their well thought out recommendations often helped the
government make sound “real world” decisions about the vital issues of the day.
The Genro input to the decision-making process immediately before the
Russo-Japanese War included advising Prime Minister Taro Katsura on reasoned approaches to many crucial decisions. The most important point was that
although Japan’s Western-style constitutional monarchy was tempered to this
extent by a traditional Japanese approach to problem solving, the final decision
was made by the prime minister—and once the prime minister had decided, the
Genro did not take any further action unless he asked it to do so. Otherwise,
what it had to do, and actually did, was keep complete silence. This custom prevented the emergence of two different national policies on single issues. Thus,
the mechanism of the Genro guaranteed the credibility of the government in the
international community as well as before the Japanese people.
Approaches to the Russian Issue
With regard to policy toward Russia, there were two schools of thought in the
Japanese government. The first was a pro-Russia school, backed by Ito when he
was the prime minister, and two major Genro, Inoue and Matsukata. They
strongly supported the second, diplomatic option mentioned above—accepting
the status quo in Manchuria in return for preeminent Japanese influence in Korea; Ito started an effort toward a possible Russo-Japanese treaty in 1901. However, the Russian government would accept only economic Japanese activities on
the Korean Peninsula, not political influence. This hard-line Russian position
proved fatal to this approach. Ito’s idea was shown to be impracticable, gradually
lost support, then finally collapsed. In June 1901 Ito turned over power to Taro
Katsura, becoming an “uncrowned giant.”
The second school of thought was a pro-Anglo/Germany faction, supported
by Genro Yamagata and Katsura (prime minister as of June 1901), as well as Foreign Minister Jutaro Komura (appointed in September 1901). These men opposed the idea of a Russo-Japanese treaty. They felt that if Japan were to secure
its sovereignty and interest in China, confrontation with Russia might be unavoidable. They acknowledged that Japan, acting alone, could not stop Russia,
let alone defeat it, but argued that it could handle Russia if supported by Western
countries that shared its interests in the region. The Japanese leadership started
thinking about the possibility of an alliance with nations whose policies were
counter to Russian expansion in the Far East—that is, Britain and Germany. The
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new Katsura cabinet began negotiations with the two nations. However, it found
Germany reluctant to support the idea, due to its complicated ties with Russia,
and quickly modified the plan to a single Anglo-Japanese alliance. Foreign Minister Komura eagerly explained to his colleagues the advantages of alliance with
the British and the disadvantages of alliance with Russia, and in December 1901
he convinced the cabinet to seek an alliance with the United Kingdom. The
6
treaty was concluded in February 1902.
The Japanese Sense of the Russian Threat
As previously stated, Japanese suspicion of Russia was a result of the Triple Intervention of 1895 and was reinforced by the Russian occupation of Manchuria
after the Boxer Rebellion. In addition to this, a buildup of the Russian East Asian
Squadron at Port Arthur and a naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in May 1903 were
perceived as a menace. Russian troops stayed in Manchuria beyond an October
1903 deadline that had been agreed between Qing and Russia in April 1902. Far
from withdrawing, Russia reinforced its force in Manchuria that month with
troops from European Russia. At the same time, Japanese intelligence sources in
Europe reported that additional Russian naval forces, including a battleship, two
armored cruisers, seven destroyers, and four torpedo boats, had left European waters
for the Far East and had reached the Mediterranean by December 1903. In January
7
1904, a substantial increase in Trans-Siberian Railroad traffic was reported.
Unlike the Japanese military and political leaders before the Second World
War, the government of this period emphasized intelligence and conducted
well-organized collection activities. The Japanese legation in London played a
key role in this effort; London, which was in those days the center of the world in
many respects, was flooded with an almost infinite variety of information from
everywhere. As for regional intelligence, the government conducted ambitious
collection activities in Beijing. Japan was able to obtain from such sources a vast
amount of invaluable intelligence, which had a strong influence on its decision
8
making. Specifically, it was intelligence reports that in 1903 persuaded the Japanese government that Russian war preparation was in the final phase and that
the breakout of war was imminent.
THE JAPANESE NAVAL BUILDUP
Immediately after the Triple Intervention in 1895, the Diet approved a new
ten-year naval buildup program for the period from 1896 to 1905. Because the
goal was a fleet of six battleships and six armored cruisers, this plan was widely
known as the “six-six fleet program” in Japan. The last ship was the Mikasa,
which was to be Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s flagship at the Battle of Tsushima.
Eventually, Japan started the war with this six-six fleet.
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In 1903, an additional shipbuilding program was put in place to implement
an amendment to the Anglo-Japanese treaty, ratified by the Diet, obligating Japan to maintain a fleet larger than that of any third nation in the region. This
supplement added three battleships and five armored cruisers. These ships,
however, were not ready in time for the war.
On 28 December 1903 the Japanese government decided to accelerate the
construction program. It also tried to purchase two battleships being built in
Britain for the Chilean navy. The Russian government made strong objections;
the British rebuffed this Russian opposition, but the Japanese government failed
to allocate funds for the purchase before the dissolution of the nineteenth Imperial Diet. The Diet was dissolved for domestic reasons that had nothing to do
with the naval buildup, but the ultimate result was the failure of the attempt to
purchase the two battleships. (The British government frustrated a Russian attempt to acquire the warships itself by purchasing them for the Royal Navy.)
The Japanese government took immediate action to make up for this failure
to purchase battleships in the United Kingdom. First, it issued an imperial ordinance allocating funds for a domestic naval buildup. Second, the government
purchased two armored cruisers under construction in an Italian shipyard for
the Argentine navy. The two ships, Kasuga and Nisshin, arrived at Japan in April
1904, two months after hostilities broke out, and effectively made good the combat loss of two battleships, the Hatsuse and Yashima, to Russian mines on 15 May
1904. Admiral Togo assigned these two armored cruisers to the battleship force,
so as to take full advantage of the long range of their eight- and ten-inch guns,
which could fire almost as far as the twelve-inch guns of the remaining four battleships. This purchase allowed the Imperial Japanese Navy to maintain its intended “six-six fleet” throughout the war.
JAPANESE STRATEGY AND POLICY
In late 1903 Supreme Headquarters (the Combined Staff Office of the Imperial
Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy) and the Japanese government,
working together, made an estimate of the current situation and identified several advantages that Japan could use in its strategy.
Elements of the Japanese Estimate and Strategy
First, revolutionary factions in Russia were generating serious domestic instability. There was no national consensus in Russia for war against Japan. The Japanese strategy to exploit this weakness was to support Russian revolutionary
groups. The government decided to send a special mission to Europe to conduct
9
activities supportive to the Russian revolutionary groups.
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A second Japanese advantage was that Russia could not fully concentrate its
army in the Far East because it had to keep some forces in western Russia as a
counter to Turkish, German, and Austrian forces. That meant that by concentrating most of the Imperial Army in Manchuria, the Japanese could field an
army with strength equal to that of the Russian force it faced there. Further, the
goal of that army was less to win than not to lose. Meanwhile, a third party, probably the United States, would be asked to mediate a peace before the war became
prolonged enough for Russian reinforcements to arrive from Europe.
At sea, the Japanese Combined Fleet was slightly superior to the Russian Pacific Fleet. But the true Japanese advantage was the fact that Russia had to divide
the Pacific Fleet into two forces, one at Port Arthur and the other at Vladivostok.
In addition, most reinforcements from Europe would have to take the long route
around the Cape of Good
IJN Fleet
Russian Pacific Fleet
Hope, along which few ports
Port Arthur Vladivostok
Others
would be available to them, be6
7
cause of British diplomatic
6
1
3
pressure on other nations, in12
4
1
2
cluding France. The Japanese
22
21
strategy was therefore to con28
7
15
centrate its fleet and engage divided Russian forces separately.
Japan badly needed to secure its sea line of communication to Manchuria, the
lifeline of the Japanese army there. In addition, the Japanese government undertook to encourage Britain to exercise fully its influence to ensure that no third
parties supported a Russian reinforcement from Europe.
The fourth Japanese advantage was that the Trans-Siberian Railway was a
single-track line and not fully complete. The Russian lines of communication,
from European Russia to the Far East and within the Manchurian plain, would
be extremely long, difficult to maintain, and of limited capacity. The Japanese
strategy was to hit and destroy the Russian field army in Manchuria before its logistic network became fully functional. Interestingly, the Japanese leaders fully
recognized that they had a similar problem and that accordingly the Japanese
army there could not afford to drive the Russian army too fast or too deep into
Manchuria, even in an advantageous situation. Further, the Japanese leaders
planned to employ a cavalry battalion to disrupt the Russian rear area.
Finally, the Russian army was too cumbersome and unwieldy to wage the
warfare of maneuver that the vast expanse of the Manchurian plain required.
The Russian formations—too large in size, their training inadequate, and their
communication poor—could not conduct coordinated mobile operations and
night engagements. The Japanese response was, first, to organize and employ
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army corps of only “adequate size,” two or three divisions, with maximum mobility, and use them in a way that took maximum advantage of relative Russian
immobility and poor communication. Second, the Japanese soldiers were
trained specifically for night engagements.
“Sixty-Forty Reconciliation”
The operations planning room in the General Staff Office in Tokyo was already
looking ahead to advantageous war termination. Public opinion in Japan supported a war of revenge against Russia, but the leaders of the government and
military were still prudent and careful in their analysis. As we have seen, their
general consensus was that Japan could not win outright but might be able to
bring the war to a draw or even to a situation that was slightly advantageous to
Japan—a possibility they called a “sixty-forty reconciliation.” If this was to occur, several conditions had to be fulfilled.
First, the Japanese army would have to establish superiority over the Russian
army in Manchuria. This seemed to be the most difficult requirement, because
of the shortage of strategic reserves, an insufficient stockpile of ammunition,
and poor field heavy artillery. Well thought out operational plans and effective
tactics on the battlefield were therefore considered the keys to making up, at
least partly, for the underlying Japanese handicaps. Indeed, the Japanese leaders
had confidence in the soundness of their operational plans, based as they were
on superior strategy, and in the hard discipline of their soldiers.
Second, it was essential for the Combined Fleet to destroy the Pacific Fleet before the arrival of Russian naval reinforcements from Europe. Further, it was
necessary in the meantime for Admiral Togo to preserve his strength, to ensure
that he had a fleet capable of destroying the reinforcements when they arrived.
The government and military leaders were convinced that both goals, though
difficult, were achievable if the Imperial Navy wisely and carefully executed its
tailored operational plans.
Third, Japan—a newly rising and still poor nation—would have to guarantee,
before a decision to go to war, that it had sufficient funds to meet a vast wartime
expenditure. The Anglo-Japanese alliance proved favorable here, enabling Japan
to raise capital in several countries. Additionally, Japanese economic leaders
agreed to support fully the national war effort. These factors convinced the government that a war would be at least barely affordable.
Finally, to bring the war to an end, Japan required the cooperation of the
United States. Washington, it was hoped, would mediate the dispute at a time
that would be advantageous to Japan. The government decided to send a special
envoy, Kentaro Kaneko, who was a member of the House of Peers in the Imperial
Diet and an old acquaintance of the U.S. president, Theodore Roosevelt. His
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mission was to convince the president to support Japan and, at the same time, to
elicit American public support for Japan, so the U.S. government would be willing to mediate.
FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
Notwithstanding its advantages and strategy, the Japanese government felt that
the risks of war were still too large, that hostilities against giant Russia should be
undertaken only as a last resort. The government pursued every possibility, no
matter how small, of achieving a settlement. In the face of the fait accompli of a
forcible Russian military presence in Manchuria, Tokyo decided to start diplomatic negotiations with Russia, and by 23 June 1903 it had developed a basic negotiating policy. A key point was that the two countries would mutually accept
Russian rights in Manchuria and Japanese rights on the Korean Peninsula. The
rationale was that if Japan was to protect its national sovereignty from Russian
pressure in the long term, the Korean Peninsula had to be kept outside of any
Russian influence, a buffer zone between Russia and Japan. This proposal was
officially passed to the Russian government on 12 August.
Thereafter, despite repeated requests for an answer, the Russian government
kept silent for almost two months, finally responding to Japan on 3 October. The
answer was far different from the proposal and disappointing to the Japanese
government. Russia made a counterproposal that mentioned nothing about
Manchuria but imposed a total ban on military use of the Korean Peninsula, establishing a neutral zone in the peninsula above thirty-nine degrees north latitude and banning fortifications along its coasts.
The Japanese government was patient enough to propose on 30 October an
amendment, to establish a neutral zone thirty miles wide on either side of the
border between Korea and Manchuria. The Russian response, presented almost
a month afterward, was basically the same as its first answer.
To the Japanese government, this new Russian position was quite uncomfortable and unreliable. However, on 21 December it again offered a compromise,
removing the ban on military use of the Korean Peninsula but establishing a
neutral zone. The Russian answer, which was brought to the Japanese government on 6 January 1904, was again almost the same as the initial offer, with minor modifications. Again, and particularly disappointing to Japan, the Russians
made no mention of Manchuria.
At this point the Japanese leaders came to the conclusion that the Russian
government had no intention of settling the dispute on the Manchuria and Korean Peninsula issues. Instead, the Russians had merely drawn Japan along, buying time for a military buildup in Manchuria, for intimidation and warfare. The
Japanese leaders, dejected at the failure of their diplomatic efforts, became
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inclined to go to war. But on 12 January the Meiji emperor directed the leadership to make one last effort for peace. In full compliance with the emperor’s directive, on 16 January 1904 the government issued a note verbale to the Russian
government requesting resumption of the negotiations; it was completely ignored. Furthermore, progress in Russian military preparations in Manchuria
and at Port Arthur was reported. To the Japanese government, this meant that
the more time Japan spent in diplomacy, the more difficult would be the military
position it would eventually face. The diplomatic effort to reach a compromise
10
with Russia had ended in failure.
In parallel with the fruitless six-month-long diplomatic effort, Japan’s leaders
had assessed their national power and compared it with that of Russia. They
made a dispassionate review, ignoring the public anti-Russian feelings and instead counting guns and warships, estimating expenditures, and analyzing Russia’s overall situation. In their view the gap was too large to make up, but they
became convinced that all their goals for war would be satisfied if they managed
to steer Japanese strategy and policy well, integrating everything necessary and
taking all possible factors into account. On 4 February 1904, the government decided to go to war against Russia.
Diplomatic relations were officially broken on 6 February 1904, and this fact
was conveyed to the Russian foreign minister in St. Petersburg (then the capital)
the same day. War was officially declared on 10 February 1904 by the government of Japan, in the name of the Meiji emperor.
CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES
While it is not the main objective of this article to examine all the engagements
of this war, there are, aside from Tsushima, two battles worth discussing in some
detail: the campaign at Port Arthur and the Battle of the Yellow Sea (10 August
1904). First, however, a short review of the general concept of operations is
necessary.
Order of Battle of Japanese Forces and Their Concept of Operations
Japanese military leaders coordinated the development of a cooperative, integrated plan by the Army and Navy, in which the roles for each were clearly defined and assigned.
The Imperial Army’s operations in the Russo-Japanese War were envisioned
in two phases, the first lasting through the autumn of 1904 (see map 4). The Japanese First Army was to land at Inchon, on the Korean Peninsula, and then proceed to Manchuria. The Second Army was to land on the southern coast of the
Liaotung Peninsula and likewise move toward Manchuria, coordinating with
the advance of the First Army. The Third Army was to land on and secure the
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MAP 4
ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY
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Source: Zusetsu Togo Heihaciro; Me de miru Meiji no Nihon Kaigun,
“Pictorial Reference of Adm. Togo and IJN in Meiji,” Togo Association, Japan.

Liaotung Peninsula, then capture Port Arthur. The Fourth Army was to land on
the northeastern coast of Po-Hai Bay and proceed to Liaoyang, coordinating
with the Second Army. The General Staff of the Army in Tokyo estimated that
large-scale winter operations would be difficult due to severe weather conditions. All the armies were in late autumn to bivouac for the winter of 1904–1905,
north of Liaoyang.
Phase Two was to begin in the early spring of 1905 and extend to the end of
the war. In this phase, the four armies were to combine and concentrate for battle with the Russian main force.
As for the Imperial Navy, the fleet had two missions. The first was to destroy
the Russian Pacific Fleet and secure the seas around Japan. The main Russian naval force was the East Asian Squadron, at Port Arthur; a second force was at
Vladivostok. The second mission was to support the landings of Army forces on
the Korean and Liaotung peninsulas. The Navy organized the Combined Fleet to
bring this plan to fruition. The Combined Fleet comprised the First Fleet (six
battleships and a cruiser force) and the Second Fleet (six armored cruisers plus
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other escorting cruisers). The General Staff of the Navy tasked the various parts
of the Combined Fleet to destroy the divided Pacific Fleet. The First Fleet was to
take the Russian Port Arthur squadron; the Second Fleet’s target was the
Vladivostok force. In addition there was the Third Fleet (not part of the Combined Fleet), composed of cruisers and coastal defense ships; this the General
Staff of the Navy assigned to escort Japanese shipping and support landing oper11
ations of the Army.
The Port Arthur Campaign
The expected naval reinforcements from Europe—in the form of the Baltic
Fleet, under Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski—was known to be preparing for its voyage to the Far East (which it actually began on 15 October
1904). Japan needed to engage and destroy the divided Pacific Fleet before the
Baltic Fleet could arrive. The Combined Fleet chose as its primary target in the
first phase of the war the East Asian Squadron at Port Arthur. Its total destruction would have significance for the Army, in that it would guarantee the security of sea lines of communication from Japan to Korea and China, which, as
noted, were vital to the Imperial Army operations in Manchuria.
Imperial Navy Operations during the Port Arthur Campaign. The Combined Fleet
was tasked with the destruction or neutralization of the Russian squadron at the
earliest opportunity. It was considered imperative that this be completed early,
so repairs and training could be accomplished before the arrival of the Russian
Baltic Fleet. The Combined Fleet developed three alternative strategies. The first
was a night torpedo assault by destroyers, to be carried out if the Russians stayed
in the outer portion of Port Arthur. The second was a blockade of the port, by
12
sinking ships or laying mines in the channel at the entrance of the harbor. The
last strategy was indirect naval gunfire from outside the reach of Russian coastal
artillery, to lure the Russian squadron into a fleet engagement in the Yellow Sea.
Whatever the merits of these three strategies, Admiral Togo’s tactical execution of them was rather poor and inadequate, and the results proved insufficient.
Despite the dedication of his sailors, Togo failed to complete his assigned missions during the first three months of the war. Worse, Togo’s fleet also suffered
serious casualties, which was considered the last thing he could afford to do,
with the Baltic Fleet soon to be on the way. Recognizing that he had a problem,
Admiral Togo asked Admiral Sukeyuki Ito, Chief of Naval Staff in Tokyo and in a
position to coordinate closely with the Army General Staff and government, to
reinforce the Third Army against Port Arthur. The leaders in Tokyo met immediately and issued orders to provide the necessary support for the ground campaign against Port Arthur.
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Imperial Army Operations during the Port Arthur Campaign. The Imperial Army
tasked General Maresuke Nogi’s Third Army to isolate, attack, and take the
well-protected fortress of Port Arthur (see map 5). Nogi’s army started its campaign on 26 June 1904, employing simple infantry assault tactics against the fortified defensive line that the Russians had built up in the surrounding
mountains and hills. Unfortunately, General Nogi continuously repeated these
brutal tactics, making his infantrymen easy targets for the Russian defenders,
whose carefully prepared positions allowed a continual cross fire.
MAP 5
PORT ARTHUR CAMPAIGN
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Source: Zusetsu Togo Heihaciro; Me de miru Meiji no Nihon Kaigun,
“Pictorial Reference of Adm. Togo and IJN in Meiji,” Togo Association, Japan.

Due to the inflexibility of General Nogi and his staff officers, and to their
overconfidence in the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier, which was a long
tradition of samurai, the Third Army suffered a tremendous loss of young soldiers—who, if properly employed, would have been precious as reinforcements
during the last ground campaign, around Mukden, in March 1905. Nonetheless,
the Third Army eventually conquered a key hill overlooking the harbor of Port
Arthur from which Japanese heavy artillery was able to bombard Russian ships
and base facilities. Shelling started on 7 August, inflicting substantial damage to
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facilities, personnel, and ships. By that time, all of the Liaotung Peninsula had
been taken by the Second Army, completely isolating Port Arthur.
A new concern now arose in the Japanese General Staff—the possibility of an
escape attempt by the Russian naval squadron in Port Arthur. Japanese war
planners did not want the squadron to join the remainder of the Pacific Fleet at
Vladivostok.
The Outcome of the Port Arthur Campaign. The Japanese Army and Navy coordinated well, and in the end they attained their military objectives. Admiral Togo
learned from his early mistakes and corrected them. One area of weakness that
was uncovered was low levels of skill and inadequacy of tactics in the destroyer
force; another was ineffectiveness of fleet gunnery. One underlying reason could
be that Japanese sailors were being called upon to fight the world’s first modern
sea engagement, using state-of-the-art equipment and newly developed tactics
with which they were not totally familiar. Most of the senior officers and petty
officers were veterans of the Sino-Japanese War of ten years before; however,
even they had not fully caught up with the new and unknown challenges of
modern naval warfare. For their part, Admiral Togo and his staff officers were
learning “on the job” how to employ their assets properly.
On the Army side, the loss of tens of thousands of soldiers in General Nogi’s
badly managed battles seriously affected other operations in Manchuria and
generated grave concern. The Japanese leadership feared the possible loss of the
whole Third Army, which they had counted on to reinforce the other three armies, now already in Manchuria. It was a last-minute change of tactics from unsupported infantry assault to a combination of infantry assault and artillery
barrage, as well as the capture of positions suitable for shelling, that saved the
Third Army.
This change does not excuse General Nogi’s initial mistake. Having said this,
however, we must note General Nogi’s superb leadership. History shows that in
cases of serious operational failure and incredibly high casualties caused by poor
command, most generals lose the support and loyalty of their soldiers. This in
turn brings final collapse and, for the general, disgrace. But General Nogi’s soldiers never lost their trust in him or their loyalty to the nation and their army.
Something in his leadership that is difficult to identify today strongly appealed
to his soldiers. One reason might have been that General Nogi lost both his sons
during the campaign—meaning the extinction of the family line, the most important social value of that period—but asked for no special treatment. Moreover, one of the most important points here is that many Japanese fathers and
mothers shared the same kind of mental pain at this time.
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The Battle of the Yellow Sea, 10 August 1904
As the Combined Fleet attempted to block Port Arthur and the Second and the
Third Armies progressively isolated and began to attack the port, the commander
of the Russian naval squadron became increasingly worried (see map 6).
MAP 6
BATTLE OF THE YELLOW SEA, 10 AUGUST 1904
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Source: Zusetsu Togo Heihaciro; Me de miru Meiji no Nihon Kaigun,
“Pictorial Reference of Adm. Togo and IJN in Meiji,” Togo Association, Japan.

In addition to continuing attempts to lure out and engage the Russian squadron, the Japanese fleet tried three times to bottle it up inside Port Arthur—on 24
February, 27 March, and 3 May—by sinking ships at the mouth of the harbor.
These attempts were not fully successful and Admiral Togo suffered some vital
losses in the process, but the operations imposed an emotional drain on the Russian sailors. Meanwhile, the Third Army had landed on the Liaotung Peninsula,
on 6 June, and the Second Army was isolating the peninsula. These army operations too caused serious psychological stress for the Russian leaders, whose
nightmare was, of course, the complete closure of the port by land and sea.
On 23 June, Admiral Togo got the chance he had awaited so long; the Russian
squadron attempted an escape from the port. However, after brief contact between the two forces, the Russians quickly reversed course and headed back
to the port. Togo was unable to bring on a traditional fleet engagement; the
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Russians’ sudden turning back was far different from his expectation and quite
disappointing.
When the Third Army seized the heights and, on 7 August, shelling began, the
Russian Navy General Staff ordered the squadron to leave Port Arthur and join
the Vladivostok force. It sailed on 10 August. When Admiral Togo received the
report of the Russian sortie, he quickly reacted, believing it to be the best, but
maybe last, opportunity to destroy the enemy fleet. With his First and Third
Fleets Togo eagerly engaged the enemy fleet of six battleships and four cruisers.
The first engagement of the day took place in the early afternoon. Togo saw
two objectives: one was to destroy the enemy fleet; the second was, if the first was
not successful, to prevent the enemy’s return to Port Arthur, as had been allowed
to happen on 23 June. Determined not to repeat that experience, he now used all
means to prevent a Russian retreat to Port Arthur. The result was that Togo, not
having decided on a single course of action, attempted to pursue both objectives
and so maneuvered his fleet poorly. This time the Russian squadron concentrated all of its efforts on escaping; Admiral Togo, too focused on cutting off a retreat, was outfoxed again and almost allowed the enemy fleet to get away.
Additionally, his fleet engaged the enemy (at 1:30 in the afternoon) at such long
range, about eleven thousand yards, that his guns were ineffective. Togo at about
3:30 ordered his fleet to cease firing and started to close the distance.
Two hours later a second engagement started at a distance of about seven
thousand yards. The second engagement lasted for about three hours. At about
6:30 one, or maybe two, shells from Japanese warships hit the bridge and armored conning tower of the Russian flagship, Tsesarevich, killing the squadron
commander, Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft, and severely wounding the ship’s commanding officer. The hit, destroying the Russian command structure, caused
confusion within the Russian squadron, which now scattered.
A follow-on torpedo assault by Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats against
the surviving Russian warships was badly executed and gained no success. The
remnants of the squadron escaped—although they never reached Vladivostok
13
or joined the forces there. Thus, the main Russian naval force in the Far East,
the Port Arthur squadron, was totally incapacitated.
The Battle of Ulsan
The Vladivostok force of three armored cruisers—Rossiya, Gromoboi, and
Rurik—sortied on 12 August, not knowing the result of the battle involving the
Port Arthur squadron (see map 7). The Japanese Second Fleet, which had been
assigned to fight the Vladivostok force, had moved, upon notification of the sailing of the Port Arthur squadron two days before, and had taken station near the
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Tsushima Strait, a choke point where it could intercept either Russian group. On
the morning of 14 August, the Japanese Second Fleet and Russian Vladivostok
force encountered each other east of Tsushima Strait, off Ulsan, Korea. The
Vladivostok force was destroyed, never to revive for the rest of the war.
By December 1904, the Russian Pacific Fleet was completely disabled, allowing Admiral Togo to bring his fleet back to Japan for rest, maintenance, and
training. Port Arthur was occupied by General Nogi on 2 January 1905.
THE TSUSHIMA STRAIT
If the conduct of Admiral Togo in the Battle of the Yellow Sea was flawed, he
faced a serious dilemma—the Pacific Fleet was only one of two Russian fleets
that he must fight with his single Combined Fleet. The basic strategy of Japan
was to destroy both Russian fleets, one after the other.
Lessons Learned by Admiral Togo
In the spring and summer of 1904, while Admiral Togo was facing the first set of
strong enemy forces, the second force, the formidable Baltic Fleet, was preparing
to leave European Russia. Every Japanese sailor—every Japanese citizen, for that
matter—knew that it was impossible to replace even a single major combatant
in the time the war was expected to last. Togo, then, had the nearly impossible
task of sweeping away the Russian Pacific Fleet at the earliest opportunity, while
avoiding the loss of any of his major ships. However, in May 1904 he lost two
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battleships to Russian mines near Port Arthur. It was this loss that, luckily for
Togo and Japan, was followed by the arrival, just in time, of the two armored
cruisers purchased from Argentina.
It is easy to imagine the psychological pressure upon Togo at the Battle of the
Yellow Sea, just over a hundred years ago. He could have fought the battle at
closer range to guarantee victory, but it would have increased the risk of damage
and losses. This fear of losing battleships probably dominated the tactical thinking of Admiral Togo and his staff, and therefore became one of the reasons for
his ineffective gunnery and maneuver during the Battle of the Yellow Sea.
This factor also drove Togo to reemphasize torpedo attack. Though he knew it
would result in losses to his small destroyers or torpedo boats, these losses,
though serious, could possibly be absorbed because of the relatively large number of these smaller warships. In addition, the ability of torpedoes, if they hit, to
inflict serious damage on enemy warships was also attractive to Togo. So it was
understandable that Togo expected much from his torpedo tactics, but the reality was that they were unsuccessful in the Yellow Sea battle.
If, generally speaking, Admiral Togo’s tactics in the Battle of the Yellow Sea
were questionable, what he won was significant. Further, from the Japanese
navy’s point of view, several aspects of the battle strongly influenced the result of
the Battle of Tsushima and the final outcome of the war.
First, although Admiral Togo did not completely destroy the enemy fleet by
gunfire, the end result fully met the strategic objectives of Japan. That is, the Japanese destroyed the Russian Pacific Fleet well before the arrival of the Baltic
Fleet, which departed European Russia only in October.
Second, the Imperial Navy was able to send the main force of the Combined
Fleet back to Japan for refit. The Combined Fleet took the opportunity to incorporate the lessons learned throughout all the naval operations and engagements
in the war to date. Admiral Togo personally used the time to assess the previous
naval campaigns and prepare for the coming battle against the Baltic Fleet.
Togo’s assessment revealed that, third and most important, he was now freed
from his dilemma completely—Togo was no longer required to destroy a fleet
without losing any ships. He started full-scale preparations for the coming battle
against the Russian Baltic Fleet.
A Practical Combat Concept
Admiral Togo, of course, developed before the war many combat concepts, including an operational doctrine (Sen-Saku), an operations plan (SakusenKeikaku), and tactics. In general they were well conceived by his staff officers, but
they were not yet combat proven.
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At the Battle of the Yellow Sea, Togo applied these doctrines, plans, and tactics. However, the Japanese navy’s original and overall combat concept of operations was flawed, in that it did not envision that the Combined Fleet would
conduct “reactive” engagements (as actually happened). Rather, the concept of
operations had assumed an ideal and traditional head-on engagement between
two fleets. In the Yellow Sea battle, because of his ongoing blockade operations,
Admiral Togo was not fully prepared for the sudden sortie of the Russian squadron
out of Port Arthur; therefore, he simply had to react to it. The concept of operations was, maybe, not bad in theory, but some of its elements were too sophisticated and theoretical to execute in a confused battle environment—too difficult
even for combat-experienced officers and sailors of the Combined Fleet. Indeed,
there was a gap between the envisioned concept of operations and actual execution
in the battle, a gap that made the position of Admiral Togo very difficult.
Togo recognized the necessity of filling this gap and strongly felt the need to
tailor a concept of operations with no such gap for the upcoming fight against
the Baltic Fleet. Admiral Togo directed Saneyuki Akiyama, an operations officer,
to develop a detailed and practical concept of operations that was suited to the
level of expertise of Japanese officers and sailors. Togo issued a new operational
doctrine, the centerpiece of his new concept, on 12 April 1905, and he made sure
that all the commanders and commanding officers clearly understood it.
A distinctive feature of the new concept of operations was “engagement in
14
depth.” What Togo meant by this was the complete destruction of the Baltic
Fleet by repeated attacks. This was the operational goal to which Akiyama devoted all his energy, and it was one of the real roots of the Japanese success at the
Battle of Tsushima. Several main elements supported the new doctrine.
The Competence of Gunners and Spotters. A core tenet of the operational doctrine
of the Combined Fleet had been gun engagement between main forces—the
battleships and armored cruisers. Specifically, the battleship force (the 1st Squadron) was to concentrate its fire on the leading ship, presumably the flagship, of the
enemy’s main force at the very outset of an engagement. In that way Admiral
Togo intended to take an advantageous position over the enemy fleet, but at the
Battle of the Yellow Sea, due to poor fleet handling Togo failed to comply with this
doctrine, and as a result the doctrine itself was nothing but pie in the sky.
Admiral Togo understood that his maneuvering and long-range gun engagement at the Battle of the Yellow Sea had been inadequate, and he tried to develop
all possible solutions that would address the lessons he had learned. In that connection, he ensured that his officers, gunners, and spotters were thoroughly retrained.
Specifically, Togo tried to implement a new fire-control concept that
switched from independent firing of each turret to controlled firing of all guns.
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Through the Battle of the Yellow Sea, after “open fire” was ordered, each spotter
fired his gun at his own discretion at the target designated by the gunnery officer.
The essence of the new concept was that, first, the target and firing range were
determined by a gunnery officer on the bridge; the spotters of all guns set their
sights on the same chosen target, at the designated range. When all the guns
were ready, they simultaneously fired at the same target on order from the gunnery officer. He alone observed the impacts and the fall of shot, and made corrections and adjustments. Each gunnery team was trained to repeat these
procedures until they became automatic and routine. This new firing procedure, combined with upgrades in guns and range-finding equipment, which
had broken down several times at the Battle of the Yellow Sea, produced real
15
improvements in the gun-engagement capability of Admiral Togo’s fleet.
Fully understanding that the competence of his gunnery officers, gunners,
and spotters was the key to success in the coming battle, Togo dedicated everything to improving and strengthening their training. He never made any compromise but strictly imposed practical discipline on these specialists.
Basic Formations for Gun Engagements. Another lesson that Admiral Togo
learned from the Battle of the Yellow Sea was that overly complicated maneuvers
caused the failure of long-range engagements. At the beginning of the battle, the
forces under Togo were scattered around the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea,
and he quickly tried to assemble them; however, they joined the battle separately,
one after another, and fought independently. This very much complicated his
command over the force as a whole. Admiral Togo now decided to concentrate
all of his Combined Fleet in the theater and task each force in compliance with
the new operational doctrine and plan. In addition, he chose to fight at shorter
range, seven to eight thousand yards or less. He also decided to employ a “single
line” formation as the basic gunnery disposition.
Togo also made the coordination between his two main forces clearer. The
First Fleet was first to concentrate its firepower on the enemy flagship in order to
gain an initial advantage. The First and Second Fleets together were then to coordinate and make “repeated” attacks on the remainder of the enemy’s main
force until it was totally destroyed.
Torpedo Employment. As we have seen, and contrary to the expectation of Admiral Togo, torpedo attacks had achieved poor results in blockade operations
outside Port Arthur. They also exposed inadequacies during the engagements on
23 June and 10 August.
The torpedo, because of its capability of inflicting a blow beneath the waterline and so causing serious flooding, was considered an effective and sometimes
a lethal weapon—even against well-protected ships, such as battleships and
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armored ships. That was the torpedo capability for which the Imperial Japanese
Navy strove. But the actual use of torpedoes at sea, especially during combat operations, was much more difficult than the theory stated in the doctrine suggested. There were two main reasons.
One was that Japanese tactics for torpedo attack were not well developed. For
example, some vital elements—target designation, types of engagement (day or
night), attack formation and speed, firing range, etc.—were not well defined. In
other words, there was no unified concept or standard procedure for torpedo attacks. Torpedo attacks were simply left to each independent commander and
commanding officers of units.
The second was that the technology was immature, and torpedo systems on
the ships were poor. For example, there was no ranging gear to determine firing
distance. In practice, on these very small destroyers and craft, ranging was done
by the “Mark 1 eyeball” of experienced officers. Additionally, some torpedoes
misfired or failed to run straight.
Togo directed his officers to develop the best possible torpedo tactics, approaches that reflected all the lessons of the first six months of the war. All possible corrective actions were taken to improve torpedo equipment on the
launching ships. The torpedomen, like the gunnery teams, were thoroughly retrained until they became solid, combat-ready teams. In addition, in conjunction with a reshuffling of major staffs and commanders on 12 January 1905,
Togo changed the commanders of all five destroyer divisions. The admiral now
16
had full confidence in his torpedo forces and their engagement capability.
These were to be real, if hidden, reasons for the Japanese success at the Battle
of Tsushima. In other words, without the Battle of the Yellow Sea, which was almost no victory at all, Admiral Togo probably would have gone into the
Tsushima battle without thorough preparations—without the best concept of
operations, doctrine, or plan, and without the best tactics or fully trained forces
and sailors. If that had been the case, the result at Tsushima, the decisive battle
between Admirals Togo and Rozhdestvenski, might have been completely different. So it can be said that for all intents and purposes, the stage for success at
Tsushima was set at this time. Togo had an almost 90 percent chance of success at
Tsushima before the battle started. The remaining 10 percent was left to Togo
and his determination to execute the plan within a real combat environment,
where fear, uncertainty, and the unexpected can overwhelm the “weak human.”
Ten percent seems small, but this determination is the most important factor in
the ability of any combat commander to win a battle. For the Imperial Navy and
Japan, it was fortunate indeed that Togo truly had this strong will and could sustain it in any situation on the battlefield.
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ENDING THE WAR: WALKING A TIGHTROPE
The Japanese strategy at this point in the war was on a high wire: if Japan miscalculated, the result would be devastating. Prior to the war, the Japanese leadership had drawn up a single war plan. It was believed to be the only possible
course of action, because the weak and nascent state of Japanese national power
did not seem to allow any alternatives. As we have seen, Japan intended to take
full advantage of the slow reaction of the Russian giant in a series of quick
strikes, showing Japanese superiority to the world. Before the giant could make a
full-scale counterattack, Japan would ask for mediation by a neutral party, the
United States, and thereby obtain a favorable settlement. Initial, local Japanese
military superiority over Russia was believed to be the key to building worldwide
credibility, which was expected, in turn, to facilitate foreign loans to cover war
expenditures and, at the same time, convince the American government and
people to mediate.
But if Japan missed any one of these steps, the strategy could instantly fall from
the wire; the nation would lose the war and be ruined. Understanding the risk this
plan entailed, Japan managed with great difficulty to integrate its national war
efforts, both diplomatic and military strategies, into one goal, the advantageous
“sixty-forty” reconciliation. The Japanese leaders did not think the country
could win a full victory over Russia, only achieve favorable war termination.
The level of coordination within the government, as well as between political
and military branches, was matchless. In particular, the high quality of planning,
resolve to execute plans, sound management of military campaigns, and the
bravery of Japanese soldiers were characteristic of Japan’s success in this war.
Russia, in contrast, failed. The Russians overestimated their own power, ignored that of Japan, and provoked the Japanese people—whom many Russians,
particularly Tsar Nicholas II, called “Asian small yellow monkeys.” They did not
study Japan or the Japanese people carefully. Because of the significant difference of power between the two nations, the Russians even thought that Japan
would never opt for war, whatever the Japanese security concern was. Without
sufficient knowledge of Japan, they first optimistically thought that war was not
possible for Japan; even in case of war, they felt, they could knock down the weak
and barbarous Japanese forces at the first blow. The provoked and angry Japanese showed the baselessness of this thinking.
Even after the war broke out, St. Petersburg considered it a sideshow, a matter
for the local authority in the Far East. The Russians in the region had no integrated grand strategy based on correct information about Japan. What the local
Russian forces, commanded by General A. N. Kuropatkin, intended was simply
to slaughter the Japanese army with overwhelming forces early in the war. But
the Japanese fought desperately on every battlefield and defied the estimates of
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the Russians. As they accumulated more combat experience against the Japanese
military—at Liaoyang (August–September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and
Hei-Kou-Tai (January 1905)—the Russians realized that the Japanese might be a
different enemy than they had thought.
General Kuropatkin now tried the traditional Russian military strategy that
had been used against Napoleon. The intent was to withdraw, lure the enemy
deep into an area where Russia had the advantage, build up their forces, and then
deliver a fatal blow with overwhelming troop strength. If the Russian army had
properly executed this strategy, the Japanese army in Manchuria might have
been annihilated. Particularly at the Battle of Mukden, and despite an
MAJOR LAND BATTLES OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Liaoyang. This was the first head-on ground engagement. The Japanese
army of about 134,000, commanded by General Iwao Oyama, contained all
available forces other than the Third Army, which was at Port Arthur. The Russian army, commanded by General A. N. Kuropatkin, was about 225,000
strong. Both sides expected to deliver fatal blows. Fighting started on 30 August 1904 and ended on 3 September in the retreat of the Russian forces. The
Russians outnumbered the Japanese but fought with less spirit and skill. The
Russian retreat put the Japanese force in an advantageous position, but the
victory was far from decisive. This first battle exposed the Japanese Achilles’
heel—poor logistic capability and insufficient reserves—which prevented pursuit and destruction of the retreating enemy.
Shaho. As the situation became increasing unfavorable to the Russians,
the tsar became determined to save both Port Arthur and, more importantly,
face for the Russian Empire. He directed General Kuropatkin to reverse the
tide of the war. General Kuropatkin duly attacked the Japanese in overwhelming force at Shaho, but an unexpected and fierce Japanese counterattack pushed the Russians back. If Kuropatkin had had the indomitable spirit
necessary to carry on regardless of casualties and operational inertia, he could
have smashed the Japanese force. But he did not, and his attack failed.
Hei-Kou-Tai. After the Battle of Shaho, the two forces faced each other
until the frozen Manchurian winter began. The Japanese field commanders
thought no major battle was possible and assumed that the Russians had the
same view of the difficulty of winter combat. However, General
Oskar-Ferdinand Kazimirovich Grippenberg, the newly arrived commanding
general of the Russian Second Army, quickly grasped the operational center
of gravity—the Japanese left wing, which jutted northward into Russian territory at Hei-Kou-Tai. Against the strong opposition of Kuropatkin,
Grippenberg planned and executed the attack with firm determination. The
Japanese forces, ”hibernating” in winter quarters, were completely surprised. Their command chain lost coherence, and some forces fell into helpless chaos. The uncoordinated Japanese forces were almost defeated. But
units and individual soldiers did not give up, striking back fiercely and instinctively against the enemies in front of them. They restored, barely, the front in
a series of independent engagements.
Suddenly the Russian Second Army was ordered to stop attacking. The advancing Russian soldiers, their morale extremely high because they knew they
were winning, could not understand the reason. The answer was the jealousy
of a legendary military leader, General Kuropatkin. The Japanese forces were
again saved by the Russian leadership—not, this time, by irresolution but by a
truly scandalous discord. (See Yoichi Hirama, Nichi-Ro Senso ga kaeta sekaishi
[World history changed by the Russo-Japanese War] [Tokyo: FuyoShobo-Shuppan].)
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advantageous tactical situation, the Japanese supply line was stretched almost to
the breaking point. Force strength and the logistical stocks were precariously
low in the field. The situation was the same in Japan itself.
If the Russian leaders, particularly Kuropatkin and his successor, had had a
firm resolve to execute the plan, the Russian forces could have smashed the Japanese. But they did not. Unlike that of the Japanese leaders, their resolve was
weak, and this weakness itself led the nation and its army to failure in this war. To
be sure, for Russian leaders failure would not mean the collapse of Great Russia;
for them the war against Japan was just an affair in the distant Far East. But for
Japan, the war was a matter of the life or death of the nation and its people. Japan,
particularly the Japanese army, was saved by this fatal flaw in the Russian leadership of those years.
After the Battle of Mukden in February–March 1905, Japanese leaders, despite their victory and seizure of the capital of Manchuria, knew they could not
continue combat. Due to the lack of combat-ready reserves, ammunition, and
supplies, the Japanese force could not hit and sweep away the retreating Russians. The Japanese, knowing they were losing the chance of a lifetime, could
only witness the escape of the helpless Russian units. There was no hope that Japan could recover quickly from this state of exhaustion; this was the consensus
from the lowest to the highest in the field and among the leaders in Tokyo.
The Russians, however, though they accepted that their position was now unfavorable and tactically disadvantageous, knew that they were still strong
enough to fight another large battle—and that Japan could not afford to. Particularly, they pinned their hopes on the Baltic Fleet, which was expected to arrive
in Japanese waters soon. If it destroyed the Japanese fleet and gained control of
the sea, it would shut off supplies to the already starving Japanese army. That
would mean, the Russians were confident, victory.
Thus, the battle between the Japanese Combined Fleet and the Russian Baltic
Fleet was to be crucial for both countries. If Japan was to maintain its advantageous position in Manchuria and save its army, it had to win the battle utterly.
Russia had to do the same to save its own forces in Manchuria. This is the real
meaning of the Battle of Tsushima—a battle that, as we have seen, Admiral Togo
had 90 percent won before it started.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR IMPERIAL JAPAN
By the 1930s, the Japanese leadership no longer looked back to the efforts of
their predecessors in the Meiji era and did not consider the lessons learned and
taught by their seniors who had managed the Russo-Japanese War successfully.
Of course, the leaders in the Showa era thought they were taking due account of
the past, but their conduct showed that in fact they were just skimming through
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the old lessons, never digging into the true nature of the experience gained at
17
such cost. We can readily point out a number of sharp contrasts between the
leadership in the Meiji era and that in the first twenty years (1926–45) of Showa.
Public Consensus. Meiji leaders achieved near unanimity of public opinion by
making full use of the Triple Intervention. Showa leaders, however, managed
poorly the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 and the series of incidents
in China that followed. This ten-year-long military episode in Manchuria and
China gravely shook Japanese morale. Ordinary Japanese people were still
strongly loyal to the country, but they also had a gloomy sense of never-ending
“quagmires” in China. In addition to this, many were revolted by a series of tawdry power games in Tokyo. The Japanese people in Showa were tired of a decade
of chaos and crisis, both at home and in China. The Showa leaders never established a real consensus among the people.
Clear and Realistic Goals. Meiji leaders set clear national objectives and military goals: protection of the sovereignty of Japan and achievement of a generally
favorable (“sixty-forty”) resolution of Russian issues. From any point of view,
the potential enemy was easy to identify—Russia—against which Meiji leaders
developed a well-thought-out strategy, involving Britain. They executed this
strategy well and firmly.
The Showa leaders, in contrast, confused their objectives. If it was to have
been a settlement of the collision with U.S. interests in China, the focus should
have been the United States; with the cooperation of other Western countries,
with which Japan had some common interests in China, Japan might have preserved some of its rights there. If the objective, instead, was to liberate colonies
in Asia, European colonial states like Britain, the Netherlands, and France would
have been the countries of concern. The United States and Australia, although
the latter was a member of the British Commonwealth, could in that case have
been aligned with Japan. Additionally, and surprisingly, an ally of Japan, Nazi
Germany, was helping Chiang-Kai-shek, who was fighting Japanese forces in
China. Thus the Japanese leaders of the period failed to focus on real national
objectives and so could not sort out which countries to fight and which to join.
In the end, Japan went to war against all the Western countries with presences in
the region. Additionally, the Showa leadership had no long-range strategy for
handling the relationships with the United States, Britain, or China—only stopgap measures essentially in reaction to a single incident.
Carefully Chosen Alliances. Meiji leaders allied themselves with the United
Kingdom, the strongest and the most influential country in the world at the
time. Japan received great benefits from this alliance with Britain. The alliance
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also isolated Japan’s adversary, Russia, from the international community, at
least partially, and made the Russian war effort more difficult.
Showa leaders, however, were not shrewd enough to identify their real partner, in terms of national interests. They led the country into war against the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and China, choosing instead a triple alliance (with Germany and Mussolini’s Italy) that in fact isolated
Japan itself from the rest of the world. Other than political propaganda and
some psychological effects, the Axis alliance provided almost no practical benefits to any of its members. In fact, due to global sea control by the United States
and Britain, mutual assistance between Japan and the other, very distant Axis
countries was practically impossible throughout the war. Japan’s triple alliance
meant nothing to its war effort.
The Risks of Confrontation. Meiji leaders, fully taking into account the capability of their opponent, planned and built a well balanced military force that could
meet the need in a timely manner. They ensured that adequate assets were available at the right times and in the right places.
Showa leaders were not so foresighted. They did their best, but the national
capacity of the United States, let alone the combined capability of the United
States and Britain, was too large to match. As time went by, the gap expanded
very rapidly, driving Japan into a tight and hopeless corner.
The Value of Intelligence. Meiji leaders recognized the value of high-quality intelligence. They made maximum efforts to collect information and extensively
used intelligence for war planning and actual operations.
Showa leaders similarly emphasized the importance of intelligence, but only
in theory, not practice. The Japanese intelligence structure at the time was poor
in both quality and size. Except for a few successful campaigns, military use of
intelligence was generally inadequate. The level of maturity of Japanese intelligence was far from that of the United States and Britain.
Sabotage. Meiji leadership succeeded in disrupting the enemy by supporting internal revolutionary elements. Those activities surely had a negative impact on
the Russian war effort. The Showa leaders, however, did not even attempt this
type of campaign. The United States certainly had problems that Japan could
have capitalized upon—for example, nationwide historical racial issues, and the
relationship with Mexico.
Cooperation between the Navy and Army. In the Meiji period, coordination between the services was excellent. A telling example was the victorious campaign
at Port Arthur.
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In Showa, interservice relations were generally dominated by rivalry. Even in
1941, the Army still considered its potential enemy to be the Soviet Union, and it
was preparing for campaigns in the north. The Navy’s main concern was a
southward movement for natural resources, of which Japan was short. At the last
minute the Army reluctantly provided troops for southern operations, but it
kept its main forces in China and Manchuria. Again, except for a few successes,
coordination between the two services in the Showa era was rudimentary.
Knowing When to Quit. The Meiji leaders knew when to terminate their war
and whom to ask to mediate the peace. Showa leaders went to war against multiple nations without any concrete plan for conflict termination.
Of course, these contrasts are matters of hindsight. However, the magnitude of
the change in Japanese leadership during the thirty-five years from 1905 to 1940
is easy to see. For the Japanese it is hard to accept, but this was the reality. We
should understand that for Japan the successful Russo-Japanese War was effectively the beginning of the end of Imperial Japan; the great Meiji leaders were
succeeded by poor ones. The two groups were so different that we may well ask
whether the Japanese leaders in the Showa era, who led the country to total devastation, were of the same Japanese race as their predecessors in Meiji, who had
led the nation to historic success.
There is an old Japanese saying, “A conceited and arrogant winner never lasts
long.” Unfortunately, we Japanese followed it exactly.

NOTES

1. Meiji (“Enlightened Rule”) was the name given
to the reign of Emperor Mutsuhito (1868–
1912).
2. The Qing (also known as Manchu) dynasty
lasted from 1644 until the 1911 revolution.
3. The sum of 200 million tael/liang was equivalent to 360 million yen at the time. This was
4.3 times as large as an annual budget of Japan
then. Hiromi Tanida, Nichi-Ro Senso yari-kuri
monogatari [A Balance Sheet of the RussoJapanese War], Togo (published by the Togo
Association, Japan), 16-7.8.
4. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu, Dai II Kan [Outline History of Major Naval Battles of the
World, vol. 2] (Tokyo: JMSDF Staff College,
Research Department, 1981).
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5. Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan (Chinese reading, WoXin-Chang-Dan—literally, “Lie on a layer of
charcoal and lick liver”) was a story of the
“Spring and Autumn period” of China (770–
476 BC). In order to prepare himself to avenge
the death of his father, the king of Wu, Prince
Bu-Cha, slept on a layer of charcoal, never on
a bed. Bu-Cha denied himself all luxuries and
submitted himself to hardships. He was afraid
that a luxurious life would erode his determination. Meanwhile, Gou-Jian, king of Yue, a
longtime rival of Wu, was cutting out his own
luxuries as well. He avoided all delicious foods,
preferring to lick bitter-tasting raw liver. He
wanted from the bottom of his heart to remove his worst humiliation, a defeat by Wu
at the Battle of Hui-Ji-Shan. He was determined to wage and win a new war against Wu,
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and like Prince Bu-Cha he decided to spend
his days in hard living in order not to diminish his resolution (see the Kojien Dictionary
[Tokyo: Iwanami Shuppan]). This old story is
interpreted in Japan as “To accomplish fully a
long-standing objective, encourage yourself
through diligence and dedication.”
6. With regard to the decision about AngloJapanese alliance, the four Genro and Prime
Minister Katsura met at Katsura’s summer
house in Hayama, a small town about thirty
miles southwest of Tokyo, on 4 August 1901.
At this meeting, the detailed idea that had
been developed by Katsura was introduced to
the members. Only Ito was against the alliance; however, when Ito saw the support of
the other three Genro, he compromised and
lent his support to the idea. With the Genro
behind the idea, Katsura was convinced that
it was the correct course and he proceeded to
enact the plan. But Ito was not fully convinced yet. He was still afraid of the overwhelming Russian power. This fear drove
him to make an additional but last-minute
personal attempt to seek a Russo-Japanese
treaty. One thing the Russian government
should have taken into consideration was the
real position of Ito. In other words, he was
one of the Genro, who were still influential in
Japan, but at the same time, as an individual,
he was simply a Japanese ex-politician with
no official authority. Although Ito was not in
a position to represent Japan, the Russian
government took him to be the right person
to talk to about the issue. The Japanese government, however, was embarrassed by his
private diplomatic activity. In addition to its
initial mistake, the Russian government
showed poor understanding of Japanese society and of Ito’s influence in the government
by making a fool of him when he visited St.
Petersburg. They tried to buy time by a display
of cooperativeness on Manchuria and Korea.
But the final position, sent to Ito in Berlin, was
disappointing, insisting upon unlimited Russian rights in Manchuria and only limited Japanese rights in Korea. Thus Ito was betrayed
and his private diplomacy, which might have
broken Katsura’s pro-Western attempt, finally
failed. This failure eventually gave a boost to
Katsura’s effort. At the same time, Russia lost
all credibility within the Tokyo government.
The mistaken selection of a negotiating
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partner and the mistreatment of Ito gave a
powerful weapon to the Japanese government. Ryotaro Shiba, Saka-no-ue-no-kumo
[A Biography of the Akiyama Brothers] (Tokyo: Bungei Shinju, 1970), vol. 2.
7. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu.
8. The key elements of intelligence available were
the following (ibid.).
Europe:
• The Russian army in the Far East had been
reorganized and concentrated into two
separate army corps, one responsible for
operations in southern Manchuria and
the other stationed in the Ussuri area.
• Additionally, two active army corps, four
reserve infantry divisions, and one active
cavalry brigade in European Russia were
assigned as ready reinforcements for the
Far East.
• All troops east of the Baikal were
reorganized into one army corps (III
Army Corps) and were to be transported
to the Ussuri area.
• A food supply for six months was stored
in Asian Russia.
• The Russian governor general in the Far
East had been delegated the authority to
defend the area by the tsar. He thought a
war against Japan was necessary; however,
he needed to buy some time to allow III
Army Corps to arrive. Construction of
dock facilities at Port Arthur was another
consideration.
The Far East:
• Two Russian infantry battalions were
stationed at the Yalu River.
• Construction of troop camps was under
way.
• Stockpiling of war material and purchase
of twenty thousand army horses in
Manchuria were being expedited.
• The first reinforcements, two thousand
troops, had arrived at Liaoyang.
• All Japanese residents in Vladivostok had
been ordered by the Russian governor to
evacuate to Khabarovsk.
• The Russian Far East Force had been
mobilized.
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9. Colonel Motojiro Akashi was assigned this
mission and conducted various activities to
support revolutionaries in Russia. He also
helped secessionists in Finland and Poland,
mainly by providing funds, to support Russian revolutionists indirectly. It is difficult to
identify specific footprints of his activities in
Europe, due to the clandestine nature of his
mission, but his postwar promotion to general clearly shows the government’s satisfaction with him. Yoichi Hirama, Nichi-Ro Senso
ga kaeta sekaishi [World History Changed by
the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: FuyoShobo-Shuppan, 2004).
10. Hirama, Nichi-Ro Senso ga kaeta sekaishi.
11. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu.
12. This second idea was developed by the operations officer of the Combined Fleet, Commander Saneyuki Akiyama. The Japanese
navy had sent Akiyama, as a lieutenant, to the
United States to study tactics and operations
of the U.S. Navy. During his stay he met
many of its leaders. He tried to become a student of the Naval War College, at Newport,
Rhode Island, but failed. The most important
thing, for him as well as the Japanese navy,
was that he met Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan
several times and learned the basic tenets of
Mahan’s teachings. Though he would display
a strong sense of rivalry against Japan in later
years, Mahan took good care of this young
Japanese officer. During the Spanish-American
War, Akiyama joined Admiral William T.
Sampson’s fleet at the blockade of Santiago
de Cuba, a fact that might give insight into
his ideas for blockading Port Arthur. After his
return to Japan, the Navy assigned Akiyama,
now a lieutenant commander, to develop basic tactics and operational concepts for the
Japanese fleet, looking ahead to the coming
warfare against a formidable Russian fleet.
Finally, as a commander, Akiyama was appointed as Admiral Togo’s operations officer,
which he remained for the duration of the
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war, developing all the operations and campaign plans of the Combined Fleet. So, in
terms of naval operations, it could be said
that Akiyama designed the war and Togo executed it. Kinji Shimada, Amerika ni okeru
Akiyama Saneyuki [Lieutenant Saneyuki
Akiyama: His Day in America] (Tokyo: Asahi
Shinbun, 1975).
13. Some of the warships retired to Port Arthur,
where they were ultimately destroyed by the
Imperial Army’s Long Range Heavy Artillery
for Hard-Targets Unit, which started shelling
the harbor on 18 August. Five ships—the battleship Tsesarevich, the cruiser Novik, and
three destroyers—escaped to Kiaochow Bay,
China, where Tsesarevich and the destroyers
were interned by local German officials. Novik
was able to resupply and headed for Sakhalin
but subsequently was destroyed near there by
two Japanese cruisers. All of the other ships
of the squadron suffered similar fates.
14. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu. The “engagement
in depth” concept comprised search and reconnaissance by scouting ships employed
ahead of the main force; a daytime gun engagement by the main body of battleships
and armored cruisers; a follow-on engagement by cruisers; a night torpedo assault by
destroyers and torpedo boats; a second gun engagement by the main force, possibly the next
day; continued torpedo assault by destroyers
and torpedo boats the next day; a final gun
engagement by the main force near Vladivostok; and minelaying at the mouth of Vladivostok Harbor.
15. Keigo Yoshida, “Track of Imperial Navy to
Create Perfect Victory at Battle of Tsushima,” in
Soshyutsu no koseki [Research on the Battle of
Tsushima] (Tokyo: Suzusawa-Shoten, 2000).
16. Ibid.
17. The Showa (“Enlightened Peace”) era was the
reign of Emperor Hirohito, 1926–89.
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SPACE-BASED WEAPONS
Long-Term Strategic Implications and Alternatives
Captain David C. Hardesty, U.S. Navy

T

he U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan released in November 2003 reinvigorated the debate on the issue of space weaponization. Taking a “snapshot in time” of that service’s ongoing and future transformation efforts, the
Transformation Flight Plan lays out current programs, advanced concept tech1
nology demonstrations, and “future system concepts.” Many of the systems described can be interpreted as a significant move by the United States toward
weaponization of space. As Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.) pointed out during a
recent hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, “putting weapons either offensive or defensive into space is a
2
major policy decision.” This decision will require thorough discussion and
analysis to ensure that American system deployments not only provide the
short-term benefits promised by service advocates but
contribute to increased security in the long term.
Captain Hardesty is a member of the faculty of the
Naval War College’s Strategy and Policy Department.
This article addresses one component of the debate
A 1981 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and a naon whether or not to weaponize space. Specifically, it
val flight officer, he has had a number of operational
and training tours in the E-2C aircraft community, inlooks at whether a decision to base weapons in space
cluding command of Airborne Early Warning Squadwould produce a net, long-term increase in relative
ron (VAW) 113. Additional assignments have
military capability for the United States or serve to reincluded the U.S. Atlantic Command joint task force
training team, the Cruiser-Destroyer Group 3 staff,
duce its current military dominance. It defines
and the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, Fallon,
“space-based weapon” as a system placed in orbit or
Nevada. Before joining its faculty he attended the Nadeep space that is designed “for destroying, damaging,
val War College as a student, participating in the
Mahan Scholar program and graduating with highest
rendering inoperable, or changing the flight trajecdistinction.
tory of space objects, or for damaging objects in the
3
Naval War College Review, Spring 2005, Vol. 58, No. 2
atmosphere or on the ground.”
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U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan has several program concepts that
include space-basing of weapons. The Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser
Engagement (EAGLE) concept will use “airborne, terrestrial, or space-based lasers in conjunction with space-based relay mirrors to project different laser
powers and frequencies to achieve a broad range of effects from illumination to
4
destruction.” Another, the Space-Based Radio Frequency Energy Weapon, will
“be a constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency transmitters that possess the capability to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems . . . typically . . . used as a
non-kinetic anti-satellite weapon.”5 A third, “hypervelocity rod bundles,” would
“provide the capability to strike ground targets anywhere in the world from
6
space.” While other system concepts and programs Flight Plan describes are less
specific on the point, there seems little doubt that space-basing of weapons is an
accepted aspect of the Air Force transformation planning. Now, therefore, is the
time to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of basing weapons in space—
in the end, either endorsing or recommending revision to this space-basing
assumption.
In the event, this analysis indicates that space-based weapons, though in the
short term increasing military capabilities, are in the long term very likely to
have a negative effect on the national security of the United States. Specifically, I
will argue, the vulnerabilities of space-based systems would largely negate their
projected advantages. Further, potential enemies would react to U.S. deployments, either avoiding their effects or, more ominously, space-basing weapons
of their own. These deployments would fundamentally reduce the current relative advantages the United States enjoys in conventional forces and strategic
depth—reducing the time and distance in which effective defenses must be created. Arguments for the necessity of space-basing weapons are politically untenable, based on false assumptions, or narrowly focused on space-centric concepts
that fail to integrate and take full advantage of capabilities of terrestrially based
forces. Finally, I will propose a balanced policy and strategy that should optimize
maintenance of relative advantages while hedging against uncooperative
adversaries.
HIGH GROUND OR SITTING DUCK?
Space is frequently referred to as the “ultimate high ground.” While few would
dispute that space provides an excellent vantage point, “high ground” implies a
great deal more, and in fact space is far from being the “ultimate high ground.”
On earth, high ground has physical resources near at hand for shielding and hiding
behind. In space, the “high ground” has nothing: it’s a vacuum and there is nothing
there that you don’t bring with you. On earth, high ground is often a peak with a
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castle on it like the Krak des Chevaliers, a choke point, a symbol of power. In the
“high ground” of space, you’re a thin-skinned sitting duck with a bull’s-eye painted
on your side. Anybody has a chance to shoot at you whenever they feel like it. High
ground on earth provides you with a view of everything below you, while the people
down below can’t see you, because you’re up over the edge of the fortification. In
space, everybody can see you and people on the ground can hide from you, so all
those advantages are gone. On earth, from high ground you can strike anywhere
around you while those below are limited in reaching you. In space, the attacks that
you might make, the trajectories that your vehicles might follow, follow paths that
are predictable in advance, predictable in both space and time. Ground attacks,
meanwhile, on a point in space can be almost random; they are highly variable in
time and space and are unpredictable. On earth, on the high ground, you have weapons that are more effective when you aim downward, but the “high ground” in space
is the easier target, being unprotected. Attacking uphill involves difficulty and delay
on the ground but in space, uphill and downhill attacks take about the same amount of
time and your “high ground” is very much harder to resupply and rearm. Lastly, on
earth, high ground allows a permanent control over some strategic road or territory, a
choke point that interdicts all hostile traffic around it. In space, the so-called high
7
ground is a shifting Maginot line that is easily avoided, outwaited and circumvented.

Aircraft have long performed elevated observation as well as air control and
ground strike missions. It is thus tempting to equate their demonstrated ability
to overcome ground defenses with that of spacecraft to do the same. However,
for missions in high-threat environments, various types of aircraft are grouped
in “packages” combining offensive and defensive capabilities as specifically required. Route selection, timing, and deception are keys to success, as are deliberate unpredictability and maintenance of the initiative. Spacecraft, on the other
hand, are inherently predictable, and combinations of satellites are “new” to the
enemy only on the first orbit, after which they can be planned against and lose
the initiative. Again, few similarities seem to exist between air and space
vulnerabilities.
The multiplicity of potential threats posed to U.S. space-based systems is
highlighted in the Transformation Flight Plan itself. In addition to the
space-based weapons already described that have space control missions, several
terrestrial systems are also pertinent—such as the Ground Based Laser, which
would “propagate laser beams through the atmosphere to Low-Earth Orbit sat8
ellites to provide robust defensive and offensive space control capability.” Opponents with mobile or hardened lasers could conduct speed-of-light attacks on
space-based systems at times of their choosing. The Air-Launched Anti-Satellite
Missile would “be a small air-launched missile capable of intercepting satellites
9
in low earth orbit.” Launching antisatellite weapons from aircraft could increase the unpredictability of attack and provide additional kill mechanisms
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against our space-based systems. Opponents desiring to attack our space-based
capabilities in the future would seem to have plenty of options.
THE SPACE CONTEXT
Objects in space are governed by astrodynamics: “The speed and direction of
a satellite cannot be changed as easily as an aircraft’s, and enormous amounts
of energy are required to accomplish seemingly trivial changes in a satellite’s
altitude or orbital inclination” (Howard). The movement of objects in orbit is
highly predictable—the overwhelming majority of satellites carry fuel only for
minor maneuvers at slow accelerations. Orbits, once chosen as best suited to
the satellite’s missions, are rarely changed.
Low earth orbit (LEO) (150–800 km, or 90–500 miles) gives the best imagery resolution but limits time above the horizon with respect to any given
point on earth and renders satellites vulnerable to attack or interference.
Geosynchronous orbits (GEO) (approximately 35,000 km/20,000 miles) have
periods equal to the earth’s rotation; a satellite observed from the earth appears to stay at or near the same longitude. GEO is excellent for weather observation, communications relay, and other tasks requiring continuous
hemispheric coverage from a single satellite. Beyond GEO lie high earth orbits
(HEO). Between GEO and LEO is the medium earth orbit (MEO) range. Highly
elliptical orbits can extend the time over a particular latitude.
The “clean,” clutter-free background makes objects in space easier to detect. Attempts to hide from passive or active sensors operating at one frequency can make detection by other sensors easier; as an example, painting a
satellite black to reduce reflections detectable to visible-light sensors would
cause it to become hotter and therefore emit long-wave infrared radiation detectable by infrared sensors at even greater range. However, the transparency
of space is somewhat offset by its vastness; above the lowest earth orbits, tremendous volumes must be searched to find satellites, let alone stealthy vehicles deployed from satellites. “Space situational awareness,” as a result, may
be, in practical terms, a relative concept.
All elements of space systems—in space, on the earth, and in the link between them—have vulnerabilities. Ground sites are vulnerable to threats
ranging from mortar attack to software viruses; communications links are susceptible in varying degrees to jamming. The space segment suffers not only
from predictable movement but from fragility imposed by launch weight restrictions; “armor is heavy,” and a simple device “exploded in close [would
send] shrapnel through solar arrays, battery systems, onboard computers,
guidance systems, and sensors alike” [Kennedy et al.]. If timed correctly,
direct-ascent antisatellite weapons (ASATs) fired from earth “could disperse
something as simple as sand in LEO, leaving anything passing through it . . .
severely damaged or destroyed.” Space, ground, or air-based directed-energy
weapons could conduct attacks on fragile satellite components without
warning. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and radiation generated by the
high-altitude detonation of nuclear weapons is perhaps the most devastating
threat, since “lingering effects of radiation could make satellite operations futile for many months” [Space Commission].

Sources: William E. Howard III, “Satellites and Naval Warfare,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1988); Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press,
1999); U.S. Congress, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control;
Fred Kennedy, Rory Welch, and Bryon Fessler, “A Failure of Vision,” Airpower Journal 12,
no. 2 (Summer 1998); U.S. Air Force, Space Operations Doctrine; DeBlois, “Space Sanctuary”; and Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization.
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Space-based weapons, like all space systems, are predictable and fragile, but
they represent significant combat power if used before they are destroyed—
leading to a strong incentive to use these weapons preemptively, to “use them or
lose them.” The problem is further complicated by the difficulty in knowing
what is occurring in space. As the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization pointed out:
Hostile actions against space systems can reasonably be confused with natural phenomena. Space debris or solar activity can “explain” the loss of a space system and
mask unfriendly actions or the potential thereof. Such ambiguity and uncertainty
could be fatal to the successful management of a crisis or resolution of a conflict.
They could lead to forbearance when action is needed or to hasty action when more
or better information would have given rise to a broader and more effective set of re10
sponsive options.

This lag in situational awareness can increase the effectiveness of attacks.
That is, striking first is likely to mean inflicting disproportionate losses on the
enemy; waiting increases the chances of suffering disproportionate losses
oneself.
SPACE-BASED WEAPON CONCEPTS: ADVANTAGES, ISSUES,
AND REACTION
If technical and fiscal challenges are overcome, there is little doubt that an integrated combination of airborne, terrestrial, and space-based lasers with orbiting
relay mirrors would be a flexible weapons constellation. Striking at 186,000
miles a second, laser weapons and mirrors help overcome the problems posed by
11
the large distances and high speeds for targeting in and from space. Perhaps
they would be most effective at space control, but they would also be useful for
boost-phase intercept of ballistic missiles. This is a critical missile-defense function, particularly when dealing with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. If
not destroyed in boost, nuclear-tipped missiles may deploy decoys, and chemical or biological warfare payloads might be broken into small, separate
submunitions or canister reentry vehicles, each of which is a lethal weapon that
12
must be destroyed. In such cases there is a high likelihood that defenses would
be overwhelmed.
Evolutionary Air and Space Global Laser Engagement (EAGLE)
Space-based systems would be logical for this important mission. By virtue of
the speed of the laser and its “ability to accurately place energy on targets that are
thousands of kilometers away,” a constellation would provide worldwide cover13
age against ballistic missile launch. EAGLE—which uses orbiting mirrors that
are effectively space-based weapons—might prospectively be just such a system.
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Its effectiveness, however, can only be gauged in terms of the probable reaction
of enemies.
A deployed EAGLE missile defense system by the United States would hold at
risk the ballistic missile assets of every other state. Even states with enough missiles to overwhelm EAGLE if launched simultaneously would feel increased risk,
since a first strike might reduce their inventory below the size required to saturate defenses. In that light, opponents might:

• Develop faster-burning missiles to reduce their period of vulnerability, or
harden the missiles to reduce the laser’s capacity

• Proliferate the missiles and their launchers to saturate the lasers
• Develop antisatellite capabilities against the lasers
• Shift force structure toward cruise missiles.14
The space-based segment of EAGLE would be highly predictable in its movements. An attacker would know how large a salvo of ballistic missiles would have
to be to overwhelm the defenses and when coverage would be at a minimum.
Furthermore, the one or two EAGLE laser-defense platforms that would have
engagement opportunities during the boost phase of the missile salvo could be
attacked just before it was launched. Defensive sensors could be degraded using
relatively low-powered lasers or decoys, while space-based weapons platforms
were attacked by ground-based lasers, orbiting space mines, or fast-burning,
hardened, direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) weapons. In this way, with relatively
modest resources an enemy might overwhelm the extremely expensive EAGLE
boost-phase capability. A more sophisticated foe might deploy clusters of
space-based mirrors to use in conjunction with mobile or hardened
ground-based lasers. The mirror clusters could attack large segments of the U.S.
defensive system whenever they came over their targets’ horizon.
Given these vulnerabilities and initiative possessed by the attacker in a missile
attack, it seems unlikely that EAGLE could provide anything like assured boostphase intercept.
Space-Based Radio-Frequency Energy Weapon
A constellation of satellites containing high-power radio-frequency (RF) transmitters would be a flexible system that meets critical space-control needs. During recent congressional testimony, Peter Teets, Under Secretary of the U.S. Air
Force, highlighted the need to prevent foreign powers from targeting U.S. forces
15
and the “need to have capability to deny them the use of their space assets.”
Power and modulation variations designed “to disrupt/destroy/disable a wide
variety of electronics and national-level command and control systems” would
16
likely provide a great deal of operational flexibility. In the prelude to combat it
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:15 PM

54

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2005 Issue

HARDESTY

51

might jam or disrupt systems involved in targeting U.S. forces; during conflict,
operating at high power, it could destroy confirmed enemy systems.
Here again, the question of enemy reaction is critical. It seems likely that
given the U.S. reliance on space assets, once the United States deploys RF
space-control weapons, other nations will find it to their advantage to do the
same. However, their lack of detailed intelligence on target vulnerabilities may
drive them to different space-control solutions. An opponent might fall back on
an offensive concept, using large numbers of destructive weapons—again, with
a premium on first use.
Placing space mines in the immediate vicinity of high-value American satellites would likely be a major component of an opponent’s strategy. These weapons could be fairly lightweight and possess considerable range. “For example, a
directional fragmentation warhead similar to that of a Claymore mine could
project 100,000 one-gram pellets in a pattern that would cover a 100 x 100 meter
17
area with 10 pellets per square meter at a range of 1 kilometer.” One approach
to the space mine is to “design a very small stealth weapon that is moved into po18
sition over a long period of time” and in secrecy. However, while a stealthy
space mine has definite advantages, it is not clear that an unobserved approach is
required. In a fully weaponized space environment, U.S. space-based lasers and
mirrors, each capable of attacking satellites thousands of kilometers away,
threaten distant satellites as much as would a space mine in close proximity. In
any case, until space mines actually damaged or interfered with their victims, it
would be difficult to challenge their legitimacy. To attack or disable them as a
potential threat would set a precedent for preemptive strikes against U.S.
space-based weapons, if not all its satellites.
Thus, it is likely that other countries will respond to deployment of
space-based weapons by the United States with space-control programs of their
own. Lower-technology kinetic weapons may even be seen as attractive deterrents to the sophisticated, reversible effects preferred by the United States.
Would we jam a surveillance satellite, however important, if it meant having one
of ours destroyed by a space mine? Would we not be deterred by the prospect of
seeing the critical low-earth and geosynchronous orbital zones littered with the
debris of kinetic weapons? In this area, simplicity may offer advantages to the
opposition.
Hypervelocity Rod Bundles
As far as can be known from unclassified sources, Hypervelocity Rod Bundles
are similar to other proposed kinetic-energy weapons designed for use against
terrestrial targets. These weapons, frequently referred to as “eroding rods,” seek
“to destroy targets by converting the KE [kinetic energy] associated with the
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weapon’s high velocity (5 to 11 km/s [kilometers/second]) into work and heat. . . .
For example, a two-meter rod weighing 50 pounds and penetrating a depth of
six to eight meters is similar to detonating 50 pounds of explosive in a hole
19
slightly larger in diameter than the rod.” The destructive force of these weapons is directed almost entirely in the path of the weapon’s travel; for this reason,
suitable targets include “tall buildings, missile silos, ships, and hardened aircraft
20
shelters.” Due to their extremely high speed and lack of vulnerable points, defense against the rods “would be very difficult inside the atmosphere”; the best
approach might be finding and attacking them in space before the penetrator reentry burn is complete.21 For a constellation of eroding-rod space-based weapons, trade-offs between total “delta” velocity (energy needed to deorbit), impact
velocity (destructive power), area coverage, and reentry angle suitable for accuracy seem to yield an optimum orbit altitude of around eight thousand kilometers and a response time of 1.5 to two hours.22 Such a deployment would add to
U.S. global strike capabilities, with responsiveness better than that of current
manned aircraft, and some unique munitions effects.
Once again, however, enemy reaction must be considered. Space-based global
strike weapons would confer on hostile nations much greater increases in combat power, in proportional terms, than they would for the United States. A
RAND study concluded that
because of their extremely high velocity, these [kinetic-energy] weapons are very difficult to defend against during their brief transit through the atmosphere and might
therefore be particularly interesting against heavily defended targets. These weapons
may be of only limited interest to the United States, which has other means of global
power projection. However, they may be a very good fit for another country, such as
one seeking global power projection without duplicating the American terrestrial investment or one seeking to deny access to U.S. power projection forces. For example,
instead of playing catch-up against highly evolved air and submarine defenses, a
23
country might prefer these space weapons to bypass the defense entirely.

However, conventional ordnance from space could be significantly more responsive than even kinetic weapons. Because they do not require high terminal
velocities or steep reentry angles, they could be placed in lower orbits; as a result,
24
“the responsiveness of orbital basing can reasonably be about 20 to 30 minutes.”
Space-basing precision weapons that are already available does not require high
technology. In fact, a “shape capable of carrying a large number of smart munitions might resemble a larger version of the original Discoverer/Corona film
25
return capsules.” The combination of global access, rapid response, and moderate technological development could eventually make space-based strike
weapons the preferred choice of a number of countries.
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Potentially hostile nations, however, are likely to concentrate instead on first
strike. Rather than distributing their space-based weapons evenly and at altitudes optimal for consistent, worldwide response, they might cluster weaponsdelivery platforms in lower orbits so as to reduce response time available to
defenses and increase the probability of saturating them. Even a small number of
weapons so deployed would have periodic opportunities for attacks on large
numbers of targets. Potential enemies might also emphasize the survival of individual weapons en route to targets—for instance, by firing, nearly simultaneously,
numerous submunitions that disperse even before reentry into the atmosphere.
In general, space-basing weapons would offer an enemy a number of interesting
targeting options. Even a small number of kinetic weapons could have a devastating effect on space-launch or satellite-control facilities, large warships in port,
and sensors involved in space and missile defense. Large numbers of conventional submunitions could attack military and economic targets across the continental United States. If the attack were preemptive, the chances of defeating it
or preventing extensive damage would be very low.
Even more disturbing are the targeting options if an enemy chooses
nonconventional means. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) in orbit. However, “it is difficult to distinguish
26
space-based WMD from space-based non-WMD.” Once space-based weapons
become commonplace and munitions dispensers are placed in orbit, inspection
of their contents is next to impossible. Submunitions with biological payloads,
such as anthrax, would be very deadly even if intercepted by air defenses inside
the atmosphere. “A few kilograms of the spores delivered in an inhalable form
can cause extremely large numbers of fatalities in areas of high population density. Against that kind of a target area with that kind of lethality, precision delivery is not required, just widespread dispersal and rough timing relative to the
27
time of day and weather.” Kinetic-energy weapons could add to the destruction
by targeting such sites as nuclear containment buildings and missile silos. Given
current efforts to develop a missile defense system that removes the WMD threat
to the U.S. populace, a future with space-based weapons could be very unappealing indeed.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR SPACE-BASING WEAPONS
Basing weapons in orbit, then, will not be in the long-term interests of the
United States. Still, there are those who disagree. The two most commonly heard
arguments that full weaponization of space would be beneficial for the United
States are that it is inevitable, and that space is a “center of gravity” that the nation must weaponize in order to protect. A third argument less frequently heard
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is that moving first to weaponize space would achieve complete dominance in
that domain and thus permanently secure U.S. national interests through a benevolent hegemony.
U.S. Space Hegemony
Everett Dolman argues that the downsides of space-basing weapons can be
avoided by using current and near-term capabilities “to . . . seize military control
of low-Earth orbit. From that high ground vantage . . . space-based laser or kinetic
energy weapons could prevent any other state from deploying assets there, and
28
could most effectively engage and destroy terrestrial enemy ASAT facilities.”
Other states would be allowed to compete commercially in space with the
United States, but only after notification and approval of each launch.
Underlying this view and the arguments adduced in its support is the idea
that by seizing space the United States will have seized a vantage point from
which the earth itself can be dominated. This is the “ultimate high ground” argument, which, as we have seen, has serious weaknesses; it is not at all clear that
even in strictly military terms dominance in space means dominance on earth.
In fact, its benefits are likely to be both marginal and temporary if an enemy
shifts the terms of the engagement.
The more important questions would be the political and legal. The preemptive destruction of another nation’s space-based weapon would be a direct violation of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which states that outer space “shall be free
29
for exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind.” If
U.S. deployment of space-based weapons is a peaceful use of space under the
treaty, deployment by another state is protected as well. This is not in itself a
problem for space hegemonists, who advocate “withdrawing from the current
space regime” and announcing “a principle of free-market sovereignty in
30
space.” However, potential foes are not in the least likely to accept unilateral
American assertion of space dominance, negating as it would many countries’
deterrence strategies and implying permanent and irreversible asymmetric U.S.
advantage in space. In the absence of a direct threat to their existence, such as existed during the Cold War, it is unlikely that allies would accept it either. Both
would probably, as the United States does now, view “purposeful interference
31
with space systems” as “an infringement on sovereign rights.” Heavy political
and economic costs would likely be imposed on the United States, which is unlikely to find the political will to uphold such a dramatic change in policy against
both friends and enemies.
A more limited approach, denying “rogue states” access to space, could also
be proposed. This could be construed as in accordance with the current National
Security Strategy objective to “prevent our enemies from threatening us, our
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allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction,” since it is difficult to
verify that there are no weapons of mass destruction on orbital space weapons
platforms, and even conventional space-based ordnance could attack such facil32
ities as nuclear power sites and so produce WMD-like effects. This concept
might be accepted internationally, or imposed unilaterally with acceptable political cost, against a state like North Korea, with a history of attacking its neighbors, clear links to terrorist acts, a record of violating treaties, and an
authoritarian regime. Even this example poses problems, however. Debris from
a boost-phase EAGLE engagement of a missile launched from North Korea
would presumably not hit the United States, but other nations in the region
might be struck. It is not hard to envision the outcry should debris rain on Japan,
China, or Russia from a booster that North Korea claimed had been merely placing a communications satellite into orbit.
Other rogue state space “lockout” issues are even more problematic. Iran is
frequently quoted as a potential future threat to the United States, but it seems
almost certain that a space “lockout” against a country that has not attacked its
neighbors in recent history and has functioning democratic institutions would
cause a severe international backlash. Additionally, any deployment of
space-based weapons against a “rogue state” is likely to elicit space-based weapons deployments by third parties. China is likely to be one of the first countries
to follow suit. The destabilizing aspects of space-based weapons would be particularly unhelpful in any future crisis over Taiwan. Thus, a decision to
space-base weapons should not be made under the illusion that it will result in
unilateral U.S. advantage. Some limited “lockout” from space of a rogue state
may be possible under certain circumstances, but the space-basing of weapons
in response by other states that could become enemies must be considered.
Space Weaponization Is Inevitable
The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management
and Organization reported five major findings. One of these concerned the inevitability of weaponizing space:
Every medium of transport—air, land, sea—has seen conflict. Space will be no different. . . . As with national capabilities in the air, on land, and at sea, the United States
must have the capabilities to defend its space assets against hostile acts and to negate
the hostile use of space against American interests.
Explicit national security guidance and defense policy [are] needed to direct development of doctrine and concepts of operations for space capabilities, including weapons systems that operate in space and that can defend assets in orbit and augment
current air, land, and sea forces. This requires a deterrence strategy for space, which
33
in turn must be supported by a greater range of space capabilities.
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The report cites no background analysis supporting this rather dramatic
chain of logic. The argument seems to be, first, one of historical determinism—
that other mediums having seen conflict, space will as well. That inevitability requires not only defense of assets in space but negation in advance of the hostile
use of space. The final leap is to the idea that these offensive and defensive requirements can be met only by “weapons systems that operate in space.” No potential disadvantages or possible alternatives are noted.
As for the inevitability argument, Dr. Karl P. Mueller concludes that arguments based on human nature or historical analogies to the air and sea are
“thought-provoking but ultimately weak.”34 They do not account for the fact
that though some nations continue to possess banned chemical and biological
weapons, there is no clamor in the United States to deploy such weapons in such
large numbers on the ground that their further spread is inevitable. “Perhaps
most strikingly of all, even among space weapons advocates one does not find
voices arguing that the placement of nuclear weapons in orbit is inevitable based
35
on the rule that weapons always spread.” The analogy to the medium of air also
has significant holes. Less than fifteen years after the first powered flight, military aircraft were carrying out reconnaissance, offensive and defensive
counterair, and strategic and tactical bombing missions. In contrast, over
forty-five years after Sputnik, space-based counterspace and terrestrial bombardment is not being conducted, long after the technical capability emerged.
“In fact, both superpowers did develop anti-satellite interceptors, but then
abandoned their ASAT programs, something utterly without precedent in the
36
history of air power that casts further doubt on the soundness of the analogy.”
If a decision to space-base weapons should not rest solely on arguments of
historical inevitability, it is possible to argue that weaponization of space will occur at some time in the future. When humans ultimately explore deep space,
they may indeed carry weapons for protection. A powerful weapons system may
ultimately be deployed to protect the earth from asteroids. “Ultimately” is a long
time. However, it is not long-term predictive accuracy that is important but the
almost complete irrelevance of “inevitability” to current efforts. Things that are
inevitable can be either good or bad. If something is good and inevitable, it is
logical to pursue acquisition now in order to obtain the benefits as early as possible; if something is inevitable and bad, it is logical to delay it as long as possible.
Thus, our current decisions with regard to space-basing weapons must be dictated not by its inevitability but by whether it is good or bad—by whether
weaponization and its consequences will improve or degrade the national security environment. If analysis points to overall degradation, U.S. policy should be
to delay the introduction of space-based weapons: “Even if weaponization of
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space is ultimately inevitable, like our own deaths, why should we rush to embrace it?”37
There is, nonetheless, an inevitability-based argument that is more strongly
supported by history—that once a nation deploys weapons that provide an advantage, other nations will build similar weapons or find asymmetric ways to
avoid their effect. Britain’s introduction of the dreadnought battleship at the beginning of the last century, with its combination of heavy guns, armor, and
38
speed, caused in Germany “something close to panic.” However, this revolution in warship effectiveness did not forever solidify Britain’s hold on the seas.
Only four years later, in 1909, it was the British who were in a panic, over the
39
rapid buildup of dreadnoughts by Germany; the new concept, by making previous ships almost irrelevant, was allowing Germany to overtake British naval
power much more quickly than would otherwise have been possible. History is
filled with other examples: chemical weapons, atomic bombs, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, etc.; it is difficult to think of a single
counterexample, even when the original innovator had the clear capability to
maintain a numerical lead.
Worse, space-based weapons differ in important ways from the dreadnoughts
of the early 1900s. First, as we have seen, space-based weapons are not individually robust under attack, nor can they be hidden in port; instead, they are fragile
and always exposed to attack. Additionally, in the 1900s a nation needed almost
as many expensive dreadnoughts as the enemy fleet had to have a chance of
wresting from it control of the sea. In the twenty-first century, high-technology
space-based lasers and mirrors may be able to destroy many satellites before the
attack is even detected. Even low-technology space mines and global-strike
weapons can destroy high-technology satellites and ground facilities if employed first. Finally, because of these less expensive alternatives, American technical and industrial capacity advantages will not ensure the security in space
that it would have at sea a century ago. Even if the United States deploys spacebased weapons first, its supremacy in space would not be “inevitable.”
The Space “Center of Gravity” Must Be Protected
A former director for Space Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense
outlines the essential “center of gravity” argument:
The contributions of space forces to the success of U.S. military operations and the
importance of space activities to the economy may make the medium a military and
economic “center of gravity” for the nation. A center of gravity . . . is a point of vulnerability where an attack may be decisive for the course and outcome of war. . . .
Space has emerged as an area of vital interest to the United States because of its im40
portance to national and economic security.
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This argument emphasizes the criticality of space to the military and economic interests of the United States: in view of the “hundreds of billions of dollars of national treasure invested in space activities that are woven into the fabric
of the nation’s society and economy, the U.S. armed forces will be expected to be
vigilant and ready to protect space as an area of vital national interest.”41
But is space truly an economic “center of gravity”? A thousand satellites in ten
years at an investment of a half-trillion dollars may sound large, but against an
eight-trillion-dollar annual gross domestic product, a half trillion dollars in a
decade is less impressive, on the order of 3 percent of the gross domestic product
42
of the private service sector.
Additionally, the explosive growth of fiber-optic cable has brought a relative
decrease in commercial importance of satellite communications. Total satellite
communications capacity in 2000 was approximately 130 gigabits per second
(Gbps). In contrast, 1999 cable capacity was approximately 329 Gbps, and it ex43
panded to approximately 11,942 Gbps by 2000. By 2003 the worldwide commercial satellite broadband capacity had reached approximately 160 Gbps, with
a projected increase of 60 percent over the next ten years; however, in the same
year a throughput of 160 Gbps was demonstrated over a single frequency of a
44
single fiber-optic cable. While satellites will continue to be important to commercial communications, it seems difficult to argue that they are a “center of
gravity” requiring substantial portions of the defense budget to protect.
In any case, space-based weapons would dramatically increase the vulnerability of the commercial assets they would be meant to defend. The most economically significant satellites are communications platforms in geosynchronous
earth orbits (GEO). The projected demand for commercial satellites in GEO
over the next ten years is 211, compared to only forty-eight in nongeo45
synchronous orbits. Global Positioning System satellites, on which commercial communications and transportation systems are increasingly dependent for
timing and navigation signals, are also in high, semisynchronous orbits.
Ironically, space-based weapons would place satellites in these higher orbits
at greater risk than they are now. Currently, sheer distance provides protection
from direct-ascent ASATs and the effects of nuclear detonations in low earth orbit (LEO). Even earth-based directed-energy weapons powerful enough to attack LEO satellites would need hundreds of times more power to threaten
46
geosynchronous orbits. Fairly modest hardening could even further reduce the
physical vulnerability of these satellites and, more importantly, their links. However, no amount of hardening could protect them from space mines following in
similar orbits or from kinetic ASATs in retrograde orbits—which, by attacking
any geosynchronous satellite, would place others in the geosynchronous belt at
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grave risk of collateral damage. Deploying space-based weapons to protect even
a true commercial “center of gravity” would be self-defeating.
The second element of the “center of gravity” argument is that space must be
protected as vital to the U.S. military. However, “sound military judgment has
often led military strategists to eliminate a COG’s [center of gravity’s] vulnera47
bility rather than require them to protect it.” It is not “space” that must be protected but the vital functions of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,
communications, and navigation. The medium in which they are performed is
not the key. It is the ability to support military forces while simultaneously denying those functions to the enemy that “will enable combatant commanders and
operational forces to think and react faster than an adversary and thereby dictate
48
the timing and tempo of operations.”
ALTERNATIVES
Given the notable and inherent vulnerabilities of space assets, huge investments
in pursuit of total space dominance in an attempt to shield these vulnerabilities
may not be the most intelligent approach. Better to seek alternative, terrestrial
ways to augment and enhance the key services provided from space. Space assets
would continue to perform their critical functions, but alternate systems would
provide redundancy even under attack. This approach offers even greater advantages if the alternatives operate in usefully different and, in important respects,
superior ways. When both systems are available, synergy would produce markedly better support than either could offer alone. To deny service entirely, an enemy would have to conduct successful, simultaneous attacks in two distinct
mediums; the difficulty and uncertainty involved might prevent opponents
from even making the attempt. In such a “system of systems,” terrestrial assets
might do much more to protect space assets than could any space-based
weapon.
C4ISR Mission Alternatives
Numerous options for “C4ISR”—command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—as well as for navigation
are available to augment space-based assets (see sidebar). The most logical ISR
architecture would fully integrate the relevant capabilities of satellite, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and manned systems—capitalizing on their individual strengths and increasing overall performance through networked
integration at the machine-to-machine level. Satellites, for instance, possess an
inherent advantage in peacetime access; further, and though full coverage is episodic and predictable, satellites can provide ISR across the breadth of foreign nations. If hostilities are initiated, satellites become vulnerable to attack, but it is at
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precisely this time that U.S. conventional superiority enables penetration of enemy airspace by manned and unmanned aircraft. UAVs can approach closest to
C4ISR ALTERNATIVE TECHNOLOGIES
Architectures that fully integrate the capabilities of satellites, manned and unmanned airborne platforms, and ground-based facilities could provide both
superior performance and vital redundancy in the major missions typically envisioned for satellites—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
communications; and navigation.
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are likely to assume an increasing share of ISR responsibilities.“Specially designed UAVs have long loiter time, can be positioned flexibly
near potential targets, and are small and relatively difficult to detect.” Global
Hawk offers a sixty-five-thousand-foot operating altitude, thirty-six-hour endurance, and an integrated suite of electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR) and synthetic aperture radar/moving target indicator (SAR/MTI) sensors. In 2002, the
Department of Defense foresaw three major trends for UAV sensors: “(1) migration of video to high-definition television standards, accompanied by automated precision geolocation; (2) increasing use of synthetic-aperture radar
(SAR) and moving-target indication (MTI) modes to provide all-weather,
high-resolution, wide-area situational awareness/cueing; and (3) a combination of foliage-penetration (FOPEN) radars with hyperspectral imagery (HSI) to
detect and identify targets in deep hide” (quoted in Hewish). A tiered, networked constellation of UAVs could be fielded that included high-altitude,
wide-area-surveillance UAVs working with medium and low-altitude tactical
UAVs employing EO/IR and range-gated laser radars. It could support U.S.
forces even if most space-based ISR assets were lost. UAVs, however, are not
without limitations—primarily cost, large-bandwidth communications, and
low combat survivability.
Communications and Navigation The U.S. military is already highly dependent on space for communications and navigation. Growing information
requirements and the introduction of bandwidth-intensive systems like UAVs
are increasing this reliance. The Department of Defense is developing
Transformational Communications System (TCS), a new laser-based architecture that will provide extremely high bandwidth between satellites and highaltitude airborne platforms. This truly transformational capability will increase
reliance on space-based communications; the vast majority of communications satellites, being in GEO orbits, are relatively invulnerable to direct attack
from earth, but they could be attacked, as could Global Positioning System
(GPS) navigation satellites in MEO orbits, by space-based weapons.
Complements and alternatives to space-based communications and navigation capabilities include fiber-optic cable, which could provide cheap, extremely large-bandwidth access to fixed forward military assets.
Communications with mobile military ground and air assets will likely be
conducted via radio frequency (RF) transmission. Alternatives to satellite RF
relay include manned aircraft and UAVs, which offer increased flexibility, reduced relay time, and lower power requirements. One option being explored
is to install relay capability on current large manned aircraft with other primary duties. A family of Scalable, Modular, Airborne, Relay Terminals
(SMART) has been tested on tanker aircraft. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) is examining the use of scalable, modular nodes that
support both communications relay and signals intelligence from a variety of
airborne platforms. The Army is considering mounting radios in its current
tactical UAVs to provide a “tactical internet node.”
Even the unique advantage of geosynchronous satellites will soon be challenged, by a High Altitude Airship (HAA) program. The HAA is to fly at seventy
thousand feet, carry a payload in excess of four thousand pounds, and, using
onboard propulsion and GPS navigation, maintain a geostationary position
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for over a year. Various missions and payloads are envisioned, including communications broadcast and relay, in addition to the original focus on
wide-area air and maritime surveillance of continental U.S. coasts and the
southern border. An HAA, no more than three hundred miles from its ground
users, would not suffer the “time-late” problem inherent in the 22,000-mile
round trip to geosynchronous orbit. A system linking HAA and satellite via laser communications would be highly flexible and robust indeed.
Military forces and weapons, as well as civilian infrastructure, are becoming increasingly reliant on GPS navigation and timing. While the GPS constellation has the vulnerabilities of any MEO-based satellite, terrestrial jammers
are the greater threat, as they can be small, cheap, and relatively easy to deploy. Again, complementary systems are available. The Global Positioning Experiment (GPX), conducted by DARPA, and the U.S. Air Force’s UAV Battlelab
have demonstrated the ability of airborne “pseudo-satellites” (pseudolites) to
generate high-power signals—forty-five decibels above those from the satellites themselves—that burn through anti-GPS jamming.
There would be military options even were GPS to be completely denied.
The Army’s Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) provides a
network of up to a hundred kilobytes per second with a navigation accuracy
of fifteen meters circular error probable. Similarly, the Link-16 tactical data
link has a “relative navigation” (RELNAV) that improves navigation resolution
in a GPS-denied environment, potentially at accuracies that equal or exceed
that of the current GPS system. Reliance on GPS for precision bomb delivery
could be greatly reduced with such low-cost seeker technology as the Direct
Attack Munitions Affordable Seeker (DAMASK), which has already demonstrated accuracies to within one meter without GPS. Finally, navigation receivers compatible with non-GPS satellite navigation signals (like Galileo and
GLONASS) would provide redundancy and multiply the number of navigation
systems an enemy would have to attack.
Suborbital and Space Vehicles The Suborbital Operations Vehicle (SOV)
and Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV) are under study. The SOV is a hypersonic
vehicle that, launching and recovering in the continental United States,
would “pop up” to exoatmospheric altitudes. There it would release an SMV,
which would boost itself to orbit, where it would either release low-cost ISR
satellites or collect data itself—it could pass over any given point on earth
within an hour.

Sources: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Joint Operations Superiority in the
21st Century; David B. Glade, The Technological Arsenal: Emerging Defense Capabilities
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2001); Mark Hewish, “Unmanned, Unblinking, Undeterred,” International Defense Review, 1 September 2002; Greg Jaffe, “Military Feels Bandwidth Squeeze as the Satellite Industry Sputters,” Wall Street Journal, 10
April 2002; Global Security.org, Transformational Communication Study,
www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/tcs.htm; Rhonda Siciliano, “ROBE Test Successful; ‘Smart Tanker’ One Step Closer,” USAF AFMC, www.afmc.wpafb.af.mil/HQ-AFMC/
PA/centennial/archive/news/story51.htm, and Airborne Communications Node, available at www.darpa.mil/ato/programs_ACN.htm; Phillips Business Information Corporation, “TRW Developing Payload to Demonstrate UAV-Based Communications Relay,” C4I
News, 15 August 2000; High Altitude Airship (HAA) FY03 ACTD brief, 28 June 2003,
available at www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/barbb/downloads/fy03actd.ppt; Report of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization; John Sheridan, “GPS Jamming Still a Major Concern,” Aviation International
News, www.ainonline.com/issues/03_02/03_02gpsjammingpg66.html; “Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) Fact Sheet,” Raytheon, www.raytheon.com/
products/eplrs/ref_docs/eplrs.pdf; National Research Council, Naval Forces’ Capability
for Theater Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press/Naval Study
Board, Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, 2001); Small Diameter Bomb/Small
Smart Bomb, available at www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/sdb.htm;
and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Upgrades, at www.globalsecurity.org/military/
systems/munitions/jdam-upgrade.htm; “Transformational Communication Study,”
Global Security.org, www.globalsecurity.org/space/systems/tcs.htm, p. 1.
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targets, under cloud cover, thereby providing optimal sensor performance when
target obscuration or angular resolution is an issue. UAVs and manned platforms are unpredictable threats, complicating the enemy’s cover and concealment efforts. Sensor integration from all ISR systems would enhance situational
awareness and allow rapid localization and suppression of threats to either medium. Perhaps most importantly, such networked systems would eliminate
space-based ISR as a critical vulnerability, successful attack on which could prevent U.S. victory.
As with ISR, space-based communications and navigation systems, while
providing key functions, also have terrestrially based alternatives and complements. Further, the vast majority of communications satellites are in
geosynchronous orbits and, as we have seen, would be much more vulnerable if
space-based weapons were deployed nearby; GPS navigation satellites in medium earth orbits would suffer similarly. Thus, the argument that defense of
military space assets requires space-based weapons is particularly weak for communications and navigation satellites.
Alternatives to Space-Based Weapons
The USAF Transformation Flight Plan itself lists numerous alternative systems to
perform the missions also proposed for space-based weapons. The Hypersonic
Standoff Weapon and Hypervelocity Missile concepts would allow conventional
aircraft to attack on time-critical targets at ranges out to a thousand nautical
49
miles in less than thirty minutes. The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) program
will “be an unpowered, maneuverable, hypersonic glide vehicle . . . able to
strike a spectrum of targets, including mobile targets, mobile time sensitive tar50
gets, strategic relocatable targets, or fixed hard and deeply buried targets.”
CAVs could be employed from a number of expendable or reusable platforms,
including ballistic missiles, with responsiveness that matches that of
space-based kinetic weapons.
The unique weapons effects of space-based eroding rods can also be achieved
from ground-based systems. Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) can
produce impact velocities of seven to eight kilometers per second, about the
51
same as in kinetic attacks from low earth orbit. Eroding-rod penetration capability is a function of rod length: “As long as the rod impacts at a velocity in excess of 3 km/s, the depth it penetrates depends exclusively on the composition of
the target and the rod, with only slight differences among specific hard target
52
materials.”
Similarly, non-space-based space-control weapons are available. Electronic
jamming and blinding can largely negate enemy satellite communications, sur53
veillance, and reconnaissance. These efforts can be ground or air based. The
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Air-Launched Anti-Satellite Missile and terrestrially based components of EAGLE
would contribute significantly, and computer attack could prevent information
dissemination. In any case, current American conventional capabilities and forward basing already provide a tremendous relative advantage against hostile
space systems—specifically, against ground-based telemetry, tracking, and commanding support sites, downlink reception sites, product-delivery communications systems, and launch infrastructure. If space-based weapons remain
prohibited during peacetime, competition initiated during hostilities to place
weapons in space would highly favor the nation with superior conventional
strike capabilities and strategic depth—that is, the United States.
Satellite vulnerability and the negation options described above make satellite protection a particularly challenging aspect of space control, even if
space-based weapons are prohibited. A “near-peer competitor” with ASAT capabilities is highly likely to disable at least some U.S. space assets in low earth orbit.
An important portion of the protect function identified in the U.S. Space Com54
mand’s Long Range Plan comprises, therefore, reconstitution and repair. A flexible launch mechanism with both inexpensive, partly capable and full-capability
replacement satellites could continue essential space missions in spite of losses.
Under this construct, after suffering damage to major systems the United States
would immediately launch low-cost replacement satellites to restore partial capability, while unmanned aerial vehicles would augment ISR throughout the
hostile nation as identified threats to satellites were attacked. This concept is
55
very similar to “Operationally Responsive Space” efforts already under way.
Boost-phase ballistic missile interception is extremely difficult regardless of
the medium from which it is conducted; here again, however, there are alternatives to space-based weapons. The airborne and ground-based laser components of EAGLE could be augmented with “airship relay mirrors” operating at
56
up to seventy thousand feet. This arrangement could be effective in confrontations with countries the size of North Korea, but coverage for larger countries,
and countermeasures that might be available to them, remains a concern. Other
options include ground or air-based high-speed missile interceptors. Mounting
such an interceptor on a stealthy, high-altitude, high-endurance UAV would be
costly, but perhaps it “would be no more expensive, and would be more techni57
cally feasible, than a system which relies on orbital weapons.” The possibility
that stealth UAVs are in the area could prove more unsettling to a potential attacker than space-based systems, which can be planned against.
Some analyses cast doubt upon the likelihood that any boost-phase intercept
systems could be deployed before countermeasures made them ineffective. The
American Physical Society recently concluded that neither interceptors nor airborne lasers were likely to be useful against solid-propellant ICBMs, which are
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more heat resistant and burn faster, reducing engagement time lines. While
some of the study’s assumptions are open to challenge, there is little doubt that
terrestrially based boost-phase intercept against high-end ICBM threats would
59
be challenging. Space-based systems, however, suffer similar drawbacks. The
same study calculated that over 1,600 space-based interceptors would be required to eliminate a single solid-propellant ICBM, requiring “at least a five-to
60
ten-fold increase in the current annual U.S. launch capacity.” Additionally,
most potential countermeasures to and limitations of airborne lasers also apply
to space-based laser systems.
Conventional superiority and forward basing provide numerous alternatives
having comparable capabilities, in terms of both responsiveness and effect, to
space-based weapons. Further, these alternatives confront potential enemies
with both conventional superiority and strategic depth.
THE ARMS-CONTROL OPTION
Evidence and analysis show, then, that deployment of space-based weapons will
negatively impact U.S. national security—the combination of exploiting alternative capabilities and preventing deployment of space-based weapons represents for the United States the best chance of maintaining and increasing its
military advantage. What, then, is the next step?
In the long run, it is unlikely that American self-restraint alone would prevent
other nations from pursuing space-based weapons. Some country will eventually calculate that space-based weapons provide unique capabilities or leverage,
probably against U.S. dominance. That prospect makes necessary an armscontrol regime.
Past arms-control treaty failures, “notably, the Versailles Treaty[,] resulted in
part from a failure to devise effective verification arrangements and policies for
61
response to noncompliance.” However, verification of a space-based weapons
treaty is greatly assisted by the considerable (and highly detectable) energy required to place anything in orbit. Additionally, the relatively low number of
space launches and sites, the technical adequacy of current inspection technology, low cost of inspection, and the possibility of delaying the launch if clarification is needed all suggest that the prospects are good for high-confidence
62
verification of any space-based weapons treaty.
There must be a mechanism for response to noncompliance. While most nations would desire to maintain peace, avoid destabilization, and preserve space
for peaceful use, rogue states pursuing narrow interests may view weapons in
space as a source of leverage over the United States or other nations. While international consultation would be required, unilateral action when a state believes
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a space-based weapon threatens it should be allowed for. This alone should ensure that all states would assure the international community, particularly the
major powers that could interdict a satellite system, of the treaty-compliant nature of their space vehicles. A state refusing to comply could expect rapid counteraction. “Surgical” elimination of an apparently threatening platform in the
isolation of space is more likely, and therefore more credible, than the strikes on
a state’s homeland that might be necessary to counter violation of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, or the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
While some in the United States inherently distrust arms control, sometimes
it is in the nation’s interest. The WMD threat has led the current administration
not only to call for compliance with the biological and chemical weapons conventions but for strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
63
Missile Technology Control Regime.
Unfortunately, the required analysis and decisions have not been made, nor are
they in sight—but a national policy with regard to the space basing of weapons
is needed now. American leverage to negotiate a favorable treaty will fade over
time, and system decisions are currently being made based on presumptions
about future environments. In recent congressional hearings, Undersecretary
Teets stated that Air Force trade studies are under way to determine if the new
64
Space Based Radar should be in low or medium earth orbit. Its results could be
radically different depending on whether its authors assume the presence of defensive counterspace assets or of no space-based weapons at all. Without a cogent policy on space-based weapons, billions of dollars could be spent in a less
than optimal manner.
In the military planning process, a mission is refined, friendly and enemy
strengths and weaknesses are compared, vulnerabilities are analyzed, and centers of gravity are determined. Potential enemy courses of action are then developed and war-gamed against various friendly options, and the best option is
selected. This process recognizes that the enemy’s actions are half of any military
equation—a reality that, unfortunately, the strongest advocates of space-based
weapons appear to have neglected. They have failed to examine even all available
friendly courses of action, concentrating instead on “stovepiped,” space-centric
capabilities.
Before the nation moves forward to develop space-based weapons, it must
conduct a thorough military analysis. The U.S. Strategic Command is a logical
65
agent for this critical task. The military analysis should then feed a larger policy
debate, with increased emphasis on diplomatic and fiscal factors. But wherever
and however it occurs, the debate must fully consider the long-term strategic
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:17 PM

69

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

66

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

implications of space-based weapons and potential alternatives to them. To proceed
with space-based weapons on any other foundation would be the height of folly.
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IF THE NUCLEAR TABOO GETS BROKEN
George H. Quester

A

s we contemplate the multitude of possible future calamities for our world,
very few would seem quite as dreadful as another use of nuclear weapons in
an attack on a city, or in an attack anywhere else. Because this prospect is indeed
so horrible, however, one finds relatively few people ready to focus on it, ready to
consider what would happen next.
This article is therefore intended to open the question of the probable consequences if nuclear weapons were to be used again in anger, for the first time since
the bombing of Nagasaki in 1945—that is, to begin a speculative analysis of what
the world’s likely reactions would be and of what the policy responses of the
United States (and the other democracies) then perhaps should be, if there were
indeed to be such an awful event.
The very worst breaking of the “nuclear taboo” would of course be a thermonuclear World War III, from which human life might never recover. The end of
the Cold War has led most of us to conclude that the risks of such a nuclear holocaust are much reduced. Thus speculation here would mostly be directed to the
many other ways in which nuclear weapons could again come into use, even
while a thermonuclear exchange between the United States and Russia still cannot be rated as totally impossible.
Rather than an attempt at analysis of the details of the physical damage that
would be inflicted in various kinds of nuclear attack (the sort of analysis that has
been done many times since the onset of the Cold War), this will be a speculative
exploration of the political, psychological, and social aftermath if such weapons
1
were to be used again.
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PESSIMISM OR OPTIMISM?
To begin, such an exploration is not premised on a pessimistic assumption that
such a use of nuclear weapons is so very likely to occur. Instead, the analysis is
based on the prudential assumption that it is useful to have considered the consequences if such a nuclear weapon were to be used, on the premise that a total
surprise and lack of advance speculation would indeed lead to less optimal policy responses.
Anyone embarking on this kind of speculation thus runs the risk of being accused of pessimism, or indeed of favoring an early erasure of the stigma that has
kept such weapons from coming into use again (even though a great many have
been produced) for the past sixty years. At the minimum, someone opening up
this question for analysis will also be accused of a self-confirming hypothesis, in
a process by which the mere idea of such a weapon being used leads someone
else to anticipate such use, which might cycle back to make such an event more
likely all around the system.
Yet it has to be noted that the nuclear weapons question is shaped by selfdenying hypotheses as well as by self-confirming ones. The mere thought of a use
of nuclear weapons and of the damage that such weapons would cause has
driven many governments to devote extra effort to preventing their proliferation
and use. If a speculative analysis were to do nothing more than to reinforce the
nuclear taboo, by making states all the more ready for any violation of it and
then all the better prepared to head off and thus deter such a violation, the exercise would hardly be without value.
It will therefore be desirable to avoid excessively speculative analysis, while it
will at the same time be important to broaden the horizon of the possibilities being considered. It will be important to note the most likely scenarios, while not
ignoring those that are less likely and that might thus catch the world more by
surprise.
THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIOS
The three most likely scenarios for a use of nuclear weapons might, for the moment, be in an escalation of warfare between Pakistan and India, a capricious
action by North Korea, and a terrorist attack on the United States.
If a war breaks out between two opposing nuclear powers, such as today’s India
and Pakistan, or between some other nuclear dyad of the future, it might very
possibly be the result of a brinksmanship where neither side backed down,
where bluffs got called, and where the worst that was threatened became an awful reality. In the aftermath of such a failure in crisis diplomacy, there are at least
two broad streams of follow-on.
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The worst, of course, would be a process of all-out escalation, a war in which
both sides exchanged rounds until one arsenal or another was exhausted or until
all the cities of one or both the adversaries had been destroyed. The need for intervention by the United States or another outside power might come to seem
urgent, lest millions of people be killed day after day.
At the other, more hopeful, extreme, the opposing sides might themselves be
so shocked by the magnitude of just one nuclear detonation that they would immediately devote a major effort to achieving a truce and cease-fire, leaving for
the outside world simply the role of truce facilitator.
The history of past wars does not settle us into either of these flows of events,
however. World War I did not involve weapons of mass destruction, but it did
impose mass destruction by ordinary weapons, once the unthinkable had happened and the line had been crossed into actual warfare; thereafter it proved impossible for the warring parties or outside powers to achieve a cease-fire. (The
American decision to enter that war could well be seen as driven more by the felt
need to end the war than by a definite identification with one side over the
other.)
Yet on the more positive note, the history of successful nuclear deterrence
suggests that nations have indeed been in awe of nuclear weapons, have been deterred by the prospect of their use, even while they were intent on deterring their
adversaries as well. Would the nations that have been so successfully deterred
(since Nagasaki) from using nuclear weapons not then be stopped in their tracks
once deterrence had failed, once the anticipated horror of the nuclear destruc2
tion of even a single city had been realized?
Another of the more probable scenarios has been a use of such weapons by
North Korea, a state perhaps not quite as “undeterrable” as the suicidal pilots of
11 September 2001 but given to rational calculations that are often very difficult
to sort out. This use could come in the form of a North Korean nuclear attack
3
against Japan, South Korea, or even the United States. The nearest targets for a
North Korean nuclear weapon would be South Korea and Japan, but there would
be many complications should Pyongyang use such weapons against either. (If
the complications were so severe as to eliminate the idea of a North Korean
nuclear escalation entirely, the world might heave a sigh of relief that Pyongyang
might not be so “undeterrable” after all. But the style of the North Korean leadership has unfortunately been such that almost nothing can be excluded.)
For Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons to destroy Seoul or another South Korean city would be to kill a great number of Korean “countrymen,” the people
whom the communist regime has always claimed to identify with and to want to
liberate. It would also be to destroy a very valuable economic asset that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has always wanted to inherit and
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capture, and in the meantime the place from which any economic relief to end
the North’s material misery would originate.
But if the communist leadership of the North has always claimed to love the
Korean cousins in the South, Koreans in general have often voiced a hatred for
the Japanese, based on the memories and experience of Tokyo’s forty-year occupation of Korea, and on the failure of the current Japanese government to accept
fully the guilt or blame for this, whether in new editions of schoolbooks,
speeches by public officials, or other fora.
For the DPRK to destroy a Japanese city would be to kill some number of
overseas Koreans (a fraction of whom have been identifying with the North Korean regime and remitting substantial amounts of hard currency and material
aid to the North), but also to kill a much greater number of Japanese, for whom
no affection is evident. Yet the
A taboo refers to something about which we do world’s outrage at such an attack
not weigh benefits and costs but that we simply would surely be increased if the
target were Japan, theretofore the
reject.
only victim in history of a nuclear
attack, a victim for which there would thus inevitably be reinforced sympathy.
Unless the circumstances are extraordinarily peculiar, then, the world is very
likely to denounce, and to be ready to back strong actions against, any use of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang. But this reaction could be counted upon to be all
the more vehement if Japan were the target, if Japan had to suffer again.
Because of the seeming irrationality of Pyongyang’s past behavior, the Japanese public has been quite sensitive to the possibility of North Korea’s acquiring
such nuclear warheads, or testing and acquiring the missiles needed to deliver
them to a Japanese target. Yet it has also had to live for a longer time with the fact
that the People’s Republic of China has acquired nuclear weapons and the delivery systems needed to reach Japan, over a period when Beijing at times seemed
almost as irrationally disposed toward the outside world as Pyongyang seems today (it must be noted that the PRC once fit all the dimensions of a “rogue state”).
There is also still a strong anti-Japanese feeling to be found among the Chinese
people, comparable to what one sees among the Koreans.
The trend in Japanese politics and military procurement decisions, in the face
of such nuclear threats, is thus not easy to predict. One version is that as long as
no nuclear weapons are used anywhere, Japan would simply accept being within
reach of potentially hostile nuclear forces, even if Pyongyang keeps on testing
missiles or openly acquires nuclear warheads, relying on the American connection, world opinion, or something else to deter any North Korean attack. A very
different version of the future would see Japan moving to acquire nuclear weap4
ons of its own.
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Many other scenarios remain. One—perhaps tied to an escalation between
India and Pakistan, but perhaps not—would be the inherent risk of a nuclear exchange between India and China.
Moving westward, in a certain broad sense the existence of Israel is continually in danger because of the hostility of its Arab neighbors, and because of the
narrowness of its boundaries, which always poses some doubt about the reliability of a conventional defense. If the rumors of Israel’s possessing nuclear weapons have thus served as a reinsurance for Israeli security over the past four
decades, one can never rule out the possibility of such weapons coming into actual use.5 One must also take into account the bombastic statements that sometimes emerge from Iranian or other pulpits, whereby an Islamic nuclear weapon
would be the means for destroying Israel simply by leveling its cities and killing
6
its people in a single strike. Such a horrendous scenario might seem constrained
by concern for the safety of Jerusalem, one of the three holiest sites for any Muslim, and by concern for the safety of Arabs who live in Israel or the West Bank,
but the rationality of decision processes in the Middle East has not been reassuring for the outside world.
The sum total of the likelihood of a new use of nuclear weapons must also include an array of threats of insubordinate or outright “crazy” nuclear attacks, as
well as attacks by terrorist groups unaffiliated with any existing government.
The risks even embrace the possibility that the United States might be the power
that uses such weapons again, driven to do so by one situation or another. (One
can hardly forget all the decades where the United States had to keep open the
“flexible response” option of introducing nuclear weapons for the defense of
NATO or South Korea, where a communist conventional aggression could not
7
otherwise have been repulsed.) Whenever nuclear forces have been present in
the arsenals of the states involved in international crises, there have always been
the risks of such weapons coming into use if a conventional battle erupted, because of the sheer confusion and chaos of fighting and through the natural reactions of any military unit that faces being overrun conventionally while it has
nuclear weapons close at hand.
This inherent risk of escalation, indeed, played a role in making American
nuclear responses credible on behalf of NATO in the decades that the Soviet
Union was seen as having the conventional advantage in an invasion of Western
Europe. An American president might have found it preferable not to introduce
nuclear weapons when Warsaw Pact tanks were advancing by conventional force
alone, but U.S. units possessing “tactical” nuclear weapons would in any case
have been in the path of such a Soviet armored advance. There is an old artillery
tradition that one does not allow one’s ammunition to be captured but rather
goes down firing it at the enemy; the leadership in Moscow could thus never rule
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out the possibility that a successful armored advance into Western Europe
would have triggered a nuclear response, regardless of the inclinations of a president fearful for American cities.
Some of the same inherent motivations and concerns would be at play in a
conventional military conflict between China and the United States over Taiwan. Beijing and Washington might both find it in their own supreme national
interests to keep such a conventional war quite limited, to prevent nuclear weapons from being introduced. But nuclear warheads might be present on board the
warships of either power; if such a ship were to be sunk or even attacked, there is
8
always some risk that the nuclear weapons involved would be fired.
The mere possibility of such a nuclear escalation could lead either side to
tighten up its command-and-control arrangements so substantially that this
could not happen, or perhaps to pull the nuclear weapons far back so that they
would be out of harm’s way in any likely confrontation. The Chinese communist
regime, in fact, proclaimed a “no first use” policy the moment it tested its first
nuclear weapons, suggesting that it wanted not to threaten nuclear escalation
9
but rather, mostly, to deter any adversary from such escalation.
But the same inherent risks can be exploited to make the other side very cautious about getting into even a conventional war, because of the deterring fear
that it might lead to a nuclear holocaust. One has in recent years thus seen articles by Chinese defense scholars suggesting that the Chinese military might find
some battlefield uses for nuclear weapons or might want to brandish the possibility that China would be the first, rather than the second, to employ nuclear
10
weapons once a war had begun. As each side in effect plays “chicken” with such
risks, a nuclear escalation could occur, by accident, in the heat of battle.
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one can envisage only a few such
scenarios of warfare breaking out where both sides possess nuclear weapons—in
confrontations between Pakistan and India, India and China, or the United
States and China—but there would be more such risks in the future if nuclear
weapons continue to spread. For almost all such cases, if a nuclear weapon is
used, if as “deterrence fails” one side risks bringing the other side’s nuclear weapons into use, both sides are likely to regret it.
The inherent nature of the preexisting crisis and conventional confrontation
would in many ways have prepared the outside world for the possibility of the
introduction of nuclear weapons, so that it would come as a little less of a shock
than many of our other scenarios. The immediate target—an American aircraft
carrier, a Pakistani troop concentration, etc.—would more likely be a “military”
target, perhaps thus affronting the world’s moral feelings somewhat less than if a
city had been hit. But the sheer number of sailors or soldiers killed in such an escalation would nonetheless be a major shock. For a variety of reasons, the
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natural response of the victim of such an attack would be to hit back with a nuclear retaliation, amid the risk that the back-and-forth of such a nuclear exchange would quickly get out of hand and lead to the targeting of major cities.
The net impact of the mere presence of nuclear weapons would thus be of a
pattern similar to that achieved in the Cold War: conventional wars would be
discouraged, or at least more carefully managed, but the risk would loom of a
first-use-since-Nagasaki.
WATCHING FOR THE LESS LIKELY SCENARIOS
If the above survey draws in the most likely scenarios for a nuclear escalation,
one also wants to be on guard against a nuclear attack that comes in a much less anticipated form. What we expect the least may cause the greatest damage and shock.
As one contemplates the many different ways in which nuclear weapons
could again come into use, important questions pertain to the physical impact
of such an escalation, ranging from the very major to the relatively minor. The
cases we have to be prepared for include multiple nuclear strikes or a single detonation accompanied by clear signals that more such attacks are to follow. But if a
single detonation were accompanied by signals that nothing more was threatened for the moment, the world’s reactions would be considerably different
from those following more sizable nuclear attacks. As a most important index of
how damaging an event is, one can envisage on one hand nuclear escalations in
which no one is killed, and on the other, escalations in which millions perish.
For predicting the likely reactions of the world and sorting out the presumably best policy responses for the United States, much will thus depend on
whether the damage initially inflicted seems containable (and perhaps even preventable thereafter, if proper new defensive steps are taken), or whether it seems
to be open-ended. If the use of nuclear weapons looks like a one-time aberration
from the normal post-1945 pattern, the situation may seem manageable along
the same broad lines as applied since World War II, and outside reactions may be
calmer. But if the door on nuclear destructiveness cannot be relocked, much
larger and urgent responses may seem in order. Further, as the proliferation of
weapons systems continues, much may depend on what kinds of such systems,
offensive or defensive, have been deployed by the time a nuclear weapon is used.
A great number of relevant possibilities have to be considered. By the time of nuclear escalation, the United States may already have effective missile defenses
and resuscitated air defenses, or it may not; also, it may or may not have already
11
seen a widespread proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
As in all the wars and the war plans of the past, much will depend on what
kinds of targets are hit. Nuclear weapons are most often thought of as “countervalue” weapons, capable of destroying entire cities as at Hiroshima and
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Nagasaki; nonetheless, contingencies have existed ever since the onset of the
Cold War for much more strictly countermilitary, or “counterforce,” uses of
12
such weapons. Again, there may be a great variation in the results achieved in
such an attack. If important military goals are achieved in the escalation, very
different responses might emerge than if the nuclear escalation has proven relatively fruitless.
The next power to use a nuclear weapon in combat could be a state hostile to
the United States; this scenario, to the extent that they have been thinking about
this problem at all, naturally captures the most attention of Americans. But the
user could instead be a power that is neither hostile nor friendly to the United
States, involved in a conflict in which it is difficult for Americans to identify with
either side. The nuclear escalator might even be an ally of the United States.
Finally, as noted, the scenarios for the next use of nuclear weapons also must include those involving such use by U.S. armed forces.
The victim of the attack might be the United States itself, with impact on
American territory, an American military base abroad, or ships of the U.S. Navy.
Or the victim might be a state closely allied with the United States, a military ally,
or a nation that for historical and cultural reasons is regarded with particular
friendship by Americans.
Alternatively, the nuclear escalation could come in such circumstances that
the United States does not feel particular pain at the victimization of either side.
The United States might see the target (to cite an example, Iran) as an enemy,
viewing its government and perhaps even most of its people as hostile to Americans in the previous months and years. (Extensive and vivid coverage of the
destruction by CNN or its equivalent might produce some sympathetic identifi13
cation here, of course.)
The country using the nuclear weapon, or the victim, or both, might have extensive followings around the world, linkages of ethnicity or ideology that produce widespread sympathy. Two obvious examples would be an Islamic regime
or a radical, perhaps Marxist, one, which might be viewed elsewhere as representing the economically downtrodden of the world. By comparison, either the
perpetrator or the victim might be a state that is relatively isolated (Israel or India being plausible examples).
Yet another category of differences relates to what the nuclear weapons had
been used in response to. The scenarios here may include someone else’s use of
another kind of weapon of mass destruction (WMD)—that is, chemical or bio14
logical—or someone else’s launching of a major conventional military attack.
If the nuclear attack came after a prolonged and very destructive conventional
war in which hundreds of thousands of people had already become casualties,
the shock in the outside world at the nuclear escalation would be much less.
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Shock and indignation are very much functions of expectations and context.
Such shock might be least, for instance, if, as in August 1945, the introduction of
nuclear weapons suddenly brought a horrible conventional war to a close. However, the nuclear escalation might not have been a response to any external event at
all; it may not even have reflected any conscious governmental decision. It may instead have been a result of insubordination or insanity, or an act by a terrorist
movement with no following and no territory to control, perhaps designed to
damage the very government the nuclear weapons of which had been put to use.
Differences in motivation and responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons
will thus be enormously important, ranging from the carefully calculated and
centrally managed, to possibilities of insubordination, derangement, or berserk
systems. In relation especially to counterforce motivation, the attack might be
driven by anticipations of a comparable attack from the other side, thus basically
a preemptive attack, with all the tension, and mutual reinforcement of tension,
that such preemptive scenarios have always included.
To move away slightly from the distinction between countervalue and
counterforce targets, and between military and civilian targets, some victims of
nuclear attack might be seen in the world, and in the United States specifically, as
innocent of any wrongdoing, of anything that might justify such an attack, while
others might seem much more “guilty” by some standard and thereby more understandably a target of retribution. Aside from guilt or innocence, the use of
nuclear weapons might strike the world variously as more defensive or as more
offensive—that is, nuclear weapons could be employed to repulse a conventional aggression that would otherwise have changed the territorial status quo.
Such weapons might, in contrast, have been employed to reinforce and facilitate
such an aggression.
THE NATURE OF A TABOO
The background of the possibilities we are considering here must also include
15
some discussion of the nature of a taboo. One often hears references to a “taboo” on the use of nuclear weapons, but people usually have difficulty putting
their finger on exactly what that means. A taboo surely is more than simply
something we want to avoid, something we disapprove of, for we do not hear of
taboos on bank robberies or on murder. A taboo, then, refers to something that
we are not willing even to think about doing, something about which we do not
weigh benefits and costs but that we simply reject.
The best example in ordinary life is the taboo on incest. If a six-year-old girl
asks whether she could marry her brother when they grow up, her parents typically do not reason with her, perhaps suggesting, “Your brother and you are always squabbling about your toys; surely you can find someone else more
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compatible to marry.” We instead respond simply, “No one marries their brother
or sister!” The child quickly enough picks up the signal that this is something
that is simply not done. Another such taboo is, of course, cannibalism. Air Force
crews are briefed on hundreds of measures they can take to survive after a crash,
but one subject never touched upon is that of avoiding starvation by consuming
the body of a dead comrade. The entire question is just not thinkable.
The taboo on nuclear weapons use that seems to have settled into place over
the nearly sixty years since Nagasaki may indeed have taken this form. We do not
hear many discussions of the costs and benefits of a nuclear escalation, but a
somewhat unthinking and unchallenged conclusion that such escalation is simply out of the question. Related, though hardly identical, is speculation as to
whether a “customary international law” on the use of nuclear
The nuclear weapons question is shaped
weapons may be said to have
by self-denying hypotheses as well as by selfemerged, by which the battlefield
confirming ones.
application of such weapons has
become illegal without any international treaties being signed or ratified, simply
16
because they have gone so long unused. How such a custom or taboo is developed and what happens to it when violated will play an important part in our assessment of what the world would be like after a new nuclear attack.
The fact that the nuclear taboo is not violated decade after decade, that nuclear weapons are not used again in anger, arguably strengthens the taboo, but
there are also a few ways in which that state of affairs may endanger it. The reinforcement comes simply from the general sense that such an act must be unthinkable because no one has initiated one for so long; it is in this sense that
“customary international law” is held to be settling into place by which the abstinence of other states presses our own state to abstain. People did not begin
speaking about a “nuclear taboo” for a number of years after Nagasaki. It was
only in the late 1950s, after more than a decade had passed without repetition of
the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the feeling arose that a barrier
17
now existed to treating nuclear weapons as “just another weapon.”
But in time there will be hardly anyone alive who was a victim of the 1945 attacks, hardly anyone who remembers seeing the first photographs of their victims or who recalls the nuclear testing programs of the 1950s and 1960s.
Further, an unwelcome result of the bans on nuclear testing, intended to shield
the environment and discourage horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation, is
that some of the perceived horror of such weapons may be fading, so that ordinary human beings will be a little less primed to reject automatically the idea of
such weapons being used again.
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The only fair test of the long-term viability of the nuclear taboo would, of
course, be for the world to manage to keep that taboo observed and intact. The
net trend, the net result, of a prolongation of non-use is most probably that such
non-use will be strengthened and renewed thereby, just as it seems to have been
over the decades of the Cold War and its aftermath.
There have been parallel “taboos” in other areas of warfare, taboos that have indeed been violated in the last several decades. The world for many years sensed the
development of such a taboo on chemical warfare; the effective prohibition was
reinforced by the Geneva Protocol but observed even by states that had not yet ratified the protocol (the best example being the United States at its entry into World
18
War II). A similar taboolike aversion was thought to apply to biological warfare.
The long period since naval forces have confronted each other on the high seas
(broken only by the Argentine-British war over the Falklands) may have had some
similar characteristics. The longer one goes without engaging in some form of
warfare, the stranger and less manageable that kind of conflict will seem, and the
more the public and others will regard it as simply not to be contemplated.
Similarly, the world’s resistance to the proliferation of nuclear weapons has at
times seemed to be mobilizing a widespread popular feeling that a taboo or
“customary international law” was developing on proliferation as well. Ordinary
people and even military professionals in many countries were coming to assume that nuclear weapons were so horrible, and so different, that it simply
19
made no sense to think of even acquiring them.
One more kind of taboo on weapons use was grossly violated in the attacks on
the American homeland beginning on 11 September—a pattern, not easily explained while it persisted, by which terrorists had not engaged in attacks using
“weapons of mass destruction.” Analysts of terrorism used to wrestle with why
such attacks had thus far never threatened more than dozens or hundreds of in20
nocent people and had not utilized chemical or biological weapons. Some argued that the chemical and biological weapons were too difficult to acquire,
while other experts in those technical areas scoffed, suggesting that their
first-year graduate students could produce such weapons.
The explanations then tended to shift to the motivation of the terrorists; possibly they were seeking to win the sympathies of the populations that they were
attacking. With regard to WMD, some analysts sensed that terrorists might be
imitating governments, perhaps because the terrorists were seeking to become
governments themselves. That is, the argument went, since governments were not
using chemical and biological weapons terrorists were not using them either, being affected to some extent by the same cultural norms, the same taboo. It was
perhaps because governments were not killing thousands of people in nuclear
exchanges that terrorists were steered away from killing thousands themselves.
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All of this was, of course, very badly shaken after 11 September, as the airliners
that were seized and flown into large buildings put more than sixty-five thousand people at risk; as the use of anthrax in letters mailed to various public
21
figures introduced a biological warfare element into terrorism; and just as the
1995 nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult had already introduced the chemical weapons element.22
Thus, when taboos are violated, the question immediately arises whether the
taboos will remain or whether violation by many more parties has become much
more thinkable. We may be able to learn something from the aftermath of cases
where other taboos were violated. The world has seen several rounds of chemical
warfare since the 1950s, though this was the one kind of warfare that the Allies
23
and the Axis largely managed to abstain from during World War II. There have
been reports that the Soviet Union and its allies experimented with various
forms of biological warfare in Cambodia and in Afghanistan (and during
World War II the Japanese engaged in horrible experiments with biological
24
warfare in China).
The Indian and Pakistani detonations of nuclear warheads in 1998 may not
have changed very much of the reality of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, as
India was projected to have enough plutonium already for as many as seventyfive nuclear weapons (and had already detonated a “peaceful nuclear explosive”
in 1975) and as Pakistan was assumed to have enough enriched uranium for as
25
many as ten warheads. Yet the blatancy of the detonations again challenged the
idea that a further spread of nuclear weapons was unthinkable, that it was somehow taboo.
Pessimists might thus have expected extensive nuclear weapons proliferation
around the world after India and Pakistan had made such an open display of
their newly acquired weapons, as they might have expected numerous conflicts
on the high seas after the Falklands War. Fortunately for the world, neither has
happened. In these parallels, then, single violations did not totally shatter the
pattern of restraint or eliminate the world public opinion behind that
restraint.
Pessimists might expect that the use of chemical and biological warfare is
now generally more likely, as more and more states and even nonstate actors are
able to lay their hands on such weapons and as the instances of state and
nonstate exploitation of such weapons erode the taboo. One has to be very careful not to ignore the pessimistic forecasts here—just as one cannot assume that
the attacks on the World Trade Center will be one-of-a-kind operations just because the immediate perpetrators killed themselves in the process. Other attacks are likely to be launched against tall buildings, by agents of the same
organization that launched the 11 September attacks or by “copycat” imitators.
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Yet neither should one simply conclude that nothing good is possible hereafter,
that the world’s feelings about what is “thinkable” or “unthinkable” make no
difference.
If nuclear weapons are used, whatever taboo had been at work will have been
violated, and further uses of such weapons will seem more thinkable. Yet the
very possibility that a taboo had been in place suggests that it could be renewed
and retained even then. If most of the world now regards a given kind of military
action as “unthinkable,” an actual instance would challenge that attitude but not
necessarily demolish it.
INPUTS FROM SIMULATIONS
One can learn from simulations of possible future scenarios, and one can teach
the participants in such simulations a great deal about the choices and options
26
that a national decision maker would face in some future crisis. Yet one can
also exaggerate the reliability of such simulations as a research tool and as a predictor of future behavior, because the individuals taking part may be excessively
self-conscious about role playing.
It was commonly observed in the Cold War that the players in simulations
were surprisingly reluctant to employ nuclear weapons—reluctant to escalate
even when the scenario was specifically designed to explore what the nuclear
phase of a war would be like. All in all, such simulation results might be good
news, suggesting that the entire premise of the present study is too pessimistic,
that nuclear weapons are not likely to come into use. But these simulations
might also support the more worrisome inference that the players in such exercises are themselves under the influence of the “nuclear taboo,” inclined to see a
use of such weapons as unthinkable, and hence reinforcing our disinclination
even to think about nuclear escalation and its consequences.
That the players in simulations are not ready to use nuclear weapons might
simply mean that no one is ready for this possibility—no one, that is, but the solitary rogue-state decision maker who one day launches such weapons.
COUNTERVALUE OR COUNTERFORCE TARGETING
Since 1945, nuclear weapons have been seen primarily as a “countervalue” instrument, more significant for how they affect the motivations of the opposing
side than for what they can do to its capabilities. These weapons persuaded the
Japanese to surrender and persuaded the Soviets not to exploit their advantage in
conventional forces in Europe; they did not cripple the Japanese invasion defenses or the Warsaw Pact’s arrays of tanks.
All through the Cold War one saw advocates of “tactical,” battlefield, applications of nuclear weapons, typically requiring the development of more
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advanced designs, lower in yield and lighter in weight. Skeptics, however, often
saw tactical nuclear weapons mainly as “tripwires,” designed to do little more
than push a prospective conflict over the conventional/nuclear line, leading to
all-out escalation and World War III—the mere prospect of which would presumably deter the launching of a war in the first place.
The deterring and compelling impact of the awesome destructive power of
nuclear weapons was thus mainly a matter of brandishing weapons that were
not used but held in reserve. Hiroshima and Nagasaki had to suffer actual destruction because nuclear weapons had not yet shown what they could do. No
Americans wanted Hiroshima or Nagasaki destroyed; they wanted Japan to surrender so that such cities could be occupied by American military forces and then
democratized. Indeed, some nuclear scientists had urged that the first atomic
bombs be demonstrated on some uninhabited island, so that Japan could see what
fate threatened its cities, without seeing one actually destroyed. The demonstration would have posed a “countervalue” threat against cities, as did the later
thermonuclear weapons tests at Eniwetok, but a potential threat held in reserve.
As we look forward to the prospect of nuclear weapons use, however, we must
consider some real uses of such weapons, intended to cripple or destroy real targets, not merely to deter or compel opposing-party behavior. Some scenarios
emerge because of improved nuclear warheads with lower yields of radioactivity,
blast, and heat; such warheads would serve as effective antitank weapons, destroying less of the countryside in the process of repulsing an armored attack
27
than older designs would have. Other strands will develop because of new motivations for conflict that affect the confrontations of states.
Two current speculative examples can be cited of nuclear weapons being used
actually to kill an opponent, rather than to intimidate it by threatening the loss
of its population. The case is sometimes made that if the leadership of some terrorist group, such as al-Qa‘ida, buried itself in an underground bunker, perhaps
with a rudimentary stockpile of biological weapons or its first atomic bombs,
advanced deep-penetration nuclear warheads could be legitimately used to dig
28
out and destroy it. The world would be less likely to condemn, and more likely
to applaud, the next use of nuclear weapons if it preempted and headed off a
WMD attack against a major population center.
A very different example of this emerging strand of motivation is illustrated
in the statements noted earlier by Iranian strategic analysts to the effect that an
Islamic nuclear weapon would be used to “kill” Israel, not to deter the Israelis or
to defeat their military forces. It would be used to solve the Arab problem with
Israel once and for all by destroying Tel Aviv, Haifa, and the other Israeli population centers, so that the Palestinian Arabs could live the way they have always
29
wanted to live, all by themselves in Palestine.
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What would have made such a scenario much less thinkable in the past, even
from the most hostile Arab or Iranian view, was the fact that a large number of
Islamic Arabs would be killed as well in this nuclear attack, since Arabs and Jews
have been intermixed for so long. The mutual-deterrence relationship between
Israel and its Arab enemies has thus all along been very asymmetrical—Israel
could meaningfully pose a threat of the destruction of Damascus or Cairo as its
retaliation for an Arab conventional military attack, but the Arab states could
not pose a parallel threat to Haifa, with its sizable Arab population, or to much
of the rest of Israel, or to Jerusalem, the third holiest site for Islam and the home
of a substantial Arab population. The Arabs living close by may have been seen
as generally unwelcome by the Israelis, but they served at the same time as hostages limiting the advantages for the Arabs of brandishing nuclear weapons.
But over time, in response to Arab conventional suicide bombers and ordinary
terrorism, the Israelis may be driven to a greater and greater separation of the two
populations; some hard-liners are already suggesting that they would welcome
most of the Arabs’ moving across the Jordan River, and so on. If the Israelis, for
one reason or another, become persuaded that they are better off living by themselves, their enemies may think of nuclear attack as a viable approach. Such a malevolent Iranian or other Islamic nuclear strategist would still have to provide for
the preservation of Jerusalem and deal with the prospect of lingering radioactivity
on the Palestinian land, once Arabs were finally free to reclaim Jaffa, etc.
OPTIMISM OVER PESSIMISM?
This entire question might seem the more interesting at first to those who are
pessimistic about future risks and who might thus regard speculation about an
end to the nuclear taboo as overdue. Yet, to repeat, pessimism may not be necessary, since analysis of the likely consequences of nuclear escalation might stimulate governments and publics to head it off. The chances are as good as three out
of five that no nuclear event will occur in the period up to the year 2045—that
there is a better than even chance that the world will be commemorating a full
century, since Nagasaki, of the non-use of such weapons. But analysts and ordinary citizens around the world to whom the author has put these odds typically
dismiss them as too optimistic. Indeed, the response has often been a bit bizarre,
essentially that “we have not been thinking at all about the next use of nuclear
weapons, but we think that you are too optimistic about such use being
avoided.” Such responses in Israel, Sweden, Japan, or the United States might
support the worry that people around the world have simply been repressing an
unpleasant reality, refusing to think about a very real danger. Yet the possibility
remains that the relative inattention is not simply a repression of reality but
rather a manifestation of the unthinkableness of nuclear weapons use.
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One could also introduce another wedge of hope, that any such use of nuclear
weapons between now and 2045 would be followed by reactions and consequences that reinforced rather than eroded the taboo. That would be the case if
the world did not retreat in the face of such use but rallied to punish it, and as a
result the perpetrator did not advance its interests by such an escalation but actually lost the battles and territories that were at issue. The “centenary celebration” would then be less grand, but a basic pattern of optimism rather than
pessimism would still be in place.
A very much more pessimistic strand of overall analysis intrudes as attention
shifts to other weapons of mass destruction—chemical and biological. By 2045
the spread of latent capabilities for such weapons may have been so enormous,
because of the inherent dual-use
nature of the science and technolThe next power to use a nuclear weapon in
ogy in these fields, that a large
combat could be a state hostile to the United
number of nations and subStates.
national terrorist groups will be
able to lay their hands on them. If
a biological warfare attack can kill more people than were killed at Hiroshima or
Nagasaki, what would have been the worth of continued non-use of nuclear
30
weapons for a full hundred years?
The length of time involved, and the speed we now see in the advances of
technology, might also suggest that some entirely new approaches to mass destruction will emerge, involving approaches as unimaginable as nuclear physics
might have been for almost everyone in the year 1905. The speculation about
cyberterrorism at the beginning of the millennium foreshadowed such a threat.
As a happy result of the “Y2K” software patches, on 1 January 2000 banking and
other important systems did not break down and the storage of drinking water,
etc., around the globe turned out to be unnecessary. But specialists on information technology can see ways in which someone intent on disrupting computer
networks could do much more damage than merely delaying e-mail transmissions or automated teller machine operations, even causing major explosions
and killing large numbers of people.
Yet none of such speculation about an unfolding array of approaches to
mass destruction—chemical, biological, computer hacking, or entirely new
realms of science—negates the existing destructive potential of nuclear and
thermonuclear weapons. None negates the premise that we would all be profoundly shocked, beyond our ability to forecast such shock, by most of the foreseeable uses of nuclear weapons. Avoiding the use of those weapons remains a
major and self-renewing accomplishment.
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For the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons continue to be uniquely and distinctly threatening as weapons of mass destruction, in the amount of damage
they can do and the rapidity with which they can do it. The threat of other WMD
does not yet suggest that this particular nuclear element has lost its relevance or
that there is no point in focusing on nuclear weapons and whether they will kept
out of use.
Certainly we have reason to be horrified by what a smallpox or anthrax attack
could inflict on an unprotected population. A biological or chemical attack inspires fears not associated with a nuclear event; the attack would be ambiguous
in its earliest symptoms, leaving governments and private citizens unsure from
day to day whether an attack was even under way, thus generating waves of false
alarms, etc. Yet the absence of any nuclear attacks since Nagasaki and the numbing of our feelings through all the Cold War years of preparation for a thermonuclear holocaust might also have caused us collectively to underrate the real
horror of a nuclear attack on a city. The horror after a nuclear attack would almost certainly be significantly greater than what other weapons could inflict.
In fact, there are important policy choices to be made about whether nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons should be lumped together as “WMD” or
should be handled separately, in the nonproliferation efforts to head off the ac31
quisition of such weapons and in the deterrence arrayed to head off their use.
Since 1945 the world has handled the dual-use aspect of nuclear technology
fairly successfully, putting in place the safeguards, precedents, and procedures of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and inducing most nations to
renounce the possession of nuclear weapons for themselves (accepting the principle that they can utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only if they
submit such operations to IAEA inspection) even though the first five possess32
ors of nuclear weapons continue to possess them. However, the dual-use problems in the chemical and biological fields may be much more difficult to
33
manage. Lumping all destructive weapons together in a single nonproliferation effort would be far from optimal if it were to dilute, perhaps squander, accomplishments in specifically nuclear proliferation.
Similarly, a “no first use” policy specifically for nuclear weapons is substantially different from “no first use of WMD.” The latter may have the benefit of
making the introduction of chemical or biological weapons less likely, but at the
price of introducing one more scenario in which nuclear weapons could come
into use, perhaps even again by the United States.
This analysis thus directs itself, if for no other good reason than the public
imagery involved, to 2045 as a meaningful anniversary. The maintenance of the
non-use of nuclear weapons until the hundredth year after Nagasaki would seem
a very important accomplishment. If abstention from nuclear attack can be
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maintained until then, the idea that the use of such weapons has become somehow unthinkable will most probably be reinforced.
SORTING THE CATEGORIES OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION
Rather than simply striving to see how many different scenarios we can imagine
for a new use of nuclear weapons, we might more appropriately look for “differences that make a difference.” We might thus close here with an attempt at collecting all the many ways that nuclear weapons could again be used into
categories that might lead to very different likely responses by Americans and
other peoples around the world and might suggest policy responses by their governments that might not have been immediately evident.
Cases of ambiguity, because of either uncertainty of definitions or doubts
about the facts as to whether the nuclear taboo had indeed been violated, constitute
one such category. Examples could include the use of a nuclear-waste “garbage
bomb,” or rumors of a large detonation that might have been either nuclear or
conventional, or a conventional attack on a nuclear power plant. It is possible that
the best policy here would be to encourage the world to define away such cases as
nonviolation of the taboo, if for no other reason than to keep the taboo alive.
Nuclear attacks with little or no collateral damage to civilians, where the
weapons were used mostly or entirely against military targets, form a second
group. An example here might be a nuclear warhead on a defensive missile that
intercepts an incoming missile carrying a conventional or chemical-biological
warhead. If such a relatively nonlethal use occurred (perhaps launched by a
friend of the United States, or by American forces themselves), it might be important to try to reshape the taboo, to dignify as acceptable such uses of nuclear
weapons while continuing to condemn the other uses.
Cases involving uncertainty about responsibility for the initiation of the
attacks, ranging from simple accident to insubordination or outright madness
and nuclear terrorism, make a third set. This may be our paramount fear in the aftermath of 9/11, and it may suggest the value of widespread sharing of the
command-and-control technology and techniques appropriate to nuclear
weapons, even if it might seem to be “rewarding nuclear proliferation.”
Clear and highly destructive nuclear escalation, with definite government responsibility and a general inclination to acquiesce, represents a fourth category.
This is another candidate for our worst fear, simply because it would encourage
many other regimes to acquire and use nuclear weapons. The prospect suggests a
need for an extensive culling and advance analysis of scenarios wherein world
opinion could be mobilized against nuclear use only with difficulty.
Clear and highly destructive nuclear escalation launched by a sort of “rogue
state” but with definite government responsibility and a braver world response
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constitutes a fifth group. If the world can be mobilized to punish such a state resolutely, the beneficial result might be a nuclear taboo renewed by experience
rather than erased. It may be very important to seek to convey that the use of nuclear weapons did not reward the perpetrator. If the world were to celebrate the
hundredth anniversary of Nagasaki with “just” one use of nuclear weapons, this
exception could be made to prove “the rule.”
A sixth category is that of clear and highly destructive nuclear escalation, but
in a contest where two opposing sides hit each other’s cities with nuclear weapons. Here the most urgent need for the United States and other outside powers
witnessing millions of casualties each day might become intervention to end the
war, placing it above alliance considerations and the collective-security standard
of punishing the war initiator.
Seventh and finally comes nuclear escalation that is similarly clear and destructive but is launched by a perpetrator who retains a major residual nuclear
force thereafter. The extensive literature that was developed during the Cold War
on the possibilities of “limited strategic war” may be applicable here, though no
such partial use of nuclear weapons ever occurred in that era.

NOTES

1. Useful data on the likely physical impact of
nuclear explosions can be found in Samuel
Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan, The Effects of
Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Departments of Defense and Energy Research and
Development Administration, 1977).
2. This kind of optimism on the impact of nuclear proliferation in general is outlined very
well by Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper
171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
3. A useful overview of North Korean behavior
can be found in Michael Mazarr, North Korea
and the Bomb (New York: Macmillan, 1995).
4. Japanese considerations on future nuclear
choices are discussed in Shawn Burnie and
Aileen Mioko Smith, “Japan’s Nuclear Twilight Zone,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
57, no. 3 (May/June 2001), pp. 58–62.
5. The risks of Israeli nuclear weapons coming
into use are discussed in Yair Evron, Israel’s
Nuclear Dilemma (New York: Routledge,
1994).
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THE UNRAVELING AND REVITALIZATION OF U.S. NAVY
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE
John R. Benedict

T

hat “those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it” is a
1
truism. As Captain John Morgan warned more than five years ago concerning U.S. Navy antisubmarine warfare (ASW), “Acknowledging and understanding ASW’s recurring cycles of ‘boom-and-bust’ can accelerate the awakening
2
that is now underway in the Navy. We need to avoid any further unraveling.” The
present Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Vernon Clark, has recently
taken a number of related steps, most notably the establishment of a new Fleet
3
ASW Command in San Diego, California. A central
Mr. Benedict is a member of the principal professional
premise of this article is that we can learn from previstaff in the National Security Analysis Department of
ous successes and failures in reinvigorating antisubthe Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboramarine warfare. That reinvigoration is critical;
tory (JHU/APL). He is a specialist in naval operations
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antisubmarine warfare needs to be “maintained as a
field. He has participated in Naval Studies Board proj4
Naval core competency.” ASW is a key component of
ects and served as a principal investigator in such Chief
Sea Shield (projecting defensive power from the sea),
of Naval Operations–sponsored studies as Task Force
ASW, ASW Transformation Perspectives, and The Way
which in turn enables both Sea Strike (projecting ofAhead in ASW. He has published in U.S. Naval Instifensive power from the sea) and Sea Basing (supporting
tute Proceedings, Submarine Review, U.S. Navy Journal of Underwater Acoustics, ASW Log, Johns
a widely distributed and netted fleet). These three operHopkins APL Technical Digest, and other journals.
ational concepts are the essence of the CNO’s Sea
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5
Power 21 vision. Without effective antisubmarine
The views expressed in this article are the author’s alone
warfare it cannot be ensured that losses to submarine
and do not represent the official position of JHU/APL,
the Department of the Navy, the Department of Dethreats can be kept to acceptable levels among carrier
fense, or the U.S. government.
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prepositioning forces, afloat forward staging bases, merchants (strategic sealift
and commercial), or other maritime forces in joint operating areas.
This article draws upon open sources to document capabilities and trends of
the past and to identify the factors that most closely correlate to health in antisubmarine warfare. Those sources support a number of major arguments—
above all, that the U.S. Navy is not doing well in antisubmarine warfare. The real
threat is the transfer of submarine-related technology to possible future adversaries. Further, and although the submarine threat to U.S. military access in key
regions is being addressed to some extent, new undersea threats related to
homeland defense and force protection are largely being ignored. Third, focusing on ASW technologies and systems without concomitant disciplined data
collection and analysis represents a false economy. Fourth, the open literature
shows that basic oceanographic research and operational and technical intelligence related to antisubmarine warfare have been allowed to atrophy. In addition, the current acquisition environment is taking too long to field new
systems; virtually no innovative ASW sensor and weapon concepts (without
Cold War origins) have entered service since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Finally, open sources make clear that there is no panacea in antisubmarine
warfare; the U.S. Navy will, as previously, need to pursue a variety of technical
and operational approaches to countering adversary submarines in the future.
Specifically, getting healthy in antisubmarine warfare will depend more on sensor hardware and software technology—particularly related to surveillance and
cueing*—than on marginal adjustments to manned-platform force structures,
which are declining in any case. Getting healthy also depends on training at all
appropriate levels, with feedback mechanisms to ensure progress. In addition,
without reliable, timely, and accurate surveillance cues and reliable weapons,
ASW becomes a very hard, inefficient, and asset-intensive game—yet the next
generation of distributed ASW surveillance systems (beyond the Advanced Deployable System) has yet to be established.
The U.S. Navy appears to be on the brink of a real commitment to revitalize
antisubmarine warfare, but the pace of this revitalization will be significantly
less than it needs to be if sustained support, effective organization, and ample resources are not forthcoming. Even a comprehensive and unified effort will take
many years to turn antisubmarine warfare around.
THE IMPORTANCE OF UNITY OF EFFORT IN ASW
The effort to revitalize antisubmarine warfare can be fragmented, with different
naval communities taking independent paths, or it can be integrated and
*That is, alerts to the presence of possible targets quick and precise enough to allow the targets to be
localized, identified, targeted, and ultimately engaged by tactical assets.
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cohesive. If the latter, there is a chance for effective unity of effort from top to
bottom of the pyramid shown in figure 1. The top portion of the pyramid relates
to vision, acquisition strategy, and the organization and resources needed to implement them; without these, it is unlikely that the required capabilities will be
fielded. In a crisis or contingency involving a submarine threat, the top of the
pyramid determines whether the right equipment and capabilities have been
fielded to deal with it. Until recently there has been no consensus on ASW
war-fighting or investment strategies; the various communities (submarines,
surface combatants, aircraft, undersea surveillance) have largely set their own
priorities and fended for themselves. This is understandable, considering that
for much of the post–Cold War era there has been no agreement on ASW requirements, concepts of operations, engineering approaches, fleet tactics, or
6
doctrines. Some communities during the 1990s assigned very low priority and
meager resources to antisubmarine warfare compared to other missions and
7
roles. They did this although ASW, as was evident both in the Second World
War and in the Cold War, requires a diverse collection of assets.
FIGURE 1
ASW PYRAMID OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE

National/Military/Navy Strategy & Guidance
Fleet Operation/Concept Plans & DoD/Navy
Planning Scenarios
ASW Vision & Organization
ASW Strategy, CONOPS, Requirements, &
Investment Strategy
ASW-Related Organizations/Leadership (Fleet, Acquisition)
ASW-Related Force Structure (Manned & Unmanned Systems)
ASW Foundational Sensors (Surveillance/Cueing, Tactical)

ASW War-Fighting Components

ASW Foundational Weapons & Countermeasures (CMs)
ASW-Related C4I (Including All-Source Intelligence)
ASW-Related Enabling Technologies (S&T)
ASW Training/Tactics Development—Unit, Group, Theater Levels (ASW “Art”)

Key Support Areas for ASW

Disciplined At-Sea Measurements, Analysis, & Feedback (ASW “Science”), i.e.,
– Tactical Oceanography
– Technical/Operational Intelligence
– System Engineering Tests (e.g., “Root Cause” Determination for ASW Shortfalls)

The middle of the pyramid represents the key elements of antisubmarine
warfare (force structure, sensors, weapons, countermeasures, and C4I*) that
would be brought to bear in a conflict involving adversary submarines. The
*Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.
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bottom of the pyramid represents key support areas; they largely determine
whether the ASW forces and systems in the middle of the pyramid achieve their
full potential or disappoint the fleet. These support areas represent the dull and
dirty work that is often overlooked and under-resourced; indeed, since the end
of the Cold War the ASW support infrastructure has been significantly reduced.
For instance, neglect in at-sea environmental measurement, intelligence on the
threat, and system engineering has undermined the science of antisubmarine
warfare, while neglect in training and tactical development at the unit, group,
and theater levels has undermined the art.
Two historical examples illustrate the importance of unity of effort to success
in antisubmarine warfare. The first is the Tenth Fleet, established by the U.S.
Navy in May 1943 to control antisubmarine operations in the portions of the Atlantic assigned to the United States. It was organized into five divisions that performed, respectively, fusion and dissemination of operational intelligence,
routing and rerouting of convoys based on surveillance and intelligence, allocation and coordination of ASW units (none were directly under the command of
the Tenth Fleet per se), the development of doctrine and tactics, and the evalua8
tion and fielding of materiel and equipment. Previously, U.S. Navy antisubmarine warfare had been largely unresponsive and ineffective. The unifying
contribution of this command, and of its British counterpart, helped turn
around the Battle of the Atlantic.
A second historical example is the Cold War, during which ASW emerged as a
top priority, served by a clear, shared war-fighting vision and a concept of operations that emphasized far-forward offensive operations and layered defenses.
Reliable undersea cues were available from the Sound Surveillance System
(SOSUS). There was also an investment strategy, delineated in an ASW Master
Plan, which was regularly updated. Adequate resources were applied, and strong
organization was evident in the requirements and acquisition communities and
in the fleet. Each component understood its roles and contributions to the overall antisubmarine mission.
Even so, it took decades to achieve superiority against the evolving Soviet
submarine threat, just as in World War II it took years to defeat the U-boat threat
in the Atlantic. In the 1982 Falklands War, conversely, it took the British only a
few weeks to realize that they had major problems in ASW: lack of knowledge of
the threat and environment, inadequate surveillance and cueing, unreliable tac9
tical sensors for the littoral conditions, and undisciplined tactics. In the next
conflict involving adversary submarines, the U.S. Navy probably will not have
decades to prepare or years to win; the contingency may prove to be as unexpected and brief as the Falklands. The Navy can accept the risk and decline to
prepare, hoping that the adversary will be equally unprepared (like the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1
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Argentineans, whose torpedoes failed to work properly against British warships).10 Or it can prepare for such an eventuality, developing and maintaining
the required unity of effort in antisubmarine warfare throughout the ASW
pyramid.
A LONG-TERM VIEW OF ASW HEALTH
The cyclic nature of health or wholeness in antisubmarine warfare for the U.S.
Navy and its allies over the last sixty or more years is indicated in figure 2, which
resembles a roller coaster. After a disastrous start, the Allies (primarily the
United States, Britain, and Canada) were able to overcome the German U-boat
11
antishipping campaign and win the Battle of the Atlantic. But the Allies were
FIGURE 2
LONG-TERM VIEW OF USN ASW TRENDS

Primary Threat Focus
b

ASW “Scorecard”
1944
U.K./U.S.
forces win
Battle of
Atlantic
(10th Fleet)

1958
Task Force
Alfa raises
HUK ASW
performance

1960s, 1970s
Increased ASW
focus including
national intel
support

Circa 1975
Major USN
acoustic
advantage over
Soviet SSN/
SSGN/SSBNs

1980–90
Significant
Soviet nuclear
sub quieting
(i.e., facilitated
by Walker/
Whitworth)
erodes USN
passive
acoustics

“Saved by the
bell”*

1942
Disastrous
U-boat
campaign
in western
Atlantic

Circa 1955
Large Soviet
diesel sub
force; Low
U.S. ASW
capability

2015–20
Full ASW
transformation to
increased reliance
on distributed/
networked sensors
& weapons?

“Saved by the
bell”*

1962
Mixed ASW
results in
Cuban missile
crisis

Circa 1995
Early post–Cold
War w/ limited
ASW capability
against
stealthier Soviet
sub force

2003
Today—Few new
ASW sensor &
weapon capabilities
fielded to counter
diesel subs in littorals
(mostly upgrades to
systems begun in
Cold War)

?

2003–20
ASW Systems
fielded that
directly address ROW
submarine forces
in shallow & deep
littoral regions

*Cote, The Third Battle (see note 14).
See Benedict, Long-Term Perspective, p. 22 (see note 32).

woefully unprepared to deal with the Type XXI U-boats, equipped with snorkels,*
12
that were entering service in 1945. For example, at-sea radar trials conducted
after the war against a snorkel established a .06 probability of detection per op13
portunity with the best Allied radars available. The Allies had been “saved by
14
the bell.” This threat, as subsequently posed by Soviet diesel submarines, became the primary focus in U.S. Navy antisubmarine warfare. Nonetheless, by
*Extendable air intakes that allowed submarines just beneath the surface to operate their diesels, renew their air, and recharge batteries.
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1958 the CNO, Admiral Arleigh Burke, wanted “to know why the Navy’s ASW
15
effort, despite all the high tech, was so weak and ineffective.” He formed Task
Force Alfa on 1 April of that year to experiment at sea with new ways to counter
diesel Soviet submarines. The stated goal was to be able to detect submarines
and then track them continually for up to four days, using “hold-down tactics”
designed to force them eventually to snorkel. Combined ASW tactics were developed with destroyers, helicopters, and fixed-wing aircraft, the latter both carrierand land-based. But after extensive work against surrogate U.S. diesel boats,
16
Task Force Alfa was able to track these submarines only up to eight hours. It
was unable to overcome physical and budgetary constraints through tactics and
doctrine alone. Nonetheless, the improvements it made in ASW tactics and effectiveness yielded the partial success achieved during the Cuban missile crisis
four years later.
The 1962 crisis provides the best operational example of the U.S. Navy combinedforce antisubmarine capabilities that emerged from the 1950s. Four Soviet
Northern Fleet long-range diesel attack submarines (Foxtrot-class boats
equipped with conventional and nuclear torpedoes) were sent to Cuba as an advance reconnaissance force. They were most vulnerable to detection for about a
month, 1 October–2 November. The U.S. Atlantic Fleet was essentially on a wartime footing, with about 85 percent of its assets at sea, including those involved
17
in the quarantine around Cuba. Numerous hunter-killer groups of carrier aircraft and destroyers supported by land-based patrol aircraft (P-2Vs and P-3s)
were alerted to the transit of the Soviet submarines and attempted to locate and
track them. Despite some SOSUS contacts in and to the south of the GreenlandIceland–United Kingdom gap, none of the Foxtrots had been firmly tracked as of
25 October, when they reached their stations off Cuba. They were now inside the
quarantine line, where the various ASW-capable assets were generating many
false contacts with their tactical sensors. Nonetheless, by 2 November all four
boats had been detected. Three were initially found, either snorkeling or on the
surface, by aircraft (land- and carrier-based); one was initially detected by destroyer radar while snorkeling and was subsequently reacquired by a World War II–
vintage AN/SQS-4 shipborne active sonar. In three of the four cases, hold-down
tactics forced the Foxtrots to surface to recharge batteries. The fourth Foxtrot
18
was able to break contact before being obliged to snorkel.
The emergence of Soviet nuclear submarines, including SSBNs equipped
with nuclear land-attack ballistic missiles, increased the priority of antisubmarine warfare within the U.S. Navy during the 1960s and 1970s. This resulted
in a heavy reliance on passive narrowband acoustic sensors to exploit discrete
“tonals.” These sensors included improved SOSUS arrays, towed arrays on
American nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), improved sonobuoys for
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1
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P-3 and S-3 aircraft, and eventually towed arrays on surface combatants. This
was a successful time for antisubmarine warfare, in which robust wide-area surveillance by SOSUS, effective large-area search by land-based patrol aircraft responding to open-ocean cues, and protracted track-and-trail capabilities of
SSNs were all demonstrated.19 This level of performance, however, was made
possible by the relatively noisy first- and second-generation Soviet nuclear submarines of that era. Also, results were often less impressive at the battle-group
20
level without the benefit of undersea surveillance cueing. Furthermore, the
success enjoyed in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean was difficult to replicate in the vast expanses of the North Pacific.21
The extent of acoustic superiority enjoyed by the U.S. Navy during the 1960s
and 1970s was exposed to the Soviets by the espionage of John Walker and Jerry
Whitworth, which ended only in the mid-1980s. The Soviets translated this
knowledge into significant quieting improvements for Victor III, Mike, Sierra,
22
Akula, Oscar, Typhoon, and certain Delta-class submarines. As pointed out recently, “Since 1960, 35 decibels of quieting have reduced . . . [detection] ranges
23
from 100s of miles to a few kilometers.” The change did not happen overnight,
but by the mid-1990s a significant portion of the (by then Russian) submarine
order of battle was significantly quieter than it had been in the 1970s. Once
again, the U.S. Navy had been saved by the bell—this time, the end of the Cold
War. A 1989 report to the House Armed Services Committee had warned, “The
advent of quiet Soviet nuclear submarines and the prospect of even quieter nonnuclear submarines with considerable submerged endurance means . . . the loss
of effectiveness of passive sonar. . . . [This] will affect virtually every phase of our
24
ASW capability . . . [and] raises profound national security problems.”
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Navy ASW concerns have gradually
shifted away from former Soviet nuclear submarines to the diesel submarines of
the rest of the world. The latter could pose a risk to American and allied naval
25
and maritime forces in regional contingencies. Where previously the Navy had
focused on a known adversary whose military and submarine force could
threaten the nation’s very survival, it now concentrated on uncertain potential
adversaries with area-denial strategies designed to inflict unacceptable losses (as
occurred in Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993). Modern conventional submarines employing antiship torpedoes, mines, and cruise missiles are difficult to
counter in adverse littoral environments and are capable of inflicting significant
damage to U.S./allied forces.
How would the U.S. Navy do in antisubmarine warfare today? Vice Admiral
John Grossenbacher, as commander of Submarine Forces, Atlantic
(ComSubLant) and ASW Forces, Atlantic (CTF 84), recently stated, “As I testified before Congress, our ASW capabilities can best be described as poor or
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weak. . . . [A]s a minimum our Navy must have the capability and capacity, if required, to neutralize the potential undersea threats posed by China, North Korea
and Iran, today.”26 Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific
Fleet (CincPacFlt), has declared, “Today when Naval components prepare
OPLANs [operations plans,] [the] most difficult problem to deal with is [the]
submarine threat. . . . [ASW] is not a mission we can outsource to . . . [the] joint
community—it is distinctly naval. . . . [W]e will need greater ASW capability
27
than we have today. [This is] at the top of my tactical problems in the Pacific.” In
recent Senate testimony Admiral Fargo remarked, “250 submarines call the Pacific
home—but only 30 percent of these submarines belong to allied nations. . . .
28
[F]uture technologies are essential to counter the growing submarine threat.”
U.S. Navy exercises with diesel submarines since the mid-1990s have often
proved humbling. South African Daphné-class, Chilean Type 209, Australian
Collins-class, and other diesel submarines have penetrated battlegroup defenses
and simulated attacks on surface ships, including aircraft carriers, often without
29
ever being detected. The 1982 Falklands War may be the best available indication of how a U.S. Navy ASW operation might go today. The Royal Navy has
been at the forefront of antisubmarine warfare for nearly a century. It was re30
sponsible for more than two-thirds of the U-boats sunk during 1942–44. Unlike the U.S. Navy, the British navy continued to focus on Soviet diesel
submarine threats throughout the Cold War, especially those that could operate
in the European littorals to attack NATO reinforcement shipping. Yet in 1982, as
we have seen, and despite such steady emphasis on conventional submarines,
British antisubmarine forces in the Falklands were not up to the task. An Argentine Type 209 diesel submarine stayed safely at sea for over a month while the
British expended more than 150 depth charges and torpedoes against false contacts. British antisubmarine forces scored no hits on the submarine and failed to
prevent two attacks on surface ships, which were saved only by defective Argen31
tine torpedoes.
The Falklands ASW campaign proved to be more of a crapshoot than an exercise in sea control. The U.S. Navy needs to do better. But how many American
ASW sensor programs fielded today are not Cold War legacies? How many were
developed entirely as responses to nonnuclear threats in the littorals? The answer is zero. All U.S. Navy submarine towed arrays, all surface-ship active sonars,
all aircraft sonobuoys, all helicopter dipping sonars, and all undersea surveillance systems in the fleet in 2004 have their origins in the Cold War. Most of
these sensors have been adapted for littoral and diesel applications by software
and hardware upgrades or redesigns. But truly new capabilities directed at post–
Cold War threats are still trying to get through the acquisition process fifteen
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. These include the Advanced Deployable
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System for undersea surveillance in the littorals, an advanced periscopedetection radar capability, and ASW mission modules being developed for the
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). So what makes us think that any antisubmarine
contingency fought today or in the near term would look significantly different
from the Falklands? In truth it probably would not, particularly if we continue
to neglect some of the crucial enablers in the pyramid of success or failure.
Any prediction as to whether the health of U.S. Navy antisubmarine warfare
will be on the upswing during the next fifteen years, as shown in figure 2, then,
requires significant qualification. That is the stated intent of Navy leadership,
but it remains an open issue.
ASW THREAT DEVELOPMENTS
The submarine threat continues to evolve in terms of stealth, submerged endurance, combat system automation, weaponry, and operational proficiency (as facilitated by user-friendly equipment). The real threat is the post–Cold War
global marketplace, which allows any nation or group with adequate fiscal resources to acquire advanced military technology.
It is illuminating to trace diesel submarine characteristics from circa 1935
and then project them to about 2010. The state of the art has evolved from the
standard German U-boat of the early Second World War to the Mark XXI with
snorkel at the end of the conflict, to the Soviet Romeo and Foxtrot designs of
around 1960, the German Type 209 series introduced in the 1970s (and still in
service today), and Russian Kilo and follow-on designs since the 1980s, to the
German Type 212/214 with fuel-cell-based air-independent propulsion (AIP),
of which deliveries have been made since 2003 and are scheduled through at
least 2012. It is striking how little resemblance there is between the U-boats of
World War II and today’s diesel submarines. The modern boats are two to three
times faster submerged, have four and a half to six times more submerged endurance even without AIP (and fifteen to twenty times more with it), can reach
two and a half to four times greater maximum depths, are much quieter (at low
speeds they compare favorably to the most modern nuclear submarines), and
are equipped with much more advanced weaponry (torpedoes, mines, even
32
cruise missiles).
With regard to air-independent propulsion, at this writing four or five large
conventional submarines are in operation with hybrid diesel-AIP propulsion,
33
and at least another fifteen submarines are in development or on order. AIP
comes in various forms, including the closed-cycle diesel (the Dutch and Italian focus), the closed Rankine-cycle steam turbine (a French design reflected in
Pakistan’s Agosta 90B acquisitions), Stirling engines (Swedish and Japanese),
and fuel cells (German, Canadian, and Russian). All are available for export.
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Air-independent propulsion is expected to become standard for new conventional submarines by 2015 or 2020. AIP can provide weeks of submerged endurance at low speeds without the need to snorkel, making a bad situation in
antisubmarine warfare even worse.34 As an American submariner, Rear Admiral
Malcolm Fages, warns, “The marriage of air independent, nonnuclear submarines with over-the-horizon, fire and forget antiship cruise missiles and high endurance, wake homing torpedoes . . . [means that] traditional ASW approaches,
employing radar flooding and speed, are not likely to be successful against this
35
threat.”
Excluding the United States, today more than forty countries have, among
them, between three and four hundred submarines, depending upon whether
minisubs (under three hundred tons) and submarines in reserve status are included. But the issue is not quantity but quality; nearly three-fourths of these
submarines are relatively modern designs, incorporating technology of the
36
1970s or later. This proportion will only increase in the future as countries like
China replace their Romeos (diesel) and Hans (nuclear) with Kilos (diesel),
Songs (diesel), and Type 093s (nuclear) over the next decade. With the help of
Russia and others, the Chinese are rapidly converting from an operational force
of more than fifty older, noisier submarines to a comparably sized force dominated by modern, quiet submarines. The recent sale of eight additional Project
636 Kilos equipped with wake-homing antiship torpedoes and submergedlaunch 3M54E Klub-S antiship cruise missiles is indicative of the transforma37
tion of this submarine force. The Project 636 Kilo “is one of the quietest diesel
38
submarines in the world”; wake-homing torpedoes are countermeasureresistant, “user-friendly” weapons effective at ten kilometers or more, even for
39
less proficient submarine forces; and the Klub-S missile has a 220-kilometer
40
maximum range against ships and a terminal speed of up to Mach 3. Such a capability represents a very formidable threat to American and allied surface units.
From a lethality viewpoint, heavyweight torpedoes carried by submarines are
a particular concern. These weapons, with explosive charges typically weighing
two or three hundred kilograms, are designed to detonate under the bottom of a
surface ship, rupturing the keel and thus causing rapid sinking and high casualties. Historically, hits by four torpedoes or fewer have sunk even ships of 13,000–
41
30,000 tons, causing hundreds of deaths (up to two-thirds of the crew). Large
aircraft carriers are not invulnerable to these weapons. Carriers are more likely
to be rendered immobile and suffer mission degradation than to be sunk by
standard 53 cm–diameter torpedoes, but during the Cold War the Soviet Union
developed 65 cm torpedoes specifically designed to sink them. The Type 093 nuclear submarines being built by China are believed to have torpedo tubes capa42
ble of firing 65 cm weapons. The loss of life in the sinking of a typical surface
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combatant would be comparable to that suffered in the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing or during the entire 1991 Gulf War. For an aircraft carrier, the loss
could be comparable to that in the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001.
The threat goes beyond damage to maritime forces. Several countries outside
NATO and the former Soviet Union are pursuing the idea of placing land-attack
missiles with nuclear warheads on their submarines. These include China and
India, which have in development, respectively, the Type 094 SSBN (to replace
the existing Xia) and the ATV (Advanced Technology Vehicle) nuclear-powered
missile-equipped submarine programs. There is also speculation that countries
like Pakistan and Israel are exploring nuclear-tipped land-attack cruise missiles
43
for their submarines.
On a final disturbing note, minisubs, manned submersibles, and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) are becoming worrisome with respect to
force protection (including in overseas ports) and homeland defense. Commercial and military development in these areas has been rapid; advanced technology related to automation, navigation, AIP, and other categories has made these
44
unconventional threats even more viable than in the past. Minisubs (SSMs) and
swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs) are now, according to one expert, a “proven
weapon of war. . . . [M]odern bases are virtually defenseless against this form of
45
attack.” The countries known to have SDVs or SSMs today include Colombia,
Iran, North Korea (the largest minisub force in the world), Pakistan, and South
46
Korea. Drug cartels have used submersibles and minisubs to smuggle cocaine
47
from ports in Colombia to ships at sea. North Korea has used submersibles,
48
minisubs, and coastal submarines to insert agents into the South. The Tamil
“Sea Tigers,” a terrorist group, has attempted twice to build SDVs or minisubs
49
(but has been aborted so far by authorities). The Neiman Marcus 2000 Christmas catalog offered a twenty-million-dollar personal submarine that could be
50
deployed from a megayacht or ship. Osama Bin Laden attempted to purchase a
small personal submarine through a relative in the United States (the deal was
51
stopped by the FBI). Tourist submarines carry up to approximately two mil52
lion people underwater annually, with no reported fatalities to date. Current
tourist submarines have limited submerged endurance (some ten hours), but a
craft of that type carrying up to five tons of explosives could be deployed from a
mother ship on a one-way, possibly suicide, mission. Future tourist submarines
are being advertised with submerged endurances allowing ranges of 40–350
53
nautical miles.
A number of other commercial developments may interest terrorists as well:
general-purpose manned submersibles (typically with two crew members, submerged endurance of from four to twenty-eight hours, and 150–300 kilograms
of payload), autonomous underwater vehicles, remotely operated vehicles
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(ROVs), and semisubmersibles with large payloads. AUVs and ROVs are being
used extensively for oil and gas surveys and pipeline inspections. They are also
used in preventive maintenance of fiber-optic submarine cables, cable laying,
54
and oceanographic, hydrographic, and seabed surveys, sometimes at great depths.
Large-diameter (1–1.5 meters) AUVs can offer a combination of long endurance
55
(36–150 hours) and large payloads, the equivalent of at least one torpedo.
Any assessment of the threat posed by minisubs, manned submersibles, and
autonomous underwater vehicles requires a caveat. Why should adversaries go
to the trouble, if American and allied borders, ports, merchant shipping, airports, and air traffic are already porous and vulnerable? The United States is attempting to secure its borders and coastlines against threats by land, air, and the
sea surface. If it does not do the same against subsurface threats, its adversaries
will presumably try to exploit that weakness to deliver agents, contraband, explosives, even weapons of mass destruction.
The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard need to identify and begin developing appropriate counters to this potential threat. These would include undersea surveillance systems capable of finding and identifying small submersibles off the
coasts or even inshore. At present, neither the Navy nor the Coast Guard seems
to be addressing this contingency in a significant way. This is inconsistent with
recent guidance from the secretary of defense, Donald Rumsfeld: “We must
transform . . . [and] be proactive[;] . . . not wait for threats to emerge and be ‘validated’ but rather anticipate them before they appear and develop new capabili56
ties to dissuade and deter them.”
ASW FORCE STRUCTURE TRENDS AND IMPACT
At the peak of the Second World War, more than five thousand Allied ships and
aircraft were involved in operations against U-boats. Such numbers were crucial
to winning the Battle of the Atlantic, a campaign of attrition that lasted several
years, but they also demonstrate how demanding and costly antisubmarine warfare becomes without reliable, timely, and accurate surveillance cues and reliable
weapons. For example, in those years, in daytime, 470–660 flight hours were required per visual contact gained; about the same (466–600) were needed per ra57
dar contact. At night, visual detection was nearly impossible, but radar contact
rates actually increased, since it was more likely that the U-boats would surface
then. In addition, depth charge attacks had only 4–10 percent success rates (i.e.,
58
of sinking the U-boat) per barrage. The result of these factors was a tough,
grinding campaign in which over 2,500 merchant vessels (more than fourteen
million tons) and more than five hundred American and British warships were
59
sunk and over eight hundred U-boats were lost. Eighty-five percent of the
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U-boat sinkings were achieved by surface ships and aircraft, in roughly equal
60
proportions.
Figure 3 shows the relentless downward trend since World War II in ASWcapable force structures, paralleling that across the entire military. By 1955 there
had been about a 55 percent reduction in U.S. Navy ASW-capable assets compared to 1945. By 1970 there had been a 35 percent reduction from 1955 levels,
and by 1985, 20 percent more. By 1995 ASW-capable assets had been reduced
another 30 percent; by the end of 2005 there will be a further 30 percent drop
(compared to 1995); and the trend is expected to continue. From 1945 to 2005,
the antisubmarine force structure (warships and escorts, aircraft carriers,
fixed-wing aircraft, and submarines) will have decreased by an order of magnitude, to about 350 units. Any successful concept for antisubmarine warfare must
also account for the fact that today and in the future many of the remaining units
do not and will not specialize in ASW. They will be multimission platforms, with
antisubmarine warfare only one of several subspecialties.
The peak years of the Cold War (1975–80) provide an interesting
counterexample to the World War II experience. The U.S. Navy was able with
only moderate ASW force levels of eight or nine hundred units to dominate Soviet submarines. This dominance was due to integrated undersea surveillance
FIGURE 3
ASW-CAPABLE FORCE STRUCTURE TREND: 1940–2020
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See Benedict, Long-Term Perspective, pp. 13–15. The component surface combatant, submarine, aircraft carrier, and fixed-wing aircraft force levels for 1945,
1955, 1970, 1985, 1995, 2005, and 2015 were derived from multiple sources, including Jane’s Fighting Ships for the appropriate years (albeit for 1945 a variety
of World War II source materials were used), as well as Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:24 PM

109

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

106

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

system cueing and the success of sensor technologies (both surveillance and tactical) against the noisy Soviet nuclear submarines of that era. That is to say,
all-source intelligence and acoustic superiority acted as “force multipliers.”
As both World War II and the Cold War illustrate, getting healthy in antisubmarine warfare depends more on sensor (and cueing) hardware and software
than on numbers of ASW-capable platforms. Higher force levels, in a joint,
multithreat environment, can enhance the likelihood that multimission units
will be available for antisubmarine tasking, and they can better handle high
false-contact rates. But large force levels cannot overcome poor sensor technology, surveillance, or cueing; weaknesses there are potentially fatal.
ASW SURVEILLANCE/CUEING AND SENSOR TECHNOLOGY
ENABLERS
Table 1, if correct, points to a high correlation between ASW success and both
surveillance (cueing) and sensor technology. Between 1940 and 1950 the primary ASW surveillance sensor was HF/DF (high-frequency/direction-finding)
conducted ashore and on board specially equipped ships. The primary tactical
“enablers” were radar and visual search by ships and aircraft, and early sonar
(American) or asdic (British) acoustic sensors on surface ships. Each of these
technologies was important, but none proved entirely satisfactory. Gaining radar or visual detection in the open ocean proved very time consuming. Sonar (or
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF ASW SCORECARD “DRIVERS”: 1940–2020+
Time Frame
1940–1950
1950–1960
1960–1980
1980–1990
1990–2003
2003–2010
2010–2020+

ASW Surveillance &
Cueing “Scorecard”

F
F
E
F
J
F
?

ASW Force Structure
“Scorecard”

B
F
F
F
G
J
J

ASW Sensor Technology
“Scorecard”

F
F
E
F
J
F

Overall ASW
“Scorecard”*

?

F
F
E
F
J
F

†

?

*Emphasizes ASW “health” at end of designated time frames.
†If key sensor capabilities are demonstrated, embraced by fleet (training/proficiency issues overcome) & fielded in adequate numbers.

See Benedict, Long-Term Perspective, pp. 9–11, 13–14, 16–17, 19, 48–49, 54–56, 60–61, 65–66, 70–72, 76–77, 82–83.
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asdic) limited follow-on attacks against convoys, but it did not meet prewar expectations, and U-boats could counter it by attacking on the surface. HF/DF and
ULTRA code breaking played important roles in the Second World War, but information was often withheld due to operational security or proved untimely or
inaccurate. For example, HF/DF and ULTRA cues were withheld in 1940 from
British hunter-killer operations, which then proved ineffective and were abandoned. In contrast, timely and reliable cues from these sources, shared with
American hunter-killer groups in the eastern Atlantic from May 1943 to May
1945, contributed to fifty-two of the fifty-three U-boat sinkings—that is, only
61
one sinking did not rely on this support. This figure represented about 30 percent of all U-boats sunk by the U.S. Navy in World War II.62 The British did not
provide ULTRA-related cues to their tactical ASW forces, but they used this information to reroute convoys and to reinforce their surface and air escorts if they
were likely to be threatened (based on estimated U-boat locations).
Very-long-range aircraft in the Atlantic made one U-boat sighting approximately every thirty hours on patrol for “threatened” convoys, compared to one
every 640 hours for “unthreatened” convoys—a dramatic demonstration of the
63
force-multiplying effect of surveillance cueing.
From 1950 to 1960 the primary sensor-technology enablers were passive
acoustics against snorkeling submarines, ship and aircraft radar, and shipborne
active sonar in the five-to-fifteen-kilohertz (kHz) region. Once again, each of
these sensor technologies was important, but none proved robust. Passive acoustic
sensors in early SOSUS arrays, on U.S. submarines (nuclear or conventional), and
on fixed-wing aircraft (shore- or carrier-based) provided good capability against
snorkeling submarines. However, passive acoustics sensors were not as effective
against submerged submarines on battery. Ship and aircraft radar was much less
effective against snorkels than against surfaced submarines. Shipborne 5–15 kHz
active-sonar detection ranges were eight to ten thousand yards at best. SOSUS was
not complete in 1960, and its emphasis at that time was more on intelligence than
the support of tactical antisubmarine warfare. These shortcomings were reflected
in the mixed results seen in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.
In the 1960–80 time frame the primary ASW sensor technology enablers were
passive narrowband acoustics (in all antisubmarine communities), towed arrays
for submarines and surface ships, and active acoustics for ships (3.5 kHz) and
helicopters. Electronic intelligence from aircraft and spaceborne systems became a key component of all-source intelligence and cueing. As described earlier, the ASW and intelligence communities focused on tracking Soviet first- and
second-generation nuclear submarines, and they had considerable success.
Ship-towed arrays and shipborne medium-range helicopters came into the
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fleet at the end of the era and (along with developments in carrier-based antisubmarine air) showed real promise.
Thus, the Navy emphasized a balance of offensive (integrated surveillance,
land-based air, and SSNs) and defensive (surface ships and their helicopters, and
carrier-based ASW aircraft) approaches. In the next decade (1980–90), as we
have seen, the same ASW sensor technology was significantly less effective
against much quieter Soviet nuclear submarines. By 1995 these stealthy submarines constituted the bulk of a reduced Russian submarine order of battle, but
they were no longer the adversary.
Since 1990 the sensor technology focus has remained on passive narrowband
acoustics and active monostatics, operated from ships and helicopters. But it has
also included active multistatics, in the form of extended echo-ranging (EER),
using individual impulse sources to ensonify multiple passive receivers. The
“threat driver” is now the modern nonnuclear submarine, operating on battery,
that may be encountered in regional contingencies. Passive acoustics against
such stealthy boats are likely to produce primarily short-range detections. Active
monostatics are better suited to the task but must overcome false-contact issues.
Active multistatics via EER were originally intended to preserve the viability of
large-area acoustic searches by land-based patrol aircraft; however, the
first-generation EER sensor was not designed for shallow littorals, with their
“clutter.” An improved system, IEER, is about to enter the fleet and may gain
greater acceptance for use in littorals.
The undersea surveillance systems designed for the Cold War have limited
applicability in contemporary locales of interest, including much of the Asian
rim and the Arabian Gulf. SOSUS and the first-generation Fixed Distributed
System (FDS) suffer from geographic mismatch—they are not in the right
places. Other fixed surveillance system (FSS) concepts may be useful for known
contingency regions, but they must be installed well in advance. Ocean surveillance ships such as SURTASS (Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System) units
cannot employ their towed arrays or active sources in water as shallow as the
Arabian Gulf. The SURTASS low-frequency active (LFA) sensor has only recently renewed testing after a more than five-year moratorium caused by environmental concerns related to its impact on marine mammals. The Advanced
Deployable System (ADS), the one surveillance system designed expressly for
use in shallow water and littorals, is still years away from the fleet. In the meantime, as Admiral Fargo has warned, current “IUSS*/acoustic cueing is much less
64
than I would like.” Ideally, by 2010 some combination of ADS, FSS, SURTASS,
and LFA will be fielded and demonstrated to provide at least moderate effectiveness for cueing in key regions.
*Integrated undersea surveillance system.
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Tactical ASW assets have traditionally relied upon timely and accurate surveillance cueing. Aircraft, which since World War II have been a rapid means of
responding to distant contacts, have always benefited from cueing, whether they
employ acoustic or nonacoustic tactical sensors. The same is true even for active
shipborne sonars capable of detections, for example, at the first “convergence
65
zone”; unalerted (uncued) convergence-zone contacts by ships have been rare.
Yet surface combatants have been primary players in antisubmarine warfare
since World War I, particularly in protecting less ASW-capable surface units
(aircraft carriers, logistics and amphibious ships, strategic sealift, merchant vessels). Finally, American nuclear-powered submarines have been major players in
antisubmarine warfare since the early Cold War, particularly in contested waters
where other assets would be at risk. These SSNs would also benefit from cueing,
to improve the search rates of their passive sonars against modern diesel
submarines.
But for all the importance of cueing, the next generation of ASW surveillance
systems—for the years between 2010 and 2020, and beyond—has yet to be established. One promising way forward is the distributed sensor field.
THE NEED FOR DISTRIBUTED ASW SENSOR FIELDS
Distributed ASW sensor fields have been recommended for over a decade to
compensate for the short detection ranges of individual sensors against stealthy
submarines. A 1989 report to the House Armed Services Committee asserted
that “one alternative to passive sonar as we have known it—a limited number of
long-ranged passive sensors—is a large number of short-ranged passive sensors
66
in a closely spaced network.” A 1997 Naval Studies Board report predicted that
“autonomous sources and/or receivers will permit the continued development
of concepts using fields of distributed sources and receivers to very large
67
scales.” The same report projected that the Navy of the future would rapidly
deploy networked sensors throughout theaters to establish safe maneuver areas
68
without imposing mission limitations on manned platforms. In 2003 Rear Admiral Harry Ulrich, as head of Sea Shield in the office of the CNO, stated, “Task
Force ASW seeks to leverage a network of distributed sensors and weapons capa69
ble of sharing information quickly and striking with speed.”
The motivation for this sustained theme of networked, distributed ASW sensors is a preference for dispersing sensors instead of platforms for protracted anti70
submarine tasks. At a time when force structure is declining, it would take a
large number of platforms equipped with short-range sensors to cover large expanses adequately and within the required time lines; tying up large numbers of
platforms (particularly valuable warships) in surveillance is not a good use of
these assets. Yet other than developmental ADS, no new persistent distributed
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surveillance concepts designed to counter diesel submarines in littoral environments have entered the Navy acquisition process.
If distributed ASW sensor-field development is to be accelerated, both organizational and funding constraints and engineering challenges must be overcome. For most of the post–Cold War era, no flag officers have been assigned
within either the Navy Staff or the office of the Secretary of the Navy to coordinate non-platform-specific antisubmarine development. As a result, such work
on distributed and networked sensors as exists has been done within platform
communities, where it competes for funding against other needs of those communities. It should be no surprise that low priority and limited funding have
been applied to engineering issues that will determine the success of these
non-platform-specific programs.
Two such areas particularly deserving attention are communications, sensor
automation, and interrelationships between the two. Communications are one
of the key enablers for distributed ASW sensors, and they need to meet both
bandwidth constraints and covertness requirements. In-sensor automation can
reduce bandwidth but must be done carefully to avoid unacceptable levels of
false contacts or likelihoods that valid targets will be dismissed.
THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE ASW APPROACHES
In 1998 the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, predicted, “New
technologies coupled with innovative operational concepts will yield a different
71
approach to ASW.” The Naval Transformation Roadmap issued in 2003 stated,
“Transformational efforts in ASW are focused on developing new operational
concepts that leverage advanced technologies to improve wide-area surveillance, detection, localization, tracking, and attack capabilities against quiet
adversary submarines operating in a noisy and cluttered shallow water environ72
ment.” A prerequisite to successful innovation, for antisubmarine warfare as
much as any other discipline, is to encourage creativity within the government,
academia, and private industry. This will necessitate changing Navy acquisition
practices that resist radical new concepts and require fifteen or more years from
concept formulation to service in the fleet. Ten areas are particularly ripe for
innovation.

• Distributed ASW sensors: “Improved capabilities center upon achieving
greatly enhanced situation awareness . . . [and] developing a next
generation off-board distributed acoustic system with both active and
73
passive capability.”

• Sensors for in-shore and coastal antisubmarine warfare: to counter future
asymmetric undersea threats to homeland defense and for force protection.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:24 PM

114

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2005 Issue

BENEDICT

111

• ASW weapons to neutralize very small targets: to counter minisubmarines,
swimmer delivery vehicles, other manned submersibles, and unmanned
platforms such as semisubmersibles and autonomous underwater vehicles.

• Active acoustic and nonacoustic sensor approaches: for better ASW sensor
balance against stealthy targets—that is, not merely relying on passive
acoustics.

• Offboard vehicles (unmanned or minimally manned): airborne, surface,
and undersea vehicles for a variety of ASW applications in order to reduce
risk to manned platforms and free them for other purposes, to act as force
multipliers, extend the reach of warships, and provide greater
cost-effectiveness.

• Miniaturized antisubmarine sensors: for use in distributed fields, offboard
vehicles, and small aircraft.

• Reconfigurable payloads: to allow multiple applications for the manned or
unmanned vehicles and platforms.

74

• Advanced self-protection measures: to shoot first at an attacking submarine
and if that fails, to counter effectively a variety of antiship torpedoes, even
large salvos of them. This increased emphasis on unit self-defense is
reinforced by the need for dispersion of forces.

• Advanced weapon concepts: weapons that are interoperable with
distributed, networked sensors without requiring the physical presence of a
manned platform; new applications for torpedoes or ASW weapons
concepts that go beyond torpedoes.

• Advanced networks and communications: to link sensors to shooters, to
support data fusion, and to allow effective command and control of
offboard vehicles.
It should be evident that a variety of sensor, weapon, countermeasure, networking, and communications approaches will be needed for future ASW operations. Antisubmarine warfare is a continuing counter-versus-countermeasure
game. Technological breakthroughs help manage the threat—they cannot eliminate it. No single sensor works well in all environmental, target, and operational
conditions, or is likely to in the foreseeable future. Passive acoustic sensors are
susceptible to target quieting and often strongly depend on prior knowledge of
target “signatures.” Active acoustic sensors are susceptible to environmental
clutter, cannot always ensonify the entire depth regime, and, because they give
away their presence, can sometimes be evaded or avoided. Nonacoustic sensors
that can detect deep targets tend to have limited search rates; those with
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potentially high search rates are generally ineffective against slow and deep targets or are vulnerable to environmental conditions, such as cloud cover. Thus,
antisubmarine sensors are inherently “niche players” in terms of environments
(water depths, acoustic conditions, atmospheric conditions), targets (physical
sizes, acoustic signatures, operating depths and speeds), and operational factors
(system covertness, host platforms or deployment mechanisms, persistence and
endurance, fixed or mobile applications). As such they will require a variety of
communication paths to be effective elements of an overall network. By the
same token, ASW weapons and countermeasures will also need to be diverse, to
handle the expected range of undersea targets.
ASW SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE
If the foundation, the crucial bottom portion of the antisubmarine warfare
pyramid, is not sound because key support areas have been neglected, antisubmarine systems entering the fleet can be expected to fail. Beyond the science and
technology enablers already alluded to, four support areas are worth
highlighting.
Environment Characterization
Knowledge of the environment is essential for antisubmarine warfare in any locale, but especially in littoral waters, where complex spatial and temporal (i.e.,
time and space) variations can wreak havoc on the performance of acoustic sensors. It is important to conduct prior surveys to establish such static parameters
as bottom characteristics, which determine how sound at different frequencies
propagates as it encounters the bottom and the extent to which bottom reverberation will limit active-sonar performance. Dynamic environmental parameters, such as sound velocity profiles, must be measured during actual operations.
Similar static and dynamic parameters influence nonacoustic sensors. Notwithstanding, according to some experts, in the post–Cold War era the “Navy . . .
[has] let its ocean surveillance community and its support for basic oceanographic research atrophy . . . [including] the ability to exploit this operation75
ally.” The experiences of the British in the Falklands testifies to the difficulties
encountered without sufficient knowledge of the surrounding seas to make use76
ful sonar range predictions.
Threat Characterization
Cueing begins with intelligence on potential adversaries. During the Cold War,
extensive all-source analysis was performed continuously against Soviet submarines, as part of the “preparation of the battle space.” This process addressed such
technical characteristics as submarine “signatures,” acoustic “fingerprints” to aid
in search and classification; it also involved determining threat-submarine
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operating patterns and tactics. The Navy’s Ocean Surveillance Information System nodes that directed this effort closed when the Cold War ended, and no
equivalents have been put in place. In comparison with the Cold War and World
War II, ASW-related intelligence support today is unfocused and lacks continuous analysis and feedback.
ASW System Understanding
Disciplined data collection and analysis are needed for antisubmarine systems
as well, to understand fully their hardware and software limitations (design and
physics issues) and employment constraints. In recent years the Naval Studies
Board strongly recommended that the Navy “establish and maintain a dedicated, long-term program centered on at-sea measurements and tests,” which it
77
had found lacking in the post–Cold War era. Without such a program it is difficult to discern the root causes of deficiencies and decide what corrective actions
are needed. Antisubmarine warfare has a fine tradition of regular at-sea exercises, but after most of them the Navy has been able to reconstruct only what
happened, not why. That would require additional instrumentation and analysis, but it would reveal whether training, tactics, hardware, software, or some
combination is the source of poor performance.
This state of affairs is not new to ASW. In 1942, for example, the National Defense Research Committee concluded that the operational capabilities of U.S.
Navy antisubmarine equipment were poorly understood and that what was
needed was “a formal and ongoing means of systematically gathering and ana78
lyzing all available operational data.” That task became one of the key functions of the Tenth Fleet, and similar steps were taken by the United Kingdom.
Reinforcing the need for this type of effort today, Vice Admiral Grossenbacher
recently commented, “We are not, however, sufficiently disciplined . . . yet to systematically collect data, analyze it, and then effectively feed that knowledge back
79
into tactics, techniques, procedures and technological development.” The U.S.
submarine force is now attempting to correct this shortfall for its ASW sensors
through the Acoustic Rapid Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Insertion Engineering
Measurement Program. Such sensor-level data collection and analysis need to be
done across the entire ASW community, in a consistent way, and even applied to
large fleet exercises. Without this diagnostic approach, it will be difficult to know
what to prescribe to bring antisubmarine warfare back to health.
Training and Tactics Development
Training (in equipment maintenance and operation) and tactical and doctrinal
development are elements of the art of antisubmarine warfare that have received
too little emphasis in the post–Cold War era—which is disconcerting, in view of
how perishable ASW skills can be. If this underemphasis is not corrected, the full
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potential of systems, technology, and physics cannot be realized. Vice Admiral
Edmund Giambastiani (as ComSubLant) has testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that “while a traditional strength of the Navy during the Cold
War, ASW capability and proficiency have waned. . . . ASW is now more difficult
against new generations of nuclear and diesel submarines and will become in80
creasingly critical.” During the Second World War, as we have seen, the Tenth
Fleet unified ASW training and related doctrine and tactics development during a
critical two-year period. In the late 1950s Task Force Alfa was established to do the
same. Later in the Cold War, integrated training was achieved in real-world operations by theater ASW task forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean (TF
84, 12, and 66, respectively) against deployed Soviet submarines. Good unit training was also available, for example, in surface-ship acoustic analysis centers.
The post–Cold War era, in contrast, has been marked by episodic training opportunities with weak feedback mechanisms, but perhaps that will not be true
much longer. The recently formed Fleet ASW Command is intended as a “center
81
of excellence,” a “focal point” for antisubmarine operations and training. If
this command provides the same sustained unity-of-effort contribution as occurred in World War II, during the post–World War II years, and for much of the
Cold War, proficiency at the unit, battlegroup, and theater levels should dramat82
ically improve.
ON THE BRINK OF COMMITMENT
After more than a decade of watching antisubmarine warfare unravel, the U.S.
Navy appears to be at the point of revitalizing it. The surface ship community,
which largely deemphasized antisubmarine warfare in the post–Cold War era,
has exhibited a renewed interest in its ASW capability. It plans upgrades to the
AN/SQQ-89 ASW combat system, aboard the Arleigh Burke–class destroyers
and other surface combatants. The increased focus on surface ASW is most
apparent in the Littoral Combat Ship program, which has allocated funds for ASWmission-module development. LCS is expected to rely heavily for its ASW capabilities on offboard systems, including distributed sensors such as ADS, manned
or unmanned aircraft, and other unmanned vehicles. Over two hundred
MH-60R ASW-capable helicopters with advanced dipping sonars will be entering the fleet over the next ten years. Existing P-3s will soon be upgraded with
IEER. The planned P-3 replacement, the Multi-Mission Aircraft (MMA), will
have antisubmarine warfare as its primary mission, the surveillance and reconnaissance role having been largely transferred to unmanned airborne vehicles.
About a hundred MMAs are to be procured in 2012 and afterward as the
P-3 phases out. The SSN community too is focusing on littoral antisubmarine warfare, with developments like a neutrally buoyant TB-29 towed array for
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shallow-water use. Also, procurement of the Virginia class is under way; the
name-ship was commissioned on 23 October 2004. Further, as noted, the moratorium on SURTASS LFA testing has finally ended, at least for high-interest Pacific Fleet operating areas.83 The ADS program will reach the fleet in a few years
as the first distributed field system designed specifically for surveillance and
cueing in the littorals. The Mark 54 lightweight torpedo will be entering the fleet
and will correct some of the weaknesses of the Mark 46. Surface ship torpedo defense has been revitalized; the first hard-kill system, an antitorpedo torpedo,
could be fielded by early in the next decade.
Notwithstanding all this ASW-related activity, however, total funding has not
changed appreciably, which ultimately may limit the pace of reinvigoration. Key
initiatives could be slowed: distributed and networked sensor developments beyond ADS; active multistatics beyond IEER, such as “coherent” instead of impulsive sources; nonacoustic sensor development (periscope-detection radars,
electro-optic devices, advanced magnetic sensors); new weapon concepts beyond
upgrades to legacy torpedoes; offboard vehicle development; advanced torpedo
defense measures beyond the first-generation ATT; and potentially paradigmbreaking technology concepts for detecting, tracking, and destroying submarines,
minisubs, and other submersibles. Thus the time line of figure 2 requires caveats,
particularly with respect to the rate of new technology insertion. However, this
tight budget environment cannot be allowed to produce continued neglect of
such key ASW support areas as tactical oceanography, intelligence, at-sea data collection and analysis, training, and tactical and doctrinal development.
The new initiatives, Task Force ASW and the Fleet ASW Command, need to
reverse the deterioration that has occurred in antisubmarine warfare during the
past fifteen years. Admiral Walter F. Doran, speaking as Commander in Chief,
U.S. Pacific Fleet, has pointed to the urgency: “ASW is my top warfighting concern in the Pacific theater. Our challenges are many as adversary submarines can
threaten assured access for joint forces. Diesel submarines, in particular, are an
asymmetric threat to joint forces in strategic littoral areas worldwide. They can
threaten our sea-based naval power projection and supply lines for sustained
84
joint operations.”
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FROM HERE TO THERE
The Strategy and Force Planning Framework
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everal years ago, as one of the authors was making a formal presentation to the
country team of the American embassy in Madrid, the senior political counselor (who was a graduate of the Naval War College) suddenly burst out, “Why
should anyone care about strategy? It’s hard enough dealing with policy, going
from one crisis to the next!” To be fair to this foreign
Dr. Liotta is the executive director of the Pell Center for
service officer, who had recently experienced any
International Relations and Public Policy. Previous to
this, he served as the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic
number of policy crises—from Haiti to the Balkans—
Geography and National Security at the Naval War
there was a point to his objection. Why should anyone
College. He has received a Pulitzer Prize nomination
care
about strategy?
and a National Endowment for the Arts literature fellowship. His recent work includes Mapping MacedoStrategy, after all, is not politically expedient; it is a
nia: Idea and Identity (2004, with coauthor C. R. Jebb),
long-term focusing instrument that helps shape the
The Uncertain Certainty: Human Security, Environ1
future environment. Policy crises, on the other hand,
mental Change, and the Future Euro-Mediterranean
(2003), Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugoalways deal with the more immediate execution of inislavia and Why It Matters (2001), and The Wolf at the
tiatives to address critical needs and requirements.
Door: A Poetic Cycle Translated from the MacedoBut if an argument could be made in defense of stratnian of Bogomil Gjuzel (2001).
Dr. Lloyd holds the William B. Ruger Chair of National
egy, it would be this: In the absence of strategy, there is
Security Economics and is a professor in the Security,
no clear direction for the future, and any road will
Strategy, and Forces Course in the Naval War College’s
take you there, bumping over crisis and change, and
National Security Decision Making Department. He
has coedited nine textbooks on strategy and force plansuffering through one knee-jerk reaction after
ning. He is chair of the Naval War College’s Latin
another.
American Studies Group, which coordinates the College’s
Perhaps what best illustrates this reality is the scene
activities in Latin America. He lectures on contemporary national defense topics at various sites throughout
between Alice and the Cheshire Cat in Alice’s Adventhe United States and South America.
tures in Wonderland, when Alice asks, “Would you tell
me, please, which way I ought to go from here?”
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“That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat.
“I don’t much care where—,” said Alice.
“Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,” said the Cat.
“—so long as I get somewhere,” Alice added as an explanation.
2
“Oh, you’re sure to do that,” said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”
At its best, strategy will get you somewhere near where you intended to go.
Strategy provides a systematic approach to dealing with change, with both what
should and should not remain the same. Strategy, in short, is the application of
available means to secure desired ends. One could approach the execution of
strategy from various perspectives, but we prefer to offer here a “top down” approach. It begins with a series of questions we must ask and attempt to answer in
the process:

• What do we want to do? (policy objectives)
• How do we plan to do it? (strategic execution)
• What we are up against? (threats, vulnerabilities, challenges, opportunities)
• What is available to do it? (unilateral or multilateral choices, alliances or
coalitions or alignments, international institutions, viable defense forces,
economic or political or diplomatic or informational instruments)

• What are the mismatches? (risks, deficiencies, unforeseen outcomes, cultural
blinders).
We should end at a question with which we should always also begin, for
strategy is itself the critical link in a continuous feedback loop:

• Why do we want to do this? (strategic goals, desired and demanded).
Further compounding the complexity of all these necessary questions, strategy
attempts to strike a balance between answering today’s realities (the current security environment) and planning how to address tomorrow’s alternative possibilities (the future security environment).
Thus, the United States continues to reassess national priorities and fundamental elements of strategy over time. But doing so requires quality and clarity
in decisions about strategy and force planning. Lacking a clear set of objectives
and a focused, robust national security strategy, we will only be able to react to,
rather than shape, events affecting our interests. Muddling through will not do.
Today’s decisions about strategy and force planning will fundamentally influence future strategy and force posture. Done well, such decisions and choices
can prove a powerful investment in the future. Yet to avoid the consequences of
planning errors in what is often an inherently complex process, it seems useful to
revisit the basics of strategy and force planning in their fullest dimensions.
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Admittedly, making solid strategic and force choices in a free society is a difficult and lengthy process. The strategist and force planner must consider numerous international and domestic factors, including political, economic, military,
technological, and informational—and even cultural—influences. The sheer
number of ideas, concepts, opinions, and differing points of view can often be
overwhelming, all the more so if one lacks a systematic framework for organizing strategic concepts and executing strategic choices. Because planning involves preparing, often under conditions of uncertainty, there is considerable
uncertainty and much room for disagreement about preferred strategy and how
forces should be structured, organized, equipped, and designed for the future.
Unfortunately, there rarely is a single right answer.
Equally valid arguments can be made for wildly different choices, with each
choice dependent on objectives desired and assumptions made about threats,
challenges, opportunities, technological advances, and future political and economic conditions. Thus, advocates who focus on single factors most important
to their specific interests, such as a particular threat or the fiscal budget, often
fail to understand—and therefore fail to deal with—the full dimensions of the
strategic environment. In short, to execute strategy correctly, we must deal with
today’s reality and tomorrow’s possibilities.
In an attempt to address the demands of both the current and future security
environments, we offer here a framework that may help us ask the right questions, appreciate the complex dynamic of strategy, and address in a comprehensive way the important factors present in strategic decision making. While
recognizing that organizational interests, bureaucratic behavior, and politics
play significant roles in all strategic choices, our framework focuses on the formulation of national security requirements and the evaluation of alternative
strategy and force choices.
Bearing in mind that we must always deal with today’s problems and tomorrow’s plausible outcomes, we begin our top-down approach with national interests and objectives, and then address more detailed aspects that can both assist
and confound decision makers in the selection of future strategy and forces—
strategy is a complex business. To this end we have found it useful to work with
simple organizing mechanisms, such as the Strategy and Force Planning Framework (figure 1). We wish it to highlight the major factors that should be considered within these processes; accordingly, as we readily admit, it represents a
compromise between the complexity of reality and the necessity for simplicity
as an aid to understanding. The attempt to identify the most essential elements
in strategy and force planning and illustrate their dominant (and often interdependent) relationships is nonetheless a valuable one.
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FIGURE 1
STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK
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In presenting this framework, our purposes are to provide a tool for understanding the fundamental concepts of strategy and force planning and to offer a
systematic approach to organizing a decision maker’s thinking. The framework
could variously be used as a guide to developing alternative strategies and future
forces; as an aid to evaluating the arguments of strategists or force planners; and
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as a starting point for developing alternative approaches to structuring major
3
force-planning decisions.
SCARCITY AND NEEDS:
THE SCOPE OF THE STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK
Two main themes underpin our discussion of strategic concepts: the allocation of
scarce resources, and the relationship among ends, means, and risks. There will
never be enough resources to satisfy all the nation’s wants and needs. Thus, we must
make strategic choices, establish requirements, set priorities, make decisions, and allocate to the most critical needs.
Strategy, as we see it, is the most important guide for sound force planning. To
obtain the most from our limited resources (means), we need to understand what
we want to do and where we want to go (ends), and how we plan to get there (strategy). Often the critical importance of this basic ends-means relationship gets lost in
the quagmire of detailed assessments and specific weapon-system decisions. Yet forgetting the essentials of this relationship overlooks the prospect that we will more
often than not be forced to adjust our security goals (ends) to fit within the bounds
of our own ability to satisfy such objectives (means). A mismatch between ends and
means poses real danger (risk) to overall security interests.
The Strategy and Force Planning Framework is divided into two sections:
strategic choices (top half) and force choices (lower half). Strategic choices involve the identification of national interests, national objectives, and the national security strategy, incorporating traditional instruments of power
(political, economic, and military) as well as emerging influences (such as information and culture). To the left of the framework we mean to assess factors affecting the current and future security environment by considering threats,
challenges, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. To the right of the framework we
have offered factors that are both means and influences: the roles and support of
allies and friendly nations, the costs and opportunities that international institutions offer, and the undeniable presence of nonstate actors in the security environment. Equally, the framework acknowledges that resource constraints and
technology are critical factors that frequently shape, sometimes distort, and ultimately drive the development of national strategy.
Accordingly, in the lower half of the framework the national military strategy,
along with fiscal and program guidance and the influence of current and desired
military capabilities, all dictate the sizing and selection of forces. (Equally, operational challenges that forces will likely face and emerging operational concepts
to overcome these challenges will influence strategy, program guidance, and capabilities.) Force selection also involves an assessment of the ability of available
forces to support national strategy. Deficiencies are identified that result when
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specific fiscal constraints are applied to the acquisition of future defense forces.
Alternative force choices are evaluated to address deficiencies and reduce risks resulting in forces programmed for the future. As these forces are fielded, they become available to support the strategy. Thus, the darkly shaded lines in the
framework illustrate why and how constant assessment (and reassessment) is an
essential part of making and executing strategy.
In the area of defense planning, examples abound that demonstrate the reality
of strategy-to-force mismatches. The continued lack of adequate numbers of
Navy ships to meet national commitments might be one case in point. The American national leadership, with its continued emphasis on global engagement, presumably wants to maintain a level of naval presence in the oceans roughly on a par
with that of the past several decades; however, because of an insufficient number
of ships, the U.S. Navy is unable to meet this requirement. The war on terrorism
has exacerbated the demand for more ships. Since ships take years to design, fund,
and build, the lack of adequate ships will be a predetermined element in many
maritime-oriented scenarios for many years. Similar practical realities exist for
any military system that takes years to build and field, whether space systems, mis4
sile defense systems, major aircraft programs, or other comparable projects.
THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH:
USING THE FRAMEWORK TO MAKE STRATEGIC CHOICES
The national interest can be, admittedly, a slippery concept. Often, the term “interests” suggests specific policy agenda items, phrased in ambiguous terms. But
the overriding national interest of any nation should be clear and specific—to
ensure the security and prosperity of the state and its people. Normally, we see
this vital interest couched in terms of national survival and well-being. Preservation of our territorial integrity, freedom, independence, political institutions,
and honor are fundamental to our survival as a nation. Maintenance of the economic well-being and overall quality of life of the American people are also important interests, as is the survival of our allies.
National Interests
President George H. W. Bush summarized our national interests in the 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States in this way:
The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure[;] . . . [a] healthy and
growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources
for national endeavors at home and abroad[;] . . . [h]ealthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations[;] . . . [and] a stable and secure world where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic
institutions flourish.5
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President W. J. Clinton, in his 1996 National Security Strategy of Engagement
and Enlargement, stated:
Protecting our nation’s security—our people, our territory and our way of life—is
my Administration’s foremost mission and constitutional duty. . . . The preamble to
the Constitution sets out the basic objective: “to provide for the common defense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity.” The end of the Cold War does not alter these fundamental purposes. . . .
In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on what best serves our own
long-term national interests. Those interests are ultimately defined by our security
requirements. Such requirements start with our physical defense and economic
well-being. They also include environmental security as well as the security of our
6
values achieved through expansion of the community of democratic nations.

In his 1980 State of the Union address, President Jimmy Carter indicated that
free-world access to foreign oil was a vital interest of the United States. Such
judgments have important influences on strategy and force planning. Throughout the 1980s, a Southwest Asia focus was used, among others, to determine the
level and mix of future American power-projection capabilities and as a reason
to establish the U.S. Central Command. These investments paid off when the
United States with its allies and friends expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait during
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
More recently, the administration of President George W. Bush—while emphasizing the need to wage the war on terrorism on a global scale and to use preventive war if necessary—intentionally linked national interests to national
values, suggesting that it would be difficult, even impractical, to separate the two:
The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of
this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path
to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other
states, and respect for human dignity. . . . Freedom is the nonnegotiable demand of
human dignity; the birthright of every person—in every civilization. Throughout history, freedom has been threatened by war and terror; it has been challenged by the
clashing wills of powerful states and the evil designs of tyrants; and it has been tested
by widespread poverty and disease. Today, humanity holds in its hands the opportunity to further freedom’s triumph over all these foes. The United States welcomes our
7
responsibility to lead in this great mission.

National Objectives
Whereas national interests define the basic, nonnegotiable needs of a nation, national objectives support the larger execution of strategy and interests. National
objectives are the specific goals a nation seeks in order to advance, support, or defend national interests. They are generally described in three broad categories—
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political, economic, and security—although other categories, such as social,
8
ideological, or technological, are also used.
If national interests (which represent the highest level of abstraction) do not
radically shift from administration to administration, national objectives can
vary tremendously. In 2001, for example, a hypothetical Gore administration
would likely not have pushed for national missile defense as aggressively as the
Bush administration did after coming into office. Yet while a Gore administration and the actual Bush administration would have very different national objectives, their essential perspectives on national interests would vary little. In
fact, while national interests have not strayed far from the principles set down in
the U.S. Constitution, there can be wide variance—and disagreement—on what
objectives best support national interests and strategy. Accordingly, the 2002
National Security Strategy broadly outlines the following desirable objectives:

• Champion aspirations for human dignity
• Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks
against us and our friends

• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts
• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with
weapons of mass destruction

• Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade
• Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the
infrastructure of democracy

• Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power
• Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges
and opportunities of the twenty-first century.

9

These brief examples provide only a starting point for the strategist, nonetheless. Detailed objectives must be formulated and prioritized for each region and
particular situation in which U.S. interests are involved. Too often, stated objectives are vague, misdirected, overambitious, or miss opportunities. It is essential
that they be focused and clearly stated. Echoing the words of the Cheshire Cat,
John Collins has written, “If you don’t know what you want to do, you can’t plan
10
how to do it.”
National Security Strategy
“Strategy” is a word often used but little understood. It has taken on so many
meanings in different publications that it is important to set the context for its
use here. André Beaufre defines strategy as
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the art of applying force so that it makes the most effective contribution toward
achieving the ends set by political policy. . . .The aim of strategy is to fulfill the objective laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available. . . . The art of
strategy consists in choosing the most suitable means from those available and so orchestrating their results that they combine to produce a psychological pressure sufficient to achieve the moral effect required.11

National strategy constitutes the master plan for executing national objectives through a combination of political, economic, military, informational, cultural, and even psychological means. These tools are the basic instruments of
national power. Strategic choices indicate how a nation will employ all of these
instruments in the pursuit of national objectives. These strategic choices and the
assumptions made about them provide guidance and establish limits on lowerlevel decisions. The framework in figure 1 explicitly shows national military
strategy flowing from, and in support of, the national security strategy. Thus, a
top-down strategy and force-planning approach allows national strategy to set
the bounds by which successive force choices are made.
National Military Strategy
A nation’s military strategy should flow from its objectives and overall national
security strategy. Sometimes it is useful to view elements of this strategy as comprising fundamental choices concerning alternative courses of action. These elements, or “descriptors,” outline how we intend to use our military means to
achieve our ends. Some of these fundamental choices are: a coalition strategy
versus a go-it-alone strategy; deterrence versus war fighting; forward-deployed
forces versus U.S.-based strategic reserves; benign versus forcible entry; globally
flexible forces versus regionally tailored forces; and active versus reserve force
components. The demands and influences of each of these factors fundamentally determine the size and structure of future forces.
Fiscal and Program Guidance
In one sense, the strategy and force planning process is a resource allocation
problem. Two levels of resource allocation affect the amount of resources applied to defense. At the highest level, there is the consideration of the nation’s total resources and how they will be shared between the private and public sectors.
This is an integral part of the debate over the choice of grand strategy and the allocation of resources to implement it. The focus of debate at this level is concerned with growth, employment, inflation, budget and trade deficits, and the
overall productivity of the economy.
The second level of resource allocation occurs between defense and nondefense
programs within the federal budget. Competing political, economic, and security objectives strongly influence these resource allocation decisions. Thus,
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defense planners must articulate their legitimate needs to meet the nation’s security objectives. Realistic appraisals must be made of the future availability of
defense funds. Too often, defense plans assume that budgets will rise in the future to correct current deficiencies.
CURRENT AND DESIRED CAPABILITIES:
OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES, OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
At the turn of the twenty-first century, American defense planning intentionally
shifted from threat-based planning to the more conceptually challenging—but
operationally necessary—process known as capabilities-based planning. In part
this intentional shift was a recognition of multiple dynamics that were making
the security environment far more complex and challenging than during the
Cold War. Further, many saw the “2MTW” scenario—the two-major-theaterwar policy by which defense forces were nominally sized and selected—as a
12
“strategy killer.” Finally, the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001 only intensified the strategic need for lighter, more flexible, more mobile, and more responsive defense forces, able to possess and operate with a wide array of capabilities.
We have thus included in our framework the systemic driving forces of operational challenges and operational concepts, along with the continuing process of
improving current force capabilities and achieving desired ones.
Optimally, these operational influences steer military strategy, fiscal and program guidance, and the understanding of current and desired capabilities. Conversely, strategy, fiscal guidance, and capabilities push toward the further
refinement of operational concepts and ways to overcome operational challenges, such as area denial, anti-access, and force interoperability. The framework portrays a two-way arrow, indicating the multiple and interdependent
influences of strategy, fiscal guidance, concepts, and capabilities.
ASSESSMENT AND INTEGRATION:
USING THE FRAMEWORK TO MAKE FORCE CHOICES
Having selected a national security strategy and national military strategy, we
need to assess our ability to carry it out with the available forces and against the
background of projected threats and challenges. These latter assessments take
various forms, from detailed analytical treatments of opposing forces to intuitive judgments about nonquantifiable aspects of war. Whatever the form, any
strategy and force assessment must address objectives, strategy, threats, vulnerabilities, available force, and risk. The fundamental standard is simply this: Do
the military forces support the national security strategy in such a way that national objectives are achieved, at acceptable risk, in face of the threats?
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The entire force choice process should be dynamic, in order to adapt to
changing conditions. Different force planning elements are considered to varying degrees both inside and outside the Department of Defense. By design, the
entire process must come together at least once a year, for the preparation of the
Future Years Defense Program. The “FYDP,” however, is not the final word, as
Congress will modify choices to reflect its evaluation of the proposed strategy
and forces, as well as the public and political moods of the time. The framework
considers each of the force-choice elements.
Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities, Opportunities
An essential task for the strategist and force planner is to assess the security environment in terms of future threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. At some point, however, the force planner must consider the full spectrum
of conflict, ranging from weapons of mass destruction, cyber attack and other
informational or infrastructure degradations, major conventional war, regional
conflicts, and protection of the homeland to peace operations, terrorism, drug
trafficking, humanitarian assistance, and presence. Henry Bartlett, Paul Holman,
and Timothy Somes of the Naval War College have suggested that the most important task is to evaluate fully the nature of such conflicts, their likelihood of occur13
rence, and their consequences for the national interests. Ultimately, such
judgments lead to better decisions about how to structure and apply military forces.
Traditional threat assessments continue to have an important, though modified, role in the strategy and force planning process. Consideration of a specific
nation’s capabilities, intentions, and circumstances, as well as vulnerabilities, is
14
important. The intentions and plans of a potential adversary are usually more
vague and uncertain than knowledge of opposing force capabilities. Yet specific
circumstances of the time can alter a nation’s capabilities and intentions in unexpected ways, and identification of vulnerabilities allows weaknesses of a
threatening nation to be exploited in the development of strategy.
Allies, Friendly Nations, International Institutions, Nonstate Actors
A major strategic choice is the extent to which our strategy will be linked to
other nations, either through broad alignments or through specific alliances
such as NATO, cooperative security and multilateral frameworks such as the
United Nations, or ad hoc coalitions. The expected contributions of allies and
friendly nations are critically important to our ultimate strategy and our allocation of limited resources. Finally, the influence and importance of nonstate actors—both positive and negative—have only gained in importance in the
twenty-first century.
Such complex interrelationships inevitably raise the issue of the effectiveness
of such relationships as well as those of the division of labor and overall burden
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sharing. Other nations’ capabilities, intentions, circumstances, and vulnerabilities may not always align with our interests and objectives. Nevertheless, weighing and understanding these relationships will prove critical to the choice
between a coalition strategy and going it alone.
Available Forces
Another major input to the continuing assessment process is a description of the
military forces that would be available for future conflicts. These forces include:
existing forces (active and reserve) minus those scheduled for decommissioning
or disbanding; forces programmed to become operational during the time of interest; and force contributions that can be expected from allies and friendly nations in specific situations.
Existing forces provide a baseline to which additions, and from which deletions, are made. Given the extended life and long procurement lead-times for
many weapon systems, existing forces inevitably form a major part of the force
structure far into the future. Since our force structure is not built from the
ground up each year, force-modernization choices are most often made “on the
margin.” Thus, although national security objectives and military strategy
should determine our selection of forces, existing forces largely determine today’s strategy and our ability to meet today’s contingencies.
Operational planners tend to emphasize readiness and sustainability, since they
must plan for the possibility of fighting with today’s existing forces. Force planners tend to focus on modernization and force structure issues, since their goal is
to create future forces capable of supporting the nation’s future strategy and objectives. Both perspectives are important, and the best strategist and force planner
strikes a balance between operating existing forces and investing in future
capability.
Assessment
Strategy and force planning assessments comprise a complex series of analyses
that evaluate the capabilities of U.S. and allied forces to support national security strategy in the face of potential threats. Yet just as operational challenges and
emerging operational concepts deal with more than just threats, valid forms of
assessment must address vulnerabilities and opportunities as well. These richer
assessments point out deficiencies in available forces and suggest risks inherent
in current programs. These assessment exercises help formulate changes to programmed forces. This appraisal process leads to the decisions that eventually reallocate funds among various programs, within fiscal guidelines. Revised
programs are then used as the basis for future force posture. In making these assessments, defense planners must consider the basic questions we asked in introducing the Strategy and Force Planning Framework (see figure 2).
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FIGURE 2
ASSESSMENT

What do we want to do?
CURRENT
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ENVIRONMENT

How do we plan to do it?
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POLITICAL ECONOMIC MILITARY
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THREATS
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FISCAL & PROGRAM
GUIDANCE
OPERATIONAL
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CURRENT & DESIRED
CAPABILITIES

INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
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ACTORS
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What is available to do it?
ASSESSMENT
DEFICIENCIES & RISKS

What are the mismatches?

ALTERNATIVES

PROGRAMMED FORCES

Why do we want to do this?

AVAILABLE FORCES

Both qualitative and quantitative assessments are useful in comparing opposing forces and strategies. Qualitative factors include such things as leadership,
doctrine, training, morale, logistics, intelligence, technology, and initiative.
Quantitative factors include order of battle, firepower, mobility, survivability,
accuracy, range, weapons effects, and a host of other measurable quantities. The
analysis of quantitative factors makes use of counting, modeling, and gaming.
Because they add the human element, political-military simulations, war games,
and exercises also provide useful insights to the strategist and force planner.
Deficiencies and Risk
Both qualitative and quantitative assessments of objectives, strategy, forces, and
threats help identify deficiencies in our strategy or force posture. The net result
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of such deficiencies is that risks must be assumed to arise from them until improvements can be made.
“Risk,” nonetheless, is an ambiguous term with numerous definitions. In the
broadest of terms, risk is the ability or willingness to expose oneself to damage during a period of change. In the Strategy and Force Planning Framework, risk is the
gap between desired ends (national security objectives) and available means
(strategy and forces). In particular, strategy must address both the likelihood
and the potential consequences of failure. Moreover, until systemic improvements can be made to minimize their effect, particular risks must be accounted
for and recognized in any strategic analysis.
Risk requires management if its impact is to be minimized. Additional information on crucial uncertainties may be necessary before deciding on a course of action.
Budgets may be raised to lessen the overall risk of failure. Limited resources may be reallocated among mission areas, accepting increased risks in some areas in order to reduce the risk in others. At the highest level of planning, a nation may tolerate higher
levels of security risks to achieve other political or social development objectives.
Alternatives and Programmed Forces
The next step in force planning is to select from alternative forces the number,
type, and mix of military capabilities needed to correct deficiencies and minimize risks, keeping in mind fiscal realism and the need to balance force levels.
However fiscally constrained, the programmed force must satisfy the most critical aspects of the national military strategy.
Three general levels of resource allocation occur at this stage of force planning. All three must be addressed from joint and combined perspectives. The
first takes place when defense fiscal and policy guidance is refined and each service’s share of the defense budget is determined. Concerns over roles, missions,
and functions can surface at this time. Changing defense priorities could also
have an important effect. Within each service a second major resource allocation must be made among each of the appropriation accounts. Here the question is how much should be allocated respectively to force structure,
modernization, readiness, operational tempo, and support infrastructure.
A final level of allocation occurs when alternative force choices are made
within and among mission areas of each service. Should Army divisions be
heavy or light? Should the Navy emphasize carriers, submarines, strategic sealift,
or amphibious lift? Should the Air Force modernize fighter/attack aircraft or
strategic airlift? What should be the mix between active and reserve forces? What
will be the influence of networked operations and unmanned systems on force
integration? Will “fire-ant warfare,” biogenetic engineering, and self-replicating
mechanisms present true revolutionary advances in warfare? Will autonomous

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:27 PM

138

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2005 Issue

LIOTTA & LLOYD

135

warfare, the “need for speed,” and progressively smaller warfighting systems dissociate humans to some extent from future initial policy and combat decisions?
Should U.S. armed forces take the lead in developing new operational concepts
that draw from biological science, advanced manufacturing, microelectrochemical systems, and information processing?
THE CONTINUOUS FEEDBACK LOOP:
ITERATION AND REITERATION
Strategy and force planning is not a rigid, sequential process; feedback and iteration must exist at all levels. The heavy lines in the upper portion of figure 1 emphasize the need for feedback and iteration in making strategic choices. Military,
political, economic, technological, and even basic value assessments may suggest a need to revise the initial choice the better to meet national objectives. It
may also be necessary to review the national objectives to ensure that more has
not been attempted than the strategy can accomplish with available resources
and technology.
The thickly shaded lines in the lower portion of the framework indicate a
need to reassess, after the selection of programmed forces, the ability of available
forces to carry out the national military strategy. Alternative force consideration
can also help determine the best choices within resource limits.
Finally, assessment forms the link between choices about strategy and force
structure. Limitations or deficiencies of a military strategy may become apparent only after the forces needed to carry it out are already in place. Where a
strategy-force mismatch exists, either the forces must be adjusted, the strategy
strengthened, the objectives revised, or additional risks accepted. André Beaufre
characterizes this dilemma as the force planner’s ultimate challenge: “The most
difficult military problem to resolve is that of establishing a security system, as
inexpensively as possible in time of peace, capable of transforming itself very
15
rapidly into a powerful force in case of the danger of aggression.”
Political, bureaucratic, and organizational factors often obscure the important
rational elements of strategy and force planning decisions. In light of today’s dynamic security environment and increasing competition for scarce resources,
choosing the best strategy and defense forces is more crucial now than ever. Errors made today will produce strategy and defense forces ill suited to our nation’s future needs.
Because of the complexities involved and the numerous uncertainties that
make precise evaluation difficult, clear-cut choices are seldom possible. Consequently, final decisions are often made in an atmosphere of political bargaining
and organizational advocacy. Those involved in national defense must
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nonetheless employ some form of rational approach as they consider the numerous planning elements and attempt to make timely and informed judgments on
complex strategic and force choice issues. Moreover, it is essential that decision
makers communicate, clearly and concisely, their reasoning to the American
public.

NOTES

1. Although this article represents a major and
significant revision of earlier conceptual approaches, there is a narrative history to the
development of the strategy and force planning framework. Earlier iterations of this
framework approach include: Richmond M.
Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework,” in Strategy and Force Planning, ed.
Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, 3d ed.
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,
2000), pp. 1–17; Richmond M. Lloyd, “Strategy and Force Planning Framework,” in
Strategy and Force Planning, ed. Strategy and
Force Planning Faculty (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College Press, 1995), pp. 1–14; Richmond
M. Lloyd, “Force Planning for the 1990s,” in
Fundamentals of Force Planning, vol. 1, Concepts, ed. Force Planning Faculty (Newport,
R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1990), pp.
105–26; and Richmond M. Lloyd and Dino
A. Lorenzini [Lt. Col., USAF], “A Framework
for Choosing Defense Forces,” Naval War
College Review 34, no. 1 (January/February
1981), pp. 46–58.
2. Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventure in Wonderland, chap. 6, “Pig and Pepper,” Millennium
Fulcrum 3.0, at www-2.cs.cmu.edu/People/
rgs/alice-ftitle.html.
3. This diagram extensively modifies one that
originally appeared in Lloyd and Lorenzini,
“A Framework for Choosing Defense Forces,”
which was itself an adaptation of the Force
Structure Assessment Methodology given in
NWP-1 (Rev. A), Strategic Concepts of the
U.S. Navy (Washington, D.C.: Navy Dept.,
1978). This framework is intended to include
the most important strategy and force planning factors. Within each broad category,
many concepts, principles, ideas, and methods may be used. Clearly, certain factors will
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be more important than others, depending
on the circumstances. Quite often, alternative
approaches give greater emphasis to specific
factors, such as the threat, vulnerability, technology, or the budget. Ultimately, the better
strategists must review and synthesize multiple factors in a comprehensive manner. See
Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and
Timothy E. Somes, “The Art of Strategy and
Force Planning,” in Strategy and Force
Planning, ed. Security, Strategy, and Forces
Faculty, 4th ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College Press, 2004), pp. 17–33, for an alternative framework—less detailed but perfectly
useful and valid—as well as an extended discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of alternative approaches to strategy and force
planning.
4. For further thoughts on some of these planning dilemmas, see P. H. Liotta and Timothy E.
Somes, “The Art of Reperceiving: Scenarios
and the Future,” in Strategy and Force
Planning, ed. Security, Strategy, and Forces
Faculty, 4th ed. (Newport, R.I.: Naval War
College Press, 2004), pp. 139–50, also appearing in Naval War College Review 56, no. 4
(Autumn 2003), pp. 121–32.
5. George H. W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.:
White House, August 1991), pp. 3–4.
6. William Jefferson Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
(Washington, D.C.: White House, February
1996), pp. i, 3, and 11.
7. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of
the United States of America (Washington,
D.C.: White House, September 2002), available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
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8. John M. Collins, Grand Strategy (Annapolis,
Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1974), pp. 2–3.
9. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy.
10. John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning: A
Critique (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982), p. 6.
11. André Beaufre, An Introduction to Strategy
(New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 22 and 24.
12. See, in particular, Eliot Cohen, “Defending
America in the Twenty-first Century,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 6 (November/December
2000), pp. 40–56.
13. Henry C. Bartlett, G. Paul Holman, Jr., and
Timothy E. Somes, “The Spectrum of
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Conflict: What Can It Do for Force Planners?” in Strategy and Force Planning, ed.
Security, Strategy, and Forces Faculty, 4th ed.
(Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press,
2004), pp. 497–505.
14. See Frederick H. Hartmann, The Relations of
Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp.
259–62, for a discussion of why military officers prefer to focus on capabilities while diplomats tend to concentrate on intentions and
circumstances.
15. André Beaufre, Strategy for Tomorrow (New
York: Crane, Russak, 1974), p. 71.
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EURO-BASHING AS GOOD SPORT
Gordon, Philip H., and Jeremy Shapiro. Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 2004, 266pp. $19.95

Is the alliance between the United States
and the European community of nations broken beyond repair? Brookings
Institution scholars Philip H. Gordon
and Jeremy Shapiro definitively address
the most fundamental and perplexing
question continuing to face transatlantic relations. The authors, both products of the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies and
presently in residence at Brookings in
the Foreign Policy Studies Program,
undertake a disciplined, critical analysis
of whether the special relationship between nations is worth preserving. The
book, in essence, represents a magnum
opus regarding the ongoing question of
shared values and solidarity in the U.S.European alliance. Gordon and Shapiro
effectively present valuable counterpoints to prominent neoconservative
viewpoints marginalizing the influence
and utility of Europe—particularly
“Old Europe.” This volume argues that
the differences between the European
and American viewpoints on security,
particularly handling the rise of radical
Islam, are more complex than Robert
Kagan’s “Americans are from Mars,
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Europeans are from Venus” analogy.
Gordon and Shapiro’s ultimate conclusion is that strategic partners who share
so much cultural identity with the
United States, and who have had the
courage to invoke for the first time in
the alliance’s fifty-two-year history their
mutual defense clause in the wake of
the 11 September attacks, should not be
cast aside in the interest of short-term
political expediency and of pandering
to demographic elements who regard
Euro-bashing as good sport. Despite the
posturing, tough talk, and emotionalism
swirling around the continued debate
on the viability of the most successful
and functional international alliance in
history, America needs its European allies and NATO as much as they need
America.
Although Gordon and Shapiro scrutinize the historic alliance of NATO and
its relevance in light of the diminished
threat from the East, they are also talking about something larger than NATO
and its internal imperfections and
inefficiencies and the synergy of its
membership. They explore the real,
substantial fissures in the transatlantic
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alliance generally and the ascendancy of
a new paradigm of political equality between the world’s only remaining superpower and the interstate economic and
political entity of Europe. Disagreement
between the United States and the European powers is nothing new. As examples, the authors cite the 1956 Suez
crisis, disharmony over U.S. policy in
Vietnam (as the United States arguably
attempted to finish what the French
started in Indochina), substantive debates over the placement of Minuteman
nuclear missiles in Germany during the
height of the Cold War, and internal
rifts over policy in the Balkans. They
also observe that French leadership of
the international intransigence toward
U.S. policy on Iraq led some in the U.S.
government and American society in
general to exaggerate (and oversimplify)
perceived French ingratitude for American contributions to their own preservation of sovereignty—–twice in the
same century—and German ungratefulness for the substantial postwar reconstruction that brought West Germany
quickly back into the community of nations. The authors rightly observe that
the U.S.-European rift demonstrates
less about European courage and willingness to take a hard line against Iraq
than about the European community’s
demand to at long last be truly equal
partners in the alliance.
Gordon and Shapiro note that the familiar refrain, “the mission should determine the coalition,” is far more
controversial than it sounds: while a nation such as the United States should,
of course, put its own national security
interests first, is there a long view on
cooperative strategy that trumps shortterm coalition building? Allies at War
represents a road map for “how to get
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there from here.” The authors hypothesize that given more time for diplomacy
and a meaningful chance for Iraq to
avoid war, France would have eventually voted for war. Germany, emboldened by the French example of standing
down the Americans, would have probably followed suit, lessening Russian
and Chinese resolve to block the war in
the UN Security Council. The American
diplomatic strategy, born perhaps of
arrogance, intemperance, or a lack of
understanding of the value of international approval or acquiescence to the
principle of regime change in Iraq,
placed the rest of the world on the
American time line, which reflected eagerness to gain approval before the onset of summer temperatures in Iraq,
which in turn diminish combat effectiveness. The diplomatic effort was
driven by a single factor—because the
United States had moved a hundred
thousand troops and tens of thousands
of tons of gear and materiel halfway
around the world, war had to happen in
March and could not wait until October. For many Europeans, America’s
“enough is enough” policy represented
a fait accompli. The U.S. challenge was
to legitimize a decision that had been
made long before—to invade Iraq and
topple the Baathist government.
The detailed authoritative account of
the diplomatic effort is alone worth the
investment in this book. The effort was
a crusade that ultimately failed to
achieve its prewar goal to unite Europe
and add support, if not membership, to
the ad hoc coalition. Concerning the
run-up to war, and in its aftermath, the
question lingers—did the war irreparably harm the relationship between
NATO, the United States and Europe?
Is the alienation permanent? If not,
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what can and should be done to repair
the damage? Should we care?
Allies at War highlights convincingly
that the egotistical, black-and-white,
good vs. “axis of evil” juxtaposition of
parties in the conflict seemingly made it
easy, even necessary, for Americans to
demand that the Europeans choose
sides: “You’re either with us or against
us.” The Europeans, by contrast, found
room for a third position. They would
be willing to hold Iraq accountable,
through military action if necessary, but
only after diplomacy had been exhausted,
not merely attempted. Perhaps, in light
of the conflict that followed, the French
and German position was not unreasonable—that the fact that Iraq had
been in technical noncompliance with a
litany of UN Security Council resolutions for a decade or more paled in
comparison to their interest in demanding equal partnership and real,
meaningful consultation between the
United States and European powers.
The authors identify three key factors
underlying French leadership of the
European revolution: that removing
Saddam Hussein from power could
prove to be a strategic mistake; the desire to deny the United States a “blank
check” for the use of force in pursuit of
narrow national interests; and the establishment of French and German
leadership of the European Union
(EU). Yet at least one other factor does
not obtain sufficient treatment in this
book—the effect that French, German,
and other European national economic
considerations had upon the decision to
oppose U.S. military intervention in
Iraq. Indeed, eighteen months after the
initiation of hostilities, Germany, France,
and Russia were finally convinced by
U.S. diplomats to forgive up to 80
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percent of Iraq’s multibillion dollar
debt to the nineteen-nation “Paris
club” to promote Iraqi reconstruction
efforts. Moreover, a recent report by
CIA investigator Charles Duelfer revealed substantial economic interests
personally held by influential French
businessmen and politicians—interests
tied to the UN oil-for-food program.
Whether economic considerations materially affected the Franco-German
position remains to be seen; ultimately,
however, the underlying nature of
French and German prewar obstinacy
would not change Gordon and
Shapiro’s ultimate conclusions that the
U.S.-European alliance should be here
to stay and that U.S. investment in repairing continental relations would be
beneficial to both sides of the ocean.
Current “damn the torpedoes”
groupthink is not sustainable in the interest of long-term security, and the
benefit of gaining European and international legitimacy and resources is
worth the cost in efficiency and selfdetermination. The security of liberal
democracies from the common threat
of radical Islamic terrorism demands
solidarity, consultation, and compromise, not more brinksmanship and
alienation. The war on terror could
last forty-eight years, not forty-eight
months, and even the military behemoth United States cannot go it alone
in a fight this long, extensive, and
wide-ranging.
Overall, Gordon and Shapiro’s argument that the alliance is worth protecting and preserving is sound. This is a
book for security professionals serious
about examining the future of U.S. relations with the group of well resourced
and well respected nations that have
been longest our steadfast friends,

145

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

142

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

rather than indulging in oversimplified
truisms regarding French and German
national courage and gratitude for American participation in the world wars, the
Marshall Plan, and the Cold War.
ROB BRACKNELL

Major, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe
Staff Judge Advocate, USA,
Al Anbar Province, Iraq

Klare, Michael T. Blood and Oil: The Dangers and
Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency
on Imported Petroleum. New York: Henry Holt,
2004. 265 pp. $25

In Blood and Oil, Professor Michael
Klare of Hampshire College offers an
important critique of U.S. national security policy, one that should be read
by American security professionals. In
brief, he argues that U.S. foreign and
military policy has been increasingly
driven by the need to ensure reliable access to foreign oil, especially in the
Middle East, and that as American foreign oil dependence continues to grow,
U.S. forces will increasingly find themselves fighting to defend oil-producing
regions and supply routes.
An engaging writer, Klare develops his
thesis as follows. After documenting
the substantial and growing U.S. dependence on foreign oil and the problems it
has created, Klare describes the increasing involvement of the United States in
the Middle East since World War II,
particularly its close ties with Saudi
Arabia, and the negative consequences
of this involvement for American security. The next two chapters detail the
latest phase of this unfolding story; they
analyze the energy strategy adopted by
the Bush administration in 2001,
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pointing out how it has only reinforced
U.S. dependence on foreign oil, especially from the Persian Gulf, and they
describe the administration’s policies
toward the region. A fifth chapter discusses the prospects for diversifying
foreign oil supplies, concluding that
this approach offers little hope of reducing U.S. reliance on the Gulf even
though it would increase the chances of
American entanglement in conflicts
elsewhere, while a sixth describes how
U.S. oil dependence may increasingly
bring this country into conflict with
Russia and China. The final chapter
summarizes the costs of oil dependence.
It all too briefly sets forth an alternative
national energy strategy of “autonomy
and integrity,” which emphasizes detaching our pursuit of energy from security commitments to foreign
governments, reducing oil consumption, and hastening the development of
alternative energy sources.
Overall, Klare performs a valuable public service by shining a spotlight on the
national security consequences of U.S.
foreign oil dependence, consequences
that have often gone underappreciated.
A central theme is how American leaders have chosen to “securitize” oil—that
is, “to cast its continued availability as a
matter of ‘national security,’ and thus
something that can be safeguarded
through the use of military force.” The
book is very well documented, with
forty-five pages of notes, including references to a number of primary sources.
Some of Klare’s claims may seem shrill
or speculative, in part because they are
so rarely voiced, but they nevertheless
bear careful consideration. Perhaps
most controversial will be his description of the current U.S. policy toward
the Gulf. “In the months before and
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after 9/11,” he argues, “the Bush administration fashioned a comprehensive strategy for American domination
of the Persian Gulf and the procurement of ever-increasing quantities of
petroleum.” This “strategy of maximum extraction” involved three
goals—the stabilization of Saudi Arabia, the removal of Saddam Hussein
and his replacement with a stable government capable of substantially boosting oil output, and the escalation of
pressure on Iran in the hopes of producing a favorable leadership change
there as well.
As important and overlooked as oil has
been as a determinant of U.S. strategy
toward the region, this characterization
of the Bush administration’s policies
may appear simplistic given the various
other motives offered, such as nonproliferation, antiterrorism, and Israel’s
security. In particular, given the title of
the book, the connection between energy concerns and the invasion of Iraq
would have benefited from more thorough analysis. As it is, Klare devotes
just one page to an explicit discussion
of the administration’s oil-related motives for ousting Saddam. As indirect
evidence, he points to U.S. efforts to
seize Iraq’s oil facilities at the outset of
the war, but this overlooks the equally
plausible goal of ensuring that postwar
Iraq could finance its own reconstruction.
Ultimately, Klare’s argument is largely
structural in nature, but it is also a
powerful one that cannot be easily dismissed. As he notes in the preface,
“Since cheap oil is essential to the nation’s economic vigor, American leaders, of whatever party affiliation, have
felt compelled to do whatever was necessary to ensure that enough was available to satisfy our ever-expanding
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requirements.” As the competition for
oil intensifies, what is deemed necessary
could well be increasingly a military
response.
JOHN DUFFIELD

Department of Political Science
Georgia State University

Cronin, Audrey Kurth, and James M. Ludes, eds.
Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press,
2004. 320pp. $26.95

This volume is a much-needed tonic.
Attacking Terrorism—a somewhat bellicose title, since most of the articles included recognize the need for a carefully
calibrated response to terrorism—is a
diverse collection of focused and evenhanded assessments of the military,
diplomatic, economic, and legal tools
available to confront the problem.
Cronin, a terrorism specialist with the
Congressional Research Service and an
adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and Ludes, a former editor in
chief of National Security Studies Quarterly, selected their contributors well.
The diversity of expertise this volume
offers affords it a broad perspective on
counterterrorism strategies.
Lindsay Clutterbuck offers an exploration of a legal approach to combating
terrorism (including illuminating discussions of British and European Union
practices); she concludes that it is best
to combine the legal and military elements of the struggle rather than approach counterterrorism solely as a
war. Striking a similar note, Timothy
Hoyt argues that the “use of military
force may prove spectacularly unsuccessful if it is not carefully correlated
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with political objectives.” Yet he argues
that it is “indisputable” that we have
entered into a war with al-Qa‘ida. Hoyt
makes the point that the terrorists’
campaign meets Clausewitz’s definition
of a “continuation of policy by other
means,” and that the American response
will likely involve the use of military
force over “many years.” He also observes, however, that the elusive nature
of terrorist organizations raises serious
obstacles to employing military force to
counteract them.
In a well-timed essay, Paul Pillar offers
an excellent overview of the intelligence
challenges peculiar to terrorist organizations. He notes there is grave danger in a rush to reform following an
event such as 9/11. “A couple of wellpublicized mistakes . . . become the
basis for a widely expressed belief—
repeated unquestioningly by scores of
commentators—that ‘the FBI and the
CIA don’t communicate with each
other.’ ” (Ironically, Cronin echoes exactly this criticism of interagency communication in her conclusion.)
Carnes Lord offers a penetrating chapter on the opportunities and, more tellingly, the difficulties involved in what
he terms “psychological-political instruments.” While Lord is certainly correct that we must not “write off the
West’s assets in this contest,” one finds
oneself grimly concurring with Fouad
Ajami’s assessment of public diplomacy’s prospects: “It’s hopeless. We
will not get a hearing.” Lord claims the
key task is not to sell democracy but to
undermine radical Islam. Patrick
Cronin also argues that “foreign aid
triage” will certainly be of use in this regard. This aid will be urgently needed
to “strengthen general order, moderate
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institutions, and influential community
and national leaders” in order to combat terrorism over the long term.
Martha Crenshaw reviews both counterterrorism strategy and the interaction
between terrorism and security scholars
over the past two decades. She observes
that “al-Qaeda evolved under specific
and perhaps unique historical circumstances; the assumption that al-Qaeda
will be a model for future terrorism
may be incorrect.” Daniel Gouré remarks that the American homeland security strategy is “a pell-mell rush” that
lacks an obvious attempt to “provide a
risk assessment that would rank order
threats.”
Audrey Kurth Cronin herself supplies
two excellent pieces. The volume opens
with her survey of the four “levels of
analysis” of terrorism—the individual,
the group or organization, the state,
and the international system. Her structured exploration of the problem is
much needed. She rounds out the volume with a chapter on what might be
called “grand counterterrorism strategy.” Cronin calls for an assessment of
each potential target’s relative involvement in terrorism, and not a strategy
that reflexively attacks “states that do
not control the current wave of terrorism.” Our integration of counterterrorism tools is in “an extremely
primitive state.” She concludes with the
observation that “positive power” (aid,
reconstruction efforts, and image enhancement) is an essential element of a
balanced counterterrorism strategy.
“This position is not naiveté or liberalism but pragmatism.”
ANDREW L. STIGLER

Naval War College
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Ullman, Harlan. Finishing Business: Ten Steps to
Defeat Global Terror. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004, 241pp. $29.95

Harlan Ullman’s new book, Finishing
Business: Ten Steps to Defeat Global Terror, is a worthy read for Americans concerned with the long-term security of
our country. It focuses on two areas:
understanding what Ullman considers
to be the most important near- and
long-term threats to the United States,
and a strategy to defeat the challenge.
Ullman uses the term “jihadist extremism” to identify the threat. In the foreword, Newt Gingrich says of Ullman,
“He begins by correctly noting that the
global war on terror is a misnomer. The
real threat to America comes from an
irreconcilable Islamist faction that has a
coherent worldview and a very clear
strategy.”
In the introductory chapter Ullman is
more specific: “In blunt terms, the bulk
of the danger—modern variants of the
Soviet Union and Nazi Germany—that
threatens this nation and much of the
world emanates from radical Islam and
the potential realities and excesses that
fuel it. Jihadist extremists have hijacked
Islam. Osama bin Laden and others like
him, reminiscent of the extremists and
anarchists of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, are using this
perversion of Islam as a revolutionary
ideology. Their purpose, like Lenin’s
and Trotsky’s, is to seize power. Terror
is the tactic. Its purpose is to terrorize.
Furthermore, these extremists share a
common geography—the crescent of
crisis that runs from the eastern Mediterranean to the Bay of Bengal and then
to the eastern tip of Indonesia.
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“The end state for bin Laden is some
form of fundamentalist regime banked
by Saudi oil money and armed with Pakistani nuclear weapons. Whether this
regime will require a host state as Bolshevism did or if it can be borderless is
unclear. The appeal of this theocratic
formula stretches across much of the Islamic world. However, Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan are potential dominoes in
this battle, as well as key targets of Islamic extremists.”
To further accentuate the threat, in
chapter 3 Ullman quotes a portion of
Osama Bin Laden’s “letter to the American people” published in the London
Observer on 24 November 2002. The
quote includes Bin Laden’s rationale for
targeting Americans anywhere in the
world as originally decreed in his, and
his associates’, 23 February 1998 fatwa,
“Jihad against Jews and Crusaders.” Although not cited or quoted by Ullman,
the fatwa says in part, “On that basis,
and in compliance with Allah’s order,
we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and
their allies—civilians and military—is
an individual duty for every Muslim
who can do it in any country in which it
is possible to do it.” Although the book
does an admirable job of helping readers understand the characteristics of the
current threat, other sources, such as
chapter 2 of The 9/11 Commission Report, will be useful for gaining a fuller
understanding of the historical roots of
the theology and thinking that drive
“jihadist extremism.”
In the introduction to chapter 1, “From
Destruction to Disruption,” Ullman
raises the question of why our powerful
country is less secure today than perhaps at any time since the Civil War.
His answer is that extremist groups can
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be expected to strike frequently to disrupt society, the strikes will be difficult
to identify and stop, and a progressively
more integrated world will continue to
foster easier access and more effective
networks.
In chapters 4 through 7, Ullman deals
with a wide range of strategy options
for dealing with the threat. His focus is
on the causes of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict; autocratic rule in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, and Egypt; the IndianPakistani conflict over Kashmir; and the
proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
In the final chapter (chapter 8), Ullman
does an excellent job of pulling his
thoughts together and summarizing elements of a countervailing strategy
that are addressed individually in the
earlier parts of the book. They include
international considerations such as a
revised alliance system as well as domestic recommendations involving
Congress, the Department of Defense,
the intelligence community, and national security education. Overall the
chapter presents a comprehensive and
well thought out approach for tackling
the threat of Islamic extremism. As
such, it overcomes a minor distraction
of earlier chapters, where the author
occasionally digresses from his central
focus to provide possibly unnecessary
background information.
Overall, I recommend the book to any
reader concerned with Islamic extremism. Much has been written about the
subject, but Ullman is to be commended for his contribution to our understanding of the challenge and for his
wide-ranging and insightful suggestions
for a countervailing strategy.

Ferguson, Charles D., William C. Potter, et al. The
Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey, Calif.:
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2004.
378pp. $19.95

Only readers well prepared for a sobering analysis of the likelihood of the use
of nuclear materials by terrorists and its
consequences should read this book.
The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism
stands alone as a realistic and scientific
treatment of a dire threat. It is well researched, credible, and easily understood
despite delving into nuclear physics.
The authors, all with impeccable credentials, have effectively framed their
discussions around four situations that
chillingly illustrate how nuclear materials may find their way into a devastating weapon of mass destruction.
Each of the “four faces” is a distinct scenario of nuclear terrorism and a frightening apparition of what our nation
confronts. The first example is theft and
detonation of an intact nuclear weapon,
without question the most worrisome,
followed secondly by theft or purchase
of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear
weapon or, as the authors say, an “improvised nuclear device.” The third example is an attack on, or sabotage of,
nuclear installations, causing the release
of large amounts of radioactivity. The
final manifestation is terrorist dispersal
of highly radioactive material by conventional explosives, commonly referred
to as a “dirty bomb” or, in the authors’
words, a “radiological dispersion device.” For each of these calamitous circumstances, the authors provide a
cacophony of story lines, any one of
which would make a riveting movie.

HENRY C. BARTLETT, JR.

Naval War College
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The writers cleverly create an analytic
framework to examine the four “faces”
of nuclear terrorism. This probing methodology includes looking at a causative
chain of events leading to the acquisition and detonation of a mass-casualty
weapon incorporating nuclear material;
terrorist motivations and capabilities to
achieve nuclear potential; transfer of
radiological materials by force, intimidation, collusion, insider assistance, or
as a gift by rogue states; defeating safeguards on the physical protection of
fissile material or safeguards against unauthorized detonation of a nuclear
device; undetected transportation of a
device to the target; and lastly, consequence management of an undeterred
terrorist nuclear attack.
Although the authors distinguish between the four scenarios, their analysis
of underlying factors is often unnecessarily repetitive. Indeed, conclusions
are lifted verbatim from previous chapters—understandably, since patterns of
illegal activity often mirror each other,
regardless of criminal goal. This frequent redundancy undermines the argument that there are four distinct
paradigms relating to nuclear terrorism.
Nevertheless, skillful incorporation of
case studies helps to discriminate the
authors’ definitions.
The book does a less effective job of assessing the security environment. Chapter 1 states, “Risk can be defined as the
probability of an event multiplied by its
consequences . . . the greater the probability [emphasis added] or the greater
the consequences, the higher the overall
risk.” A more complete analysis of risk,
however, should consider factors of
vulnerability and threat with more
specificity. Probability, as the authors
use the word, may implicitly consider
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threat, foreseeability, and vulnerability,
but alone is inadequate to capture the
challenge of assessing risk. The book asserts that all four scenarios “pose potentially grave and imminent dangers”
and America “must work to address all
of them.” Risk analysis is designed to
prioritize resources and energy. Unfortunately, however, the book’s conclusions do not offer much in the way of
clear focus when all four faces are
equally serious. In case the reader is not
convinced of a nuclear terrorist threat,
the authors declare, “Given the significant quantities of radioactive material
currently outside regulatory control
around the world, the unambiguous evidence of terrorist interest in using
these materials to cause harm, and the
ease of carrying out a radiological attack, we believe that such an attack is all
but inevitable.” So much for risk
assessment.
In contrast, a particularly superb treatment of the most frightening development—that of a terrorist group
acquiring an intact nuclear weapon—is
found in chapter 3. This authoritative
discussion of deteriorating nuclear security in Russia is at the same time candid and grave. The authors offer an
intriguing juxtaposition between the
ominous threat of huge Cold War intercontinental ballistic missiles and today’s
menace of small, portable nuclear
weapons. Thoughtful readers will not
miss the implications that “the good old
days” of the Soviet menace made risk
assessment less risky.
Despite some drawbacks, this book effectively leads confused scientific neophytes toward clarity in dealing with
the threat of nuclear terrorism. It describes solutions in ways that allow
homeland security professionals to
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begin crafting prescriptive implementation plans. However, as with many of
the challenges to defeat terrorism, convincing the public to expend limited resources is the first hurdle. The Four
Faces of Nuclear Terrorism is a terrific
attempt to do just that.
JEFFREY H. NORWITZ

Naval War College

Cook, Martin L. The Moral Warrior: Ethics and
Service in the U.S. Military. Albany: State Univ. of
New York Press, 2004. 172pp. $54.40

Martin L. Cook’s most recent offering
covers a wide variety of subjects, including a framework for just wars, military officers’ professional qualities,
humanitarian interventions, and a historical analysis of strategic bombing.
Cook previously taught for sixteen
years in the Department of Religious
Studies, Santa Clara University, and then
as professor of ethics for five years at the
U.S. Army War College. Since July 2003,
he has served as the deputy department
head of the Philosophy Department at
the U.S. Air Force Academy. Cook has
written numerous scholarly articles and
two books: Saving the Earth: A History
of a Middle-Class Millenarian Movement
with Steven Gelber, and The Open Circle: Confessional Method in Theology.
The first chapter describes eight criteria
that civilian policy makers can use to
determine whether it is morally justified to go to war. The main tenets of
just war doctrine represent a culmination of accepted constraints going back
to the time of St. Augustine (AD 354–
430). Cook labels them as “just cause,
legitimate authority, public declaration,
just intent, proportionality, last resort,
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reasonable hope of success, and end of
peace.” A war can earn the title of just
war only when it meets these constraints when it is initiated (jus ad
bellum) and when it is justly conducted
(jus in bello). The responsibility for jus
in bello falls primarily upon the military
leadership. The military recommends
“the rules of engagement, choice of
weapons and targets, treatment of civilian populations and prisoners of war,
and so forth.” The just-war framework
will not produce “moral certainty,” but
it will provide civilian and military
leadership a framework to evaluate the
decision to go to war, as well as a guide
for conducting the war.
Cook also describes some professional
qualities required of military officers.
They must be subordinate to civilian
leadership, have integrity, and provide
professional military advice based on
professional knowledge. He writes,
“The military has a significant resistance to embracing operation-otherthan-war missions in general.” Cook
maintains that the military must be able
to see clearly the changing environment
and develop the intellectual agility to
adapt to it. Some of the chapters, written just after Kosovo and before 9/11,
argue that humanitarian operations are
the new strategic environment. (Assuming the next war will be similar to
the last one is a common trap.) Much
of the book focuses on the challenges of
humanitarian intervention. Cook writes
that “the decision to initiate hostilities
over Kosovo was unjustified and unwise.” He further states: “Humanitarian
causes and human rights were cited to
‘trump’ Serbian sovereignty. The action
itself was not authorized by any resolution of the UN Security Council.” He
seems to believe there is not an effective
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international authority. Without a
recognized legitimate international authority, he declares, future humanitarian wars will be conducted unilaterally
or by a coalition.
Another chapter describes the intent of
area bombing campaigns as either to
target the “enemy’s capability to conduct military operations” or to “terrorize civilian populations and demoralize
enemy citizens.” While today it is not
politically correct to target civilians deliberately, the author believes any targeting of the enemy’s infrastructure
could have a disproportionately negative
effect on innocent civilians. The consequences of bombing now—the loss of
clean water, heat, medical care, and
food—would surely be death later. In
addition, Cook states, that new precision
targeting may tempt political leaders to
use force early, instead of as a last resort.
The short, seven-page chapter on “Resisting Global Terrorism” briefly describes the challenges of applying the
just-war framework to terrorism. Since
al-Qa‘ida is not a sovereign state and
war is waged only against states, does
the United States have the legitimate
authority to curb terrorist organizations throughout the world? Is there a
reasonable hope of success? Cook suggests that the former model of state sovereignty for the just-war framework
must be adapted when dealing with terrorism, because terrorism is not necessarily a threat to a single state but to
our civilization’s world order. I would
have liked Cook to expand his thoughts
on modifications to the just-war framework for terrorism.
What moral direction should the United
States take now that it is the sole remaining superpower? What is the
proper role of professional military
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advice from an ethical and practical
viewpoint? Why is force protection so
imperative in humanitarian operations?
Is the desire for human rights and democratic governments universally shared?
Can we assume that the trend towards
globalization will make it “irrational for
large-scale interstate warfare”? These are
a few of the thought-provoking questions that are discussed in this book.
Of the nine chapters, eight have been
previously published. This may account
for the lack of smooth flow among the
numerous themes. Those interested in
just-war theory will find this book an
interesting read, but in our post-9/11
environment, this extensive treatment
of “humanitarian war” has lost some of
its post-Kosovo luster.
CYNTHIA PERROTTI

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Retired

Moore, John Norton. Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace. Durham, N.C.:
Carolina Academic, 2003. 212pp. $40

Solving the War Puzzle may be the most
insightful and important examination
of the causes of war since Clausewitz
published On War in 1832. This slim
volume, precisely written, superbly
researched, and elegantly presented,
carefully evaluates, integrates, and synthesizes the multiple elements the confluence of which results in armed
conflict. This presentation is then used
as a basis for choosing reasonable indices
for the deterrence of interstate violence.
The broader international system is reviewed in terms of the government
structures involved, the incentives presented to decision makers, and an examination of whether these structures
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coupled with the totality of external incentives enable or constrain high-risk
behavior that can lead to conflict.
The construct of war avoidance is further addressed by examining the nature
of specific governments involved—intercourse between well established democratic nations, between democracies
and nondemocracies, and between nondemocratic states. By reference to historical examples and by examining the
factors that influence the conduct of
states, Moore concludes that the nature
of the government alone may not be
nearly as important in creating effective
deterrence as the aggregate of external
incentives, “which may be high or low,
adequate or inadequate.”
In concluding that the best theory of
war avoidance will use the “full human
arsenal of insights against war,” Moore
carefully identifies the entire quiver of
measures available to decision makers
to achieve security. These include but
are not limited to: diplomacy, the existence of unequal power between adversaries, the willingness to precommit
forces to a troubled area, the existence
of arms control agreements, and mutual participation in international organizations. Similarly, Moore carefully
analyzes those factors that influence the
leadership elite to employ the military
instrument—the absence of democracy,
the absence of effective deterrence, and
most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both.
The “incentive theory” is further tested
in its application to instances of terrorist violence, specifically to the U.S. response to the 9/11 attack by al-Qa‘ida,
and finally, to the 2003 war with Iraq.
Arguing that assessing and influencing
the incentives of the decision elite who
run terror networks may be even more
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effective than terror, Moore suggests
that extremists will no longer choose to
pursue it. Arguing that the incentive
theory fits the Afghan War “like a glove,”
Moore also posits that had Saddam
Hussein focused more clearly on the incentives affecting President George W.
Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, he
would have understood that his only
opportunity to avoid war was a highly
visible effort to achieve full compliance
with Security Council resolutions.
In assessing the way forward, the author
urges the positive consequences for foreign policy of a paradigm rooted in the
importance of internal and external incentives. As long as incentives within
certain nations do not properly operate
to control these scourges, incentives
must be supplied externally. Moore
argues that by considering the operation
of collective security in deterrence terms,
created through effective incentives, an
essential element of foreign policy can
be both preserved and enhanced.
JAMES P. TERRY

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired

Flanagan, Stephen J., and Michael E. Marti, eds.
The People’s Liberation Army and China in Transition. Washington, D.C.: National Defense
Univ., 2003. 364pp. $34.50

Based on an October 2001 conference
at the National Defense University, but
published with revised papers two years
later, this collection of seemingly miscellaneous essays all too often either
misses the mark completely or treats
only very lightly a long list of potential
U.S.-Chinese problems.
After an introduction, the book is divided into six sections examining
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respectively, China’s fourth-generation
leadership, growing nationalism, military trends, key policy challenges,
U.S.-China military relations, and, finally, future options for U.S.-China
relations.
Part 1 includes essays by Bates Gill and
David Shambaugh. Although these
chapters are well written, many of the
political leaders and structural issues
they describe in such detail have
changed since they were submitted. For
example, Jiang Zemin did resign, and
many indicators suggest that he did so
unwillingly. Jiang’s remaining power
base, or guanxi network, may therefore
be severely limited. Meanwhile, the
membership of important structural
bodies such as the Central Military
Commission, rather than going down
from eleven to eight and staying there,
was later increased from eight to thirteen, thereby giving Hu Jintao crucial
support to retire Jiang Zemin.
The dangers inherent in Chinese nationalism are discussed in chapters by
Nan Li and Edward Friedman. Li’s essay, in particular, gives real insight in
his discussion of the continuing importance of “face” in China. This cultural
characteristic, he argues, can have an
enormous impact on how Chinese assess their enemies: “To save face, or not
to lose it, for instance, the incentive is
not only to show self-righteousness or
all the good, positive, and strong points
of the self but also to show the evil, negative, and weak points of the other,”
which can result in “an exaggeration of
the strength of the self and the weakness of the enemy.” When joined with
the Maoist idea of “voluntarism, which
stresses the power of the mind and consciousness that can overcome obstacles
of material conditions,” the two can
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create a deadly combination in which
the “PLA strategic analyses may reflect
not the balance of forces in the real
world but rather an overestimation of
PLA strength and an underestimation
of the adversary’s abilities.” Friedman
adds to this dire warning by stressing:
“The political atmosphere in this China
precludes accurate descriptions of Japan, America, or Taiwan and makes
self-interested, common-sense compromises by the Chinese government seem,
to many Chinese, to be virtual treason.”
James Mulvenon, Bernard Cole,
Richard Fisher, and Richard Bitzinger
contribute worthy essays describing
Chinese military reforms, naval and air
units, and the level of military expenditure. Although technically sound and
informative, these essays reflect the extreme fluidity in China’s military modernization. It is potentially dangerous
to predict China’s strategic behavior
solely by observing her military. Cole,
for example, even while concluding that
China’s navy is focused mainly against
any “East Asian force that stands in the
way of achieving China’s objectives in
the region,” appropriately hedges his
bets in an endnote (no. 21) by admitting that China might also consider it a
“justified risk” to fight the United
States if it feels “backed into a corner.”
Fischer, meanwhile, takes the bull by
the horns when he warns that the air
force “could gain a measure of superiority on the Taiwan Strait after 2005.”
Key policy challenges are examined by
David Finkelstein, Cynthia Watson,
John Tkacik, Eugene Rummer, Kevin
Neader, and Howard Krawitz. Taken
together, the contradictions and potential flash points discussed in these
essays present a scary picture, with
Watson admitting that if ordered to do
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so the People’s Liberation Army would
“likely choose the historical responsibility of keeping Taiwan part of China”;
Thacik counters that the Taiwanese
“will not permit an accommodation of
China’s demands that Taiwan become
subordinate to Beijing.” This standoff is
a recipe for disaster, but one that is all
too often obscured and glossed over
rather than highlighted.
Finally, U.S.-China military relations
are addressed by Paul Godwin and Alfred Wilhelm, Jr., while U.S.-China relations in general are outlined by
Richard Thornton and David Lai. These
authors again present a mixed bag, with
Godwin warning of a U.S.-Chinese “escalation dynamic expanding the scope
of the war beyond the intent of either
adversary”; Wilhelm calling for removing “all remaining military-related
sanctions on the PRC” and promoting
increased military-to-military talks;
Thornton advocating measures to
“curb” Chinese ambitions “now before
China becomes too strong to control
and we find ourselves on the path to
war ”; and Lai arguing that the China
threat has been “overblown.” Since the
book does not include a much-needed
conclusion to sort through this morass,
or an index to assist in locating particular topics of interest, the reader is left
with the unfortunate impression that
the experts could not agree with each
other, much less with the editors, on
what final message they should present
to their audience.
While many essays in this book are
quite good, they do not work well as a
whole. One is left with the feeling that
the editors published whatever they
were given, with one essay on the air
force numbering almost forty pages,
while a scant four pages are devoted to
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China’s all-important relations with
Russia, where the bulk of the PLA’s
most deadly weapons are purchased.
Furthermore, there is no chapter devoted specifically to Sino-Japanese relations, though various authors admit
that Japan is China’s nearest great
power and maritime rival. Equally relevant topics not raised by this book include rising tensions over North Korea;
China’s space program and the rapid
growth of its missile forces; territorial
disputes in the South China Sea; and
the U.S.-led efforts with Japan, and
perhaps even Taiwan, to build theater
and national missile defense. For these
reasons, this book falls short as an examination of the true nature of U.S.Chinese relations.
BRUCE ELLEMAN

Naval War College

Merom, Gil. How Democracies Lose Small Wars:
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria,
Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003,
295pp. $22.99

In this work, Gil Merom, an assistant
professor of political science at Tel Aviv
University, sets forth an intriguing
proposition based on case studies of
conflicts occurring in the second half of
the twentieth century. Democracies, he
argues, fail to win small wars because,
as democracies, they are unable to bear
either the casualties, particularly from
among the “educated middle class,”
that such wars produce or the brutality
winning such wars requires. If valid, the
implications of proving such a hypothesis are significant. For starters, a hard
blow would be dealt to the international relations school of realism and its
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offshoots. These models tend to view
relative national power, especially military power, as the primary determinant of
military success—a tenet that Merom’s
conclusions seem to refute. To the contrary, his findings would seem to offer
substantial vindication to analysts and
scholars who believe constituencies in a
democratic society’s domestic political
system are the true drivers of such a
state’s international behavior.
While important to political scientists
and international relations scholars,
Merom’s question could not be more
timely for national leaders struggling to
advance their interests in the real world,
for his work suggests that an entire
family of conflict is not likely to be won
by democracies. It would therefore follow that democracies should either
avoid small wars altogether, strike and
win before public opinion can react, or
handle these conflicts with nonmilitary
instruments. Put more bluntly, it would
imply that the United States may be
unable to secure victory in either the
Middle East or Central Asia, because
the American people will not condone
the type of action required to win these
wars and keep casualties low. Merom
includes the intentional targeting of
noncombatants, the use of concentration camps, intentional deprivation of
food and water to a civilian population, forced exile, torture, and indiscriminate bombing as some of the
brutal means traditionally used to win
small wars.
It is impossible not to see similarities
between Merom’s case studies and current U.S. operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq. However, a closer reading reveals not only significant questions but
weaknesses concerning Merom’s work.
First, it rapidly becomes apparent that
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his case studies involve counterinsurgencies, not the much broader
spectrum of conflict to which the term
“small wars” refers. Thus the successful
invasions of Grenada, Panama, and
Haiti are not examined. Neither are
such successful limited interventions
as the French operations ARTEMIS and
TOURQUOISE in Africa, the British in
Sierra Leone, or the United States in
Liberia. In fact, Merom focuses on
guerrilla warfare, a type of small war
identified by C. E. Callwell, who wrote
the book on small wars in the eighteenth
century, as “the most unfavorable shape
which a campaign [can] take for the
regular troops.”
The need for brutal measures to ensure
victory is also an assumption that deserves to be challenged. Merom does
not make the case that the only way to
win against a counterinsurgency is
through such methods. While he identifies several historical examples of great
powers embracing brutal methods to
defeat insurgencies in the past, he does
not prove that they made the difference
between victory and defeat. Nor does he
prove that such measures must be part
of a future winning arsenal.
There are also problems with his selection of cases. Merom chose three failed
counterinsurgencies to make his point;
however, Malaya in the 1950s, Greece
in the 1940s, and Central America in
the 1980s and 1990s would seem to offer obvious historical counterexamples
to Merom’s thesis. Interestingly,
Merom, on one page and in one footnote, acknowledges the existence of the
British involvement in Malaya, but he
does not identify this conflict as a successful postwar counterinsurgency. Thus
it would seem unwarranted at this point
to claim that Merom’s conclusions
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apply to all small wars, or even to all
counterinsurgencies.
A related if less telling criticism is that
the three selected conflicts are clearly
grouped at the more robust end of the
small-wars spectrum. The size of a war
may be measured by intensity (number
of deaths over a given time), duration
(amount of time over which killing occurs), or scale (number of total deaths).
Other units of measure could be fiscal
cost, percentage of armed forces engaged, or the extent to which a state’s
vital national interests are at risk. None
of the wars Merom looks at were quick,
low-cost affairs. Perhaps they should
not be included in the “small war” category at all.
That said, this book is not without
merit. It certainly suggests several areas
for future research. Of these, one of the
more intriguing would be the use of locally recruited military forces as a
means to achieve victory in counterinsurgencies and other forms of small
wars without generating adverse domestic public opinion. Such forces have
traditionally had key roles in small wars
throughout history. Merom’s findings
suggest that the need for such units may
be bigger than ever.
When it comes to the specific cases of
Vietnam, Algeria, and Lebanon,
Merom’s scholarship and argument are
convincing. Public opinion and war fatigue, aversion to casualties, and refusal
to endorse certain methods of warfare
clearly impacted national decision making in these cases. Merom demonstrates
that forces unleashed in the various domestic political systems examined in
this study had a profound impact on
war prosecution and termination. Any
scholar wishing to understand these
conflicts in deeper detail should read
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the appropriate chapters of this book.
Again, it should be noted that it is impossible not to see similarities between
these cases and current U.S. operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The potential for such domestically
driven forces to impact national security policy is clearly something that
should be of interest to any modern
political-military leader or scholar. For,
as this review is being published, U.S.
and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are determinedly attempting
to defeat counterinsurgencies while trying to avoid initiating the forces Merom
examines. So while Merom’s work does
not provide the key to the problem of
counterinsurgency, it does seem to provide at least a significant piece of the
puzzle.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

Ambrose, Stephen E. To America: Personal Reflections of an Historian. New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2003. 288pp. $24

The United States is the richest and
most powerful country in the world.
Yet over two hundred years ago it began as thirteen colonies at the edge of a
continental wilderness. Stephen
Ambrose, an eminent historian and
skilled writer, has used this short, readable book to explain how the United
States made this amazing transformation. He attributes its success as a nation to the American spirit.
The American spirit originated with the
founding fathers and was further developed by presidents Andrew Jackson,
Ulysses S. Grant, Franklin and Theodore
Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.
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It is based on the notions of justice,
equality, and the rule of law and fundamental fairness, and embraces the ability to recognize and correct the ills of
society.
At home the American spirit has been
the driving force behind the U.S. Constitution, civil rights, women’s rights,
the rights of Native Americans, the
denouncing of imperialism, the end of
racial segregation, and concern for the
environment. Abroad, it has brought
democracy to former enemies.
This slim, modest volume is an autobiography as well as an interesting summary of Ambrose’s thesis. He displays
an admirable open-mindedness and
willingness to change his position in
light of changing circumstances, although he frequently disagrees with the
academic orthodoxy, and with refreshing candor.
Ambrose’s life as a historian was truly
remarkable. He was the author of a
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sterling biography of Eisenhower and
the editor of his papers, as well as the
biographer of Richard M. Nixon. From
1969 to 1970 he held the Ernest J. King
Chair of Maritime History at the Naval
War College, and in his later years
Ambrose was the founder of the National D-Day Museum.
Ambrose was a first-class writer. His
list of published works is truly remarkable. Primarily an expert on World
War II, he had a tremendous respect
for junior officers and enlisted personnel, for whom he had developed
great admiration.
Shortly before his untimely death in
2002, Ambrose ended this compelling
volume with these words: “That [American] Spirit got us through September
11, 2001 and it will see us through the
future.”
B. MITCHELL SIMPSON III

Editor, Naval War College Review, 1975–77
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“World War II: Pacific,” one of a series of high reliefs at the
Naval War College by the late Felix de Weldon, sculptor of the
Marine Corps Memorial in Arlington, Virginia
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The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty Years of
Service, edited by Barbara Bicksler,
Curtis Gilroy, and John Warner. Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2004. 384pp. $27
Battle of the Bulge: Hitler’s Alternate
Scenarios, edited by Peter Tsouras.
Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole,
2004. 256pp. $34.95
Beachhead Assault: The Story of the
Royal Naval Commandos in World War
II, by David Lee. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole, 2004. 272pp. $34.95
The German Fleet at War, 1939–1945,
by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2004. 308pp.
$32.95

Hitler’s Secret Headquarters: The
Führer’s Wartime Bases from the Invasion of France to the Berlin Bunker, by
Franz W. Seidler and Dieter Zeigert.
Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole,
2004. 256pp. $39.95
Luftwaffe over America: The Secret Plans
to Bomb the United States in World War
II, by Manfred Griehl. Mechanicsburg,
Penna.: Stackpole, 2004. $34.95
The Reconstruction of Warriors:
Archibald McIndoe, the Royal Air Force
and the Guinea Pig Club, by E. R.
Mayhew. Mechanicsburg, Penna.:
Stackpole, 2004. 239pp. $34.95

Hitler’s Grey Wolves: U-boats in the
Indian Ocean, by Lawrence Paterson.
Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stackpole,
2004. 287pp. $34.95

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:39 PM

161

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 2, Art. 1

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/1

C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Spring 2005.vp
Thursday, March 17, 2005 3:23:39 PM

162

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College: Full Spring 2005 Issue

FROM THE EDITORS
SURFACE NAVY ASSOCIATION/NAVAL INSTITUTE LITERARY AWARD
Each year the Surface Navy Association (SNA), in Alexandria, Virginia, and the
U.S. Naval Institute, in Annapolis, Maryland, jointly recognize the author of the
best professional article addressing surface Navy or surface warfare issues published in the preceding year. This year, in what the SNA administrator describes
as an unusually large field of entries, both the winner and honorable mention
were chosen from the pages of the Naval War College Review. The winner was
“A Tale of Two Fleets: A Russian Perspective on the 1973 Naval Standoff in the
Mediterranean,” by Lyle J. Goldstein and Yuri M. Zhukov, from our Spring 2004
issue. “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,” by Ian Storey and You Ji, which appeared in Winter 2004, received honorable mention.
ERRATUM
The last paragraph of Dr. Bruce Elleman’s review of At Cross Purposes: U.S.Taiwan Relations since 1942, by Richard C. Bush, in our Winter 2005 issue (pages
161–63) should have begun: “As for what will happen in the future to this ‘one
China’ conundrum, Bush cautions that Taiwan’s recent democratic reforms
have now [vice not] given twelve million voting Taiwanese their own seat at the
table in any future cross-strait talks leading to Chinese reunification.” Our apologies for this editorial error.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) will hold its
annual conference 22–25 June 2005 at National Archives II in College Park,
Maryland. The theme for the conference is “The Past Is Never Far Away.” Participants are asked to consider ways in which diplomatic history, the history of foreign relations, and international affairs continue to inform our understanding
of the present. Anyone interested in registering may do so at the SHAFR website,
www.shafr.org. For additional information contact Sara Wilson, conference
coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.
STRATEGIC LANDPOWER ESSAY CONTEST 2005
The U.S. Army War College and the Army War College Foundation announce
the eighth annual Strategic Landpower essay contest. The topic of the essay must
relate to “the advancement of professional knowledge of the strategic role of
landpower in joint and multinational operations.” All are eligible to enter and
win except those involved in the judging. The Army War College Foundation
will award a prize of $1,500 to the author of the best essay and $500 to the runnerup. Contact Col. Michael Matheny, USA (Ret.), U.S. Army War College, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue,
Carlisle, PA 17013-5242; by telephone at (717) 2456-3459 (DSN 242-3459); or
by e-mail at michael.matheny@carlisls.army.mil.
THE EDWARD S. MILLER RESEARCH FELLOWSHIP IN
NAVAL HISTORY
The Naval War College Foundation intends to award one grant of $1,000 to the
researcher who has the greatest need and can make the optimum use of naval
history research materials located in the Naval War College’s Archives, Naval
Historical Collection, and Henry E. Eccles Library. A guide to the College’s
manuscript, archival, and oral history collections may be found on the Naval
War College’s website, www.nwc.navy.mil (click on “Library,” then “Library
Publications,” then “Naval Historical Collection”). Further information on the
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collections and copies of the registers for specific collections is available online
or by request from the Head, Naval Historical Collection, e-mail cherpake@
nwc.navy.mil.
The recipient will be a research fellow in the Naval War College’s Maritime
History Department, which will provide administrative support during the research visit. Submit a detailed research proposal that includes a statement of
need and a plan for optimal use of Naval War College materials, curriculum vitae,
at least one letter of recommendation, and relevant background information to
Miller Naval History Fellowship Committee, Naval War College Foundation, 686
Cushing Road, Newport, RI, 02841-1207, by 1 August 2005. For further information, contact the chair of the selection committee at hattendj@nwc.navy.mil.
Employees of the U.S. Naval War College or any agency of the U.S. Department
of Defense are not eligible for consideration; EEO/AA regulations apply.
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